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                                                                  ABSTRACT 
 
This study proceeds on the assumption that maternal discourse in the West, according to 
Kristeva, is repressed, which has resulted in the serious fracture of the mother-daughter 
relationship and seeks to isolate a restorative model in contemporary Chinese culture. 
Chapter One explores the feminist claim that this fractured relationship is the result of 
patriarchal oppressions (and the cause of twice as many women than men suffering 
depression) and attempts to reconcile feminist psychology with Kristeva‟s thesis that 
abjection per se is the cause of widespread depression among women. The next chapter 
delineates the features of a cross-cultural feminist analysis, which includes exploring notions 
of Foucaultian and Lacanian discourse, by situating gender as a tool within the context of 
feminist and postcolonial perspectives.  An argument is made that cinema is a privileged site 
to cull material from which to probe discourses on m/other and the thesis of a sunken 
maternal metaphor across all cinematic genres is demonstrated. Contemporary Chinese 
culture is scrutinized for possibly curative discourses and Bourdieu‟s idea of „rebel‟ and 
„orthodox‟ discourse models is employed to this end. After finding dominant discourse on 
gender in contemporary Chinese societies unsatisfactory for this purpose, I examine three 
contemporary Chinese films, with Gong Li as the female lead, in which I unearth two rebel 
discourses on m/otherhood. I argue that men and boys need to be encouraged to develop their 
aptitude and skills to nurture and care. This will allow women much needed space and time to 
come to terms with themselves and their own needs. In short, women and especially 
m/others, worn-out from guilt and expectations, are desperate for nurturance themselves. 
Keywords: Kristeva, maternal discourse, patriarchy, cross-cultural feminist analysis, 
gender, Chinese cinema, Gong Li, mother-daughter relationship, rebel/orthodox 
discourse 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a thought-provoking passage, Kristeva (1986a:163) relates that the historical course 
of Christianity enabled maternity (understood as the ability to carry a fetus and deliver 
a child at birth) to become absorbed into femininity (specifically Catholicism and the 
Eastern Orthodox branches), which is why the contemporary understanding of the 
latter concept is mothering/caring/nurturing. The linking of femininity with mothering 
is a “naturalizing” strategy of ideology in many contemporary cultures. 
 
With the secularization of Europe and other European diaspora communities around 
the globe, according to Kristeva, m/otherhood as a (dominant) discourse became 
eroded and for women who nevertheless wish to have that experience, the need for 
healthy discourse on maternity became apparent. Aside from the discursive neglect of 
m/otherhood, the jouissance (ecstatic joy) associated with motherhood is known to be 
suppressed (Kristeva 1982:39). I argue, taking my cue from Kristeva’s reasoning, that 
even if we do not wish to be m/others ourselves, our need for understanding the place 
of and coming to grips with the loss of our first love, M/other, is in itself a pressing 
need. As Lacan, reported by Stoltzfus (1996:5, 8, 10, 17), puts it so lyrically, our 
engagement with literature is a never-ending attempt, bound to fail again and again,  to 
return to the Garden of Eden, and clues to this task is hidden in the folds of the 
narrative text (the message from the unconscious). 
 
One of the legacies of the so-called dearth in discourse on the mother is the 
battle–scarred relationship between mothers and daughters in the West. Since this 
relationship is the hinge on which the construction of a woman’s psyche turns, at least 
in the West, its poor quality is a major cause of mental disease among women, 
depression and agoraphobia being cases in point, at least in the West. Jeanette 
Winterson (2012:103) gives us a vivid recollection of her almost unbelievably contra- 
nourishing relationship with her m/other.  
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We circled each other, wary, abandoned, full of longing. We came close but not 
close enough and then we pushed each other away forever. 
 
According to the authors of a feminist text on the psychology of women, Eichenbaum 
& Orbach (1988:40-41), the fractured relationship between mother and daughter is 
true for all women under conditions of patriarchal oppression(s). Since there is no 
space or time attached to their statement and it is essentially ahistorical, I have my 
reservations about the universal application of this psychological construct.  One 
reason, among others, why a cross-cultural (feminist) methodology is a good choice in 
looking for models in another culture (contemporary mainland China being the case in 
point, which might assist us in reviving/nourishing depleted discourse on m/othering 
in the West) is to possibly test that hypothesis cross-culturally.  
 
In Chapter Two I attempt to make out a rational argument for my preference of such a 
methodology over other worthy candidates, but reason cannot, of course, unearth the 
unconscious motives for (every) choice we make. Discourse is explained using the 
ideas of Foucault and Lacan as well as the rationale for using gender as a tool of 
analysis in my reading of three selected cinematic Chinese texts. 
 
Chapter Three is devoted to a brief overview of film theory, in the context of Freud’s 
notion of the inevitable return of the uncanny, specifically the reception of cinematic 
images by a gendered audience. In this chapter I also lay the foundations for 
understanding the neglected and suppressed (as well as repressed) discourse on 
mother as one such “uncanny returned” which is a theme I take up again in Chapter 
Five in the context of Žižek’s and Kracauer’s ideas on the wisdom of resurrecting the 
ghosts of abandoned revolutions (read: the return of the suppressed other[s].)   
 
In Chapter Four, utilizing the theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1977) on discourse as 
evincing both an orthodox nature and the capacity to engender rebel or dissenting 
discourses spawned in its wake, I attempt to outline a dominant discourse on gender, 
measured by the historical course Chinese society took over the past 150 years since 
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the First Opium War, concluded in 1842. As the dominant discourse on gender in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is found wanting and unsatisfactory, I seek out 
rebel discourse in that same society in the next chapter.  
 
In Chapter Five I read three cinematic texts (Chinese Mandarin soundtrack with 
English subtitles) in an attempt to uncover such rebel discourse on m/othering. In the 
first of two offerings, Zhang’s Raise the Red Lantern (1991), I examine the 
mother-daughter dyad by employing Phyllis Chesler’s idea that a woman’s 
relationship with any and every other woman is embedded in the relationship (good or 
bad) which she experienced with her mother, and having found that relationship ill-  
suited to our purposes, I take a closer look at the mother/son bond in Chinese societies 
as portrayed in The Curse of the Golden Flower  (2006). Because the features of the 
latter relationship is certainly suitable as a healthy model for possibly revitalizing the 
poor mother-daughter relations in the West (at least), I proceed to compare it (the 
generally good mother-son dyad in the Chinese societies) with one such good 
mother-daughter relationship in the West (that between the French novelist and short 
story writer Colette and her mother Sido). 
 
 Finally, in my reading of the last film directed by Zhang which I read, Yu Dou (1990), 
I shift the focus from the daughter’s perspective to that of the m/other, who is after all 
herself a legacy of a hurting and ill-nurtured daughter. Reading Yu Dou against the 
backdrop of Patrice Petro’s profound idea of the m/other taking the initiative to 
“return the look” of the eternal voyeur and thereby inaugurating a dissident discourse 
with an unusual take on the situation: compassion is evoked in the peeping tom for the 
bruised and needy female form.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
A FEMINIST APPROPRIATION OF KRISTEVA’S ‘ABJECTION’ 
 
This chapter is intended to outline the parameters of what may be described as “a 
feminist appropriation” of Kristeva‟s evocative concept, “abjection”, or more accurately, 
perhaps, as an appropriation of this concept “for feminism”, because (as I shall argue) for 
Kristeva “abjection” does not serve primarily feminist purposes, nor is it rooted in a 
feminist interpretation of the subject. Kristeva has never publicly identified herself as a 
feminist. Nevertheless, I aim to show that it is a very valuable concept as far as feminism 
is concerned – at least feminism as I understand it here. By feminism I understand, 
briefly and provisionally stated, that women are oppressed, not only by men but also by 
male-identified women (the forms and severity of oppressions also differ with time, space 
and culture), and that women have, and to a considerable extend still are, discriminated 
against in terms of employment opportunities, both range and advancement, and social 
and legal status. Apart from its overt political nature, feminism also strives to improve 
women‟s lives for the better despite the tenacity of patriarchal tendencies to construct 
their worlds. I define patriarchy below as well as attempting to outline the work by both 
feminists and evolutionary psychologists on the possible historical, or to put it more 
precisely, the pre-historical, roots of patriarchy as we understand it at this present 
historical juncture.  
 
 In particular I will argue that patriarchal culture‟s normalizing tendency to conflate the 
social category of women with the biological category of and capacity for motherhood 
(understood as the ability to carry a fetus to term and to deliver that child with or without 
mechanical assistance) which, essentially, gives patriarchy (both East and West) the 
ideological means to blend contradicting discourse convincingly (very much in the way 
in which films are edited to make the narrative appear “normal”) to keep women 
subjugated, to the extent in which they still are. 
 
By way of introduction, I refer to Julia Kristeva‟s motivation and intellectual context for 
her earmarking the quality of discourse on maternity as worthy of further research. When 
Julia Kristeva (2002a:13, 18-19) went to China in the spring of 1974 as a member of the 
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Tel Quel-editorial team to observe the results of the communist experiment, she had no 
good expectations about the stifling conformity produced by Stalinist-hybrid societies. 
What did interest her was whether the position of women showed any improvement from 
the oppressions evident in capitalist society.  
 
Kristeva found the position of women in China under the communist regime 
"problematic" and in the closing pages of her book About Chinese Women (1991, 
originally published in 1974) pondered whether alternatively a (premodern?) discourse 
stream could not be isolated among Chinese women which could be of value to western 
women by reinvigorating stereotypical discourses on motherhood consumed by people in 
the West (E. Ann Kaplan 1983a:324, Kristeva 2002a:13). One example of the loss and 
pain which women suffer as a result of the alleged dearth on maternal discourse, is the 
mother-daughter bond which, under conditions of patriarchal oppression, has experienced 
serious fault-lines in Western societies, according to the proponents of feminist-inspirited 
psychology of women. Thakur (1997:31-32n4) notes that the term “patriarchy” has fallen 
into disuse in academic discourse since its indiscriminate use cross-culturally can lead to 
structuralist, a term I explain below,  results which can conceivably be misleading. She 
suggests that the term “gender”, which I define in the next chapter, Chapter Two, 
introduced by Gayle Rubin in 1985, is more appropriate.  I use both terms 
interchangeably depending on the context since I have found that a nuanced 
understanding of patriarchy is indeed valuable for an exploration of the variety of 
oppression(s) across cultures.  
 
To return to Kristeva‟s views on the origin of the mother/daughter conflict, I postulate 
that such can, to a certain extent, be reconciled with that of feminist psychologists. I 
argue that in contemporary China (also a patriarchy albeit under socialist rule), where the 
regime has a range of legitimizing and normalizing features unavailable to liberal 
democracies in the West, the mother/daughter conflict is reproduced  in that culture 
though with a sting absent in the Western context. I will explore the mother/daughter 
relationship in the West, following Kristeva‟s thinking, as an example of and in an 
attempt to assuage her thesis that maternal discourse in the West is in trouble for want of 
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proliferation. In examining women from a cross-cultural perspective, a gender-sensitive 
approach, embedded in a feminist[-]consciousness, is deemed to have considerable 
advantages over rival methodologies (Susan Mann 1997:200, 223; Delaney & 
Yanagisako 1992:20). I will advance my reasons for this proposition in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I will attempt to appropriate Kristeva's idea of the infant's rejection (she 
coined the neologism "abjection") of the mother as instrumental in kicking off her/his 
personality formation for the benefit of feminist philosophy. I will also attempt to make 
out a case both as to why an interdisciplinary approach, even in a traditionally 
conservative discipline such as philosophy, is justified and why m/otherhood is, or failing 
that, should be, one such concern of philosophy‟s. What is feminist philosophy? 
 
Feminist philosophy should be carefully distinguished from traditional philosophy 
written and codified by deceased bleak men (Solomons & Higgins 1996:288). Apart from 
the latter being the obvious reserve of the privileged with the time and the money to 
pursue mundane interests, it brooks no argument that philosophy has traditionally 
concerned itself with almost exclusively male-conceived problems (Spelman1988:5-8;  
Brownmiller 1976:138-139; Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:8). The preponderance of white 
men in the discipline of philosophy has shaped the very contours of the subject so as to 
exclude the influence and colouring of minorities, non-European cultures and women in 
general (Alison Ainley 1995a:273). Bias, as Elizabeth Spelman (1990) reminds us, is 
embedded in privilege. Consider in this regard the work of Evelyn Fox on the gendered 
nature of knowledge production. 
 
Evelyn Fox Keller (1982:114-115) has built up an impressive body of evidence to prove 
that, in health care alone, as an example, research ideas rarely touch on the everyday 
problems women experience such as pre-menstrual and postnatal stress syndromes 
(which inconvenience significant numbers of women). Elizabeth Frazer (1995a:241-242; 
1995b:805) shows in her synopsis of feminist reflection on epistemology and the nature 
of discoveries in natural sciences (physics, chemistry, geology, botany and zoology), that 
the interpretation and understanding of research results are gender-based and leaves no 
room for the mirage of objectivity so sought after traditionally by male scientists. Does 
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that mean that a female Einstein would have come up with a different concept of 
relativity? This is what Evelyn Keller Fox (1982) suggests and her point is that any 
understanding of reality, irrespective of the discipline, is shaped by the gender of the 
researcher. 
 
Feminist philosophy, in contrast to traditional male-directed philosophy, has challenged 
not only the parameters of the enquiry (Flax 1991:138-139), but has indicated how 
feminists have redrawn the “problem of women” to focus rather on the peculiar nature of 
gender relations which give women a bad name. It also influences the very direction and 
motives underlying traditional philosophical projects (Ainley 1995a:273; Allen & Young 
1989:1-2). German (notably Herta Nagl-Docekal [2004]), American and French feminist 
philosophers have for years now begun to appropriate, rewrite and rethink classical male 
concerns (Allen &Young 1989:10-11).  
 
What is meant by appropriation for feminist ends? Shari Benstock et al (2002:xi) draws 
attention to “examples of women‟s contributions to genres that previously had belonged 
to men, including devotional texts and philosophical treatises. Women revised these, as 
they did belles lettres, and made them their own. This writing, particularly from earlier 
periods, can be difficult in ways that challenge contemporary readers…”    
 
Feminists study male productions and, in the act/art of appropriating these sites, both 
transform and transcend the original for purposes beneficial to women‟s understanding 
and consciousness (Susan Mann 1997:208-214, 219-222). Susan Mann was writing in the 
context of Chinese women poets‟ appropriation of the biographical genre during High 
Qing times (China‟s lengthy eighteenth century), but the point is the same, which is that 
feminists appropriate (male-inspired) genres for feminist ends. The traditional canon is 
not only subjected to (a) feminist reading(s) and consciousness, but scrutinized in the 
light of issues which are of particular import to women and concerns which affect 
women‟s daily lives (Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:8): examples are ideologies which 
construct or discourses which share women's experience of the body, not only 
motherhood, in ways which are endearing, friendship among women and the rocky 
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m/other-daughter bond. As far as the last item on the list is concerned, Marianne Hirsch 
(cited in Elliot 1991:99) makes the observation, in the context of an overview of feminist 
theory in as it stood in 1981, that "there can be no theory of women's oppression, that 
does not take into account woman's role as a mother of daughters and a daughter of 
mothers..."  Consider in this context the development of Western feminism over the past 
hundred years. 
 
Sally J. Scott (2010:81-91) outlines the contemporary (Western) women's movement 
(starting in the late nineteenth and continuing still into the twenty-first century) as having 
experienced three waves. The first wave (roughly around 1880-1930) focused on equality 
for women, or being on a par with men (the right to vote, the rights to own property, 
equal pay for the same work, etc.). The second wave (erupting around 1966-late seventies 
or perhaps the early eighties) concentrated on making women visible, giving legitimacy 
to women's concerns, opinions and experiences and generally privileging space for 
women. The third wave (beginning in the early 1980s, by some accounts) moved from 
the concern for "a woman's problem" to a gender-sensitive investigation whereby the 
question is expressed as an enquiry of into how the structure of gender relations in the 
West created a "women's problem" in the first place (Flax 1991:136).  
 
In particular, Deniz Kandiyoti (1996:5-6) has pointed out how the feminist appropriation 
of post-structuralist ideas on difference and identity, has enriched third-wave 
feminism(s), prompting it to critically question the second wave assumption of an 
essential (core) universal female (which should not be confused with femininity) and of 
oppression as being experienced uniformly among all women in all cultures and time. 
“Female” is a biological (physiological and anatomical) concept where people with the 
same biological attributes are classed as  “women” while femininity is a social concept in 
terms of which certain group personality traits (tenderness, caring, mothering, to mention 
a few) are assigned en masse to the group biologically identified as “female” irrespective 
of individual preferences, needs and skills. Briefly, then,  current feminist research insists 
on the importance of both difference among women and problematising gender as a 
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prerequisite to flagging and eliminating male oppression (Allen & Young 1989:12; Flax 
1991:4, 20; Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:4-5).  
 
Before moving on to explain how the modus operandi of feminist philosophy differs 
from that of male-orientated philosophy as traditionally conceived, it might be helpful to 
explain the term “poststructuralism” at this point. To understand poststructuralism, we 
need to understand first the movement of structuralism which preceded it. What is 
structuralism? 
 
The work of Ferdinand de Saussure had a decisive influence on the twentieth century 
version of structuralism (Norris 1995a:885). According to Saussure there is no necessary 
correlation between a signifier (the verbal value of a word, for example, or its written 
form) and signified (the thing or concept itself to which the sounds or the graphic marks 
refer). The relationship is entirely arbitrary and guarantees the overall systematic 
coherence of a particular language (Lodge 1988:1). Someone unfamiliar with English and 
who is under the impression that the word "horrible" actually means what is understood 
by "honourable," will have no qualms addressing someone she respects as "horrible"! 
Structuralism, which caught on as an interdisciplinary approach to cultural problems in 
the 1960s and 70s, proceeded to look into any cultural item (the institution of marriage, 
for example), by analogy to Saussure‟s language model, by analyzing its supposedly 
underlying, universally valid properties (Norris 1995a:885). In literary criticism, for 
example, texts are supposed to yield their secrets when subjected to an “anatomical” 
scrutiny of their standard indicators such as narrative devices and various ways and 
means to render the ordinary language alien (Norris 1995a:885). What is 
poststructuralism? 
 
Poststructuralism, making an appearance in French intellectual circles in the 1960s and 
seventies (three of Jacques Derrida‟s major works appeared simultaneously in 1967), 
broke with the idea that multicultural phenomena, or any phenomenon for that matter, 
can be explained by reference to their universally valid underlying features, but persisted 
with the insight that all ideas, observations and intellectual opinions are both made 
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possible in and through and centred in language because natural languages are 
constructed around the idea of a negative as systems of mutually differing between 
signifiers, “sound images” correlative to conceptual signifieds (the sounding notions 
which refer to ideas) (Norris 1995b:708).  
 
Poststructuralists are uncomfortable with the idea of timeless universal truths (Lodge 
1988:196). With conditions such as these, it is no wonder that the ideas of theorists of 
suspicion such as Nietzsche (any insight is a mere perspective) and Freud (a person does 
not have an unified, stable identity but one consisting of conflicting traits) found a 
sympathetic and influential reception among poststructuralists, such as Foucault (no 
claim to truth can be divorced from the power/knowledge nexus which precedes and 
makes it possible). This is not to say that poststructuralists reject the notion of truth, but 
merely that, invariably, they treat it as a complex notion, subject to time- and place-
constraints. As I mentioned above, post-structuralism has also had a lasting influence on 
the turn which (third wave) feminism took in the nineteen-eighties.        
  
 As for feminist philosophy, in light of the preceding discussion of structuralism and 
poststructuralism, I argue that feminist activism and feminist philosophy share different, 
but related, concerns. Whereas feminists might go about identifying and devising 
strategies of resisting modes of oppression (Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:8; Lourdes Beneria 
1998:260, 263), this is not feminist philosophy's task, although the subtle and manifold 
ways in which oppression are reproduced is a central concern. Critical engagements with 
western philosophy are initiated with the aim of showing up the limits of these encounters 
and, influenced by poststructuralist theories concerning difference, suggesting new and 
fresh ways of dealing with these concerns from a woman's understanding/perspective. 
Enriching ways to mine women's perspectives are encouraged (Ainley 1995a:273; Allen 
& Young 1989:12-13). Feminists in general and those in philosophy have not hesitated to 
employ masculinist tools, methodology and thinking to achieve their purpose in shifting 
or redesigning or recasting the platforms on which male philosophers have constructed 
their thinking (Annette Kolodny, quoted in Shari Benstock et al 2002:164).  In fairness it 
should be added that, as in the case of most issues with which feminists grapple, not 
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everyone agree on this score (Richards 1991:26-28).  Feminists encourage the 
proliferation of perspectives even if this results in a contradictory and uneasily 
(dis)assimilated body of thought (Kesselman et al 1998:42; Flax 1991:140, 142). As far 
as influence goes, this could be linked with the way in which poststructuralist 
philosophical strategies have systematically, although in different ways (including 
Foucaultian genealogy, Derridean deconstruction, Lacanian discourse theory), cast doubt 
on the tenability of one, encompassing theoretical synthesis, such as the Hegelian, or 
even Habermas‟s attempt at constructing a thoroughgoing social theory (Olivier 2009, 
Foucault 1991, Derrida 1976, Lacan 2007).  What is meant with a feminist approach to 
research? 
 
In view of the above, it should not be surprising that contemporary feminists prefer a 
pluralistic, descriptive rather than an exclusivist, prescriptive approach to assessing 
women‟s writing, and the term “feminisms” (note the plural) is in vogue (Benstock et al 
2002:x). This explains the contradictory and often divergent nature of feminist theory, but 
feminists have seen in this trend nothing but wholesome stimulation and cross-
fertilization of ideas (Flax 1991:140, 142). 
 
 Feminism(s) is the firm belief and conviction that women in contemporary society are 
oppressed by men in a personal and institutional sense, and that women‟s experience can 
only be sensibly understood as resistance to, or complicity with, or response to such 
patriarchal oppression (Allen & Young 1989:4; Brownmiller 1999:xxx; Richards 
1991:13-14). Patriarchy is defined by Gerda Lerner (1986:29 quoted in Hrdy 2000:48), in 
general terms, as “the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over 
women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in 
society in general. It implies that men hold power in all the important institutions of 
society and that women are deprived of access to such power. It does not imply that 
women are either totally powerless or totally deprived of rights, influences or resources.” 
 
According to Lerner‟s definition, women‟s limited appropriation of power is trumped by 
men‟s control of all the key-points in the “game”. Lerner dates the onset of patriarchy as 
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a deep historical force, starting  around 3000 BCE, but Hrdy argues that its roots goes 
back much further. To grasp Hrdy‟s argument, I need to distinguish between 
sociobiology (the attempt to find understanding for human behavior in comparative 
studies of other primates, as is generally known) and feminist thinking on the motivation 
for male dominance over females (Hrdy 2000:150n2, 152.) Feminists find the 
explanation in men‟s symbolic need for status and prestige in the interrelationship 
between men (much in the same way as wealth gives a person status and prestige in the 
capitalist world), whereas sociobiology finds it in the essential aim of reproduction. The 
difference lies in sex as opposed to power.  This evolutionary take on human behavior 
moves the origins of patriarchy back millions of years and also begs one to consider a 
further enquiry: Why would men want to lord it over women? 
 
Taking her cue from Mary Jane Sherfey‟s groundbreaking essay The Nature and 
Evolution of Female Sexuality (1966), Hrdy insists that women‟s sexuality evinced a 
boundless appetite for purely recreational and therapeutic purposes. Sherfey (1966:37) 
argues that “women‟s inordinate orgasmic capacity did not evolve for monogamous, 
sedentary cultures.” To illustrate, Hrdy (2000:154) cites the evidence collected by 
Wrangham that a female chimpanzee might engage in sexual “enclosure” (penetration) 
around 6000 times in her lifetime and yet she only conceives six surviving babies while 
tending to her own material needs (at p.162). Hrdy (2000:156) remarks how amazed she 
was at the accuracy of Sherfey‟s main hypotheses: “patriarchal social organization was 
partially an outgrowth of male counter-strategies for controlling the primate legacy of an 
assertive female sexuality of prehominid origin” (emphasis in the original.) The nub of 
Hrdy‟s (2000:155) argument is that contemporary female sexual modesty is the result of  
 
the tens of thousands of years hominid females have been socialized, exchanged 
between groups, reproduced, and died (some sooner than others) in various 
permutations of the patrilocal (or, in ethological parlance, „male philopatric‟) 
breeding systems that eventually gave rise in places like the Ancient Near East to 
fully fledged patriarchy. 
 
If Hrdy, and other evolutionary psychologists, are right that patriarchy is a construct 
aimed specifically at controlling and channeling women‟s explosive sexual energy, this 
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will explain the excessive preoccupation with reputation, social inhibition and sexual 
discretion found among so many women.  I will return to this idea in Chapters Two, Four 
and Five.  
 
For feminism, the personal is political precisely because many women in the 
contemporary world literally have to “sleep with the enemy” and feminists understand 
that most abuse against women, which occurs in the so-called “private sphere” of home, 
bedroom and kitchen, have political origins and can only be addressed effectively on a 
political level through collective action (Kesselman et al 1998:42; Winslow 1998:240, 
242; Gloria Steinem quoted in Du Plessis & Snitow 1998:13).  The dualism 
private/public is convenient for reasons of state as it keeps the veil of secrecy tightly 
drawn over the social construct known as the nuclear family in the West and has resulted 
in women being at the mercy of husbands, sons, boyfriends and fathers (Wilson 1992:20). 
Consequently, all cultural artefacts and practices, or the lack thereof (such as a paucity in 
healthy discourse on and among women), are seen as sites for political agitation by 
feminists (Du Plessis & Snitow 1998:7, 10-12; Epstein 1998:147-148).  I suggest that I 
have shown convincingly why m/otherhood would be concern for feminist philosophy, 
but I will also argue that it is a concern for philosophy proper. Why is m/otherhood a 
philosophical concern? 
 
Jane Gallop (1988:1-9), to whom I am greatly indebted for her valuable exploration of 
m/otherhood‟s destructive pattern(ing) in Western civilization as well as its relevance for 
(Western) philosophy, begins her book Thinking Through the Body (1988) by reflecting 
on Adrienne Rich‟s book Of Woman Born (1976). Gallop‟s title is significant in view of 
the mind/body problem in Western philosophy alluded to and explored in greater detail 
below. Central to Gallop‟s argument is the following graphic image taken from Rich‟s 
book: “On June 11, 1974, „the first hot day of summer‟, Joanne Michulski, thirty-eight, 
the mother of eight children … took a butcher knife, decapitated and chopped up the 
bodies of her two youngest on the neatly kept lawn of the suburban house where they 
lived outside Chicago”. 
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Was Joanne Michulski a monster, a once-off aberration of that institution so revered in 
Western civilization, though not peculiar to the West, namely the m/other? Or, more 
sinisterly, is Michulski telling us something about the societal and social “arrangements” 
(and I use this word gingerly) in our society which have gone horribly wrong? 
 
Rich (1976:24) reports that in the company of woman poets, of whom some were 
m/others, in a lounge in 1975 somewhere in the United States, every single woman in that 
space was able to identify with Joanne Michulski and the desire to kill off their children. 
 
How is the m/other related to the classic mind-body problem in European philosophy? 
Let as first briefly look at the contours of this problem as it has manifested itself in 
Western philosophy before going on to examine its relevance to the institution of 
m/otherhood as we have come to know it in the West.  
 
Barbara Arneil (1999) begins her comprehensive argument on the dualistic structure of 
Western societies originating in Ancient Greece by explaining how the distinction 
between nomos and physis laid the foundation for what we take for granted in the twenty-
first century Western world as the privileged hierarchical dichotomy of culture over 
nature, light over dark, public over private, male over female and countless other 
examples. Nomos is the “emperor” of reason, privileged over physis, which represents 
our vulgar urges and it is in this very division which harbors the kernel of politics in the 
West. 
 
Arneil postulates that these contradictory but supplementary sides of the coin have since 
the onset of the modern era (roughly 1500) translated into further social practices in 
which this breach showed itself. The mind became divorced from the body as Descartes 
drew the clear, and influential, distinction between mind and body with his well-known 
dictum ”I think, therefore I am.” Arneil (1999:7) argues that a detailed investigation of 
the “dualistic nature of western political thought will provide us with the tools to uncover 
the profound, but often silent, role of gender in politics”. Her argument is that language 
and reason brings structure to how we live our lives in the West and that the implosion of 
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these categories which constitute our world, will also lead to a collapse of politics as it 
has been practiced since Plato and Aristotle. According to Arneil (1999), it is an 
understanding of how power has built and sustained these opposites which is the subject 
matter of feminism. How does this digression on the alleged mind/body problem relate to 
infanticide and motherhood? 
 
M/others‟ infanticidal rage at their own children (as illuminated by both Rich 1976 and 
Gallop 1988) points at such a serious distortion of the psyche in the West, that, as to 
which Kristeva (1982:36-38) alludes, both the appearance of feminism (and m/others 
finishing off their young) at this historic junction coincides with a timely return of the 
“uncanny” (the repressed, to borrow from Freud). I explain the concept of the uncanny in 
Chapter Three. 
 
The dearth in healthy and life-sustaining discourse(s) on m/otherhood in the West can 
accordingly, possibly and provisionally, be ascribed to the fact that no such discourses 
can of necessity exist as their appearance would necessarily imply the dismantling of the 
practice of m/othering (and the power which sustains the politics which keeps it in place), 
as we have become accustomed to it in the West, and its possible dissolution. I will 
devote space to a more detailed consideration of this issue in Chapter Three but I flag it 
here to show the interrelationship between the chapters. 
 
Significantly, Gallop (1988:3) reflects on Sade‟s infamous text Philosophy in the 
Bedroom where Sade makes an attempt to reintegrate the public/private breach by 
introducing philosophical discourse and the desire for knowledge/meaning into the 
bedchambers. Sade‟s monsters (which turn out to be regular, every-day people) are 
philosophers attempting to come to terms with the public/private breach in their 
committing the most barbaric, base and cruelest acts imaginable. In Sade‟s world women 
philosophize, despise mothers (but not women) and only engage in anal penetration. Not 
surprisingly infanticide is a daily occurrence. In the final scene, a/n m/other is deliciously 
put to the rack. Luce Irigaray (1985:198-204, quoted in Gallop 1998:3) does not burn 
Sade‟s books either but concludes that he exposes the sex mentality upon which 
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European civilization rests. In the light of the aforegoing discussion on the destructive 
element in instances of infanticide in Western m/otherhood, we need to ask how feminist 
methodology can accommodate thinking on this topic in view of the role of desire in 
research.  
 
Feminist methodology, I note briefly, requires that the researcher places her cards on the 
table. Although I will devote an entire chapter to “methodo(ide)ology”, it is nonetheless 
incumbent upon me to reflect consciously on the process, my own bias, position and 
influences throughout my research project. In this respect, feminist method(s) shares 
many of the central concerns of other critical methodologies (Boonzaier & Shefer 
2006:5-6, 9). Julia Kristeva, not generally known as a feminist herself, as noted above, 
has also laid stress on the necessity of revealing one's personal desire as a motivation for 
your investment in a particular line of inquiry. She writes that "the knowing subject is 
also a desiring subject, and the paths of desire ensnarl the paths of knowledge" (Kristeva 
1986b:307). As for myself, the personal is also of intellectual importance, as I have 
picked the project to investigate and possibly fathom the psyche of Chinese women 
(because I am married to a Chinese woman born and bred in Shanghai) as well as trying 
to make sense of the difficulties in my relationship with my own mother (not Chinese) 
and many other maternal substitutes since. According to Hart (2008:222) a student‟s 
personal involvement in a research project makes for some of the best research. I might 
very well be engaged in a “writing cure”, as opposed to Freud‟s famous “talking cure”, 
myself. I turn now to a consideration of the possible link between the search for 
knowledge and the search for the m/other. I attempt to make clear the relationship 
between motive (often buried deeply in the unconscious) and desire for knowledge by 
examining the work of Gallop, Rich and De Sade on m/otherhood.  
 
Although, as Gallop (1988:169-177) notes, male (sexual) desire for the maid, the slave 
girl, the down-trodden, poor, hungry, perhaps illiterate third world women of 
color/underclass has a very long and well-entrenched tradition in male history, this 
(perhaps surprising to most women) desire for the "other women" (the maid, the 
prostitute, the Chinese woman employed in the corner take-aways, to mention a few 
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examples) in other worlds (the Third World such as the Islamic world, China, India, 
Cambodia) is not absent from the desire of privileged (upper or middle classed) women 
either. 
 
  Accordingly, Brayton (1997:6) must be given her due for highlighting the idea that 
feminist research "entails recognizing the differences between women [and that 
q]uestions about the motivations for the researcher to study women of other races, 
cultures, ages, abilities and classes need to be addressed as part of the research process." 
Gallop (1988:169-177) observes that this desire for the “m/other” woman of lower social 
standing or color is firmly and perhaps inextricably tied up with the search for the 
mother's body which had been abjected in our very early youth and has now returned to 
us in the form of the maid, the cleaner, the prostitute and the woman who takes care of 
our needs generally.  In Chapter Three I will examine the viewing audience‟s 
motivations/desires in looking for precisely this discarded object (the m/other's body) in 
my overview of feminist cinema studies perambulating my reviewing of three 
contemporary Chinese films with a Chinese Mandarin soundtrack (English subtitles). I 
also consider an overview of the politics of investment appropriate in this chapter, as I 
return to this topic in Chapter Five in the context of Phyllis Chesler‟s argument on the 
hatred which women bore for one another as so graphically and horrifically portrayed in 
Zhang‟s film Raise the Red Lantern (1991). The point of the thesis, developed above, is 
that the discourse on race and class is interchangeable as I attempt to show in my analysis 
of Zhang‟s said film. I pause to point out that a cross-cultural feminist approach to the 
practice and institution of motherhood in the West makes good sense both 
methodologically and epistemologically (in laying bare how desire is entangled with 
knowledge). The question arises to what extend reason has a role, if any, to play in 
feminist deliberation and female liberation. 
 
Despite the earlier reluctance of feminists to drop the banner of essentialism, most third 
wave-feminists are in agreement that the celebration of difference among women can 
only strengthen the assumptions underlying the new gender-centered feminisms of the 
80s and 90s (Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:7-8). Supported by reasons and sensitive to 
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alternative claims, feminists can only benefit from a rational and critical approach to the 
issues which they hold dear. The history of the women‟s movement in the West has 
shown how many divergent opinions and positions women, even in the same society, 
hold (Brownmiller 1999:52-56; Flax 1991:20). From adherents to political celibacy (the 
belief that withholding all sexual “services” to men is a political solution to the problem 
of patriarchal oppression) to enforcers of patriarchal rule, women appear to have little in 
common apart from their anatomical features (Susan Mann 1997:224-226) and the 
systemic and pervasive oppression men subject them to (Flax 1991:139; Spelman 
1990:15). But even so, eradicating sexism is not necessarily the first priority for women 
everywhere (Martinez 1998:118, 120; Epstein 1998:64-65, 69), and while employing the 
insights of Western middle-class white feminists in their work and thinking, researchers 
are at pains to “highlight[…] the specificity of Third World women‟s experience” 
(Kandiyoti 1996:5). 
 
The point is that general irrefutable truths, such as men‟s position of social coinage at the 
expense of women, which most members of that culture are prepared to accept 
uncritically, have no place in our postmodern world (Spelman 1990:9). Reason has a role 
to play in searching for a fair dispensation among the sexes (assuming for the moment 
that such a dispensation is possible). As I will argue in the final chapter, within the 
context of analyzing three Chinese films, women do have a special contribution to make 
in efforts aimed at their own liberation. In the next chapter I will attempt to show the 
common ground between Foucault‟s ideas on discourse, power and the production of 
knowledge, and feminist thinking on the gender-bias of knowledge, as I pointed out in the 
brief reference to Evelyn Fox Keller. 
 
   
Apart from the challenges posed by feminists, philosophy as the arbiter of rationality in 
the West has also come under pressure from other sources. Jane Flax (1991:7) is of the 
view that rationality has been undergoing a measure of uncertainty in recent times. In a 
recent essay, Umberto Eco (2008) suggests that the end for Europe and its affairs 
(including such Eurocentric concerns as reason and philosophy) are in sight and that the 
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centre of world is moving from Europe and the east coast of the United States to the 
American west coast. A rash of recent popular history books (for example Ferguson 
2011:305-308, 312-313, 315-325) have expressed the opinion that China (or India or 
both) may be the vanguard of a new emerging empire in the wake of the American 
giant‟s waning in the early twenty-first century. How does the rise of the “Yellow Peril” 
fit with Kristeva and her imaginative introduction of her new coined concept “abjection”? 
 
 
Returning to Kristeva, an interesting link between the old order of Euro-American 
investment and the possible new chapter of Far Eastern (Chinese) concerns is to be 
detected in her work, on the paucity of satisfactory discourse on mothers in contemporary 
Western society. Discourse is that fraught area in our social lives where language and 
power intersect and produce narratives which both knowingly and unknowingly shape 
and constitute the lives of countless people. The dearth of existing (healthy) maternal 
discourse or otherwise in the contemporary West can be measured in Freudian terms. 
Freud‟s (quoted in Toril Moi 2006:143) view is that silences or slips of the tongue are 
significant as they reveal a reluctance on the part of the individual, who is him- or herself 
a member of a wider society, to engage in a taboo or topic which leaves the subject 
uncomfortable. This is certainly the position in the West. Kristeva (1986a:184-185; 1987: 
301-307) is particularly bent on exposing idealized discourse on motherhood for what it 
is and she points out that only two discourses on the maternal body are available to 
contemporary Western culture. It is significant that in her book on Chinese woman, 
Kristeva pointedly asks after the possibility of a remedial discourse among Chinese 
women which might be of benefit to Western women. Why is this important?    
 
Despite the apparently undeniable patriarchal similarities between Western and Chinese 
societies, Susan Mann (1997:11, 15-16, 205) is at pains to point out that a Chinese 
m/other‟s only meaningful relationship is likely to be with her son as her husband is a 
peripheral figure at best and her daughter is groomed from an early age to leave home 
and join that of her own husband. This is the “string” I referred to in the mother/daughter 
relation in the Chinese context. As far as the m/other is concerned, this feature is unlike 
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the contemporary position in the West.   Jane Flax (1991:18-19) observes that both 
psychoanalysis and postmodernism leave no room for a meaningful bond with the 
m/other and neither of these discourses in the West gives any credence to the m/other 
being a person in her own right. 
 
The discourses on m/otherhood which are available in the West are identified by Kristeva 
as that on the Sacred, particularly as perpetuated by Catholicism, and science's 
reduction/conforming motherhood‟s to Nature. Both these discourses on the maternal 
body are unsatisfactory. The former doubles in the construction of "Virgins and Mothers 
of God" in that delightful expression of Toril Moi's (1997:213). As I will argue in chapter 
five, male-dominated societies (both the West and contemporary China) conflate the 
social category of the woman with that of the biological role of mother (i.e. 
reproduction), without any regard for the dissimilarities between the two roles and 
conveniently overlooks the fact that both men and women can mother.  
 
But mothers do exist and not only are the existing discourses on maternity/ the maternal 
body unacceptable, but Kristeva (1989:27-30) argues that in patriarchal society the 
matricidal drive (an idea she borrows from Freud, i.e. the abjection or rejection of the 
maternal body) is essential to enable the infant (her/him) to become an independent 
subject. Smith (1996:150) notes that Kristeva appropriates and develops this idea from 
her reading of Freud's account of the oedipal happening, explained below, and the child's 
assuming her/his “engendered identity ". Freud‟s genius lies in his understanding that the 
individual‟s engendering follows a psychic (and not an anatomical) path and I will 
attempt to explain briefly the concepts of the positive and the negative Oedipus complex 
below. 
 
According to Freud (1986a, 1986b), the most crucial psychological development in every 
person's life is the outcome, successful or otherwise, of the Oedipus complex, which 
occurs in the first few years of the infant‟s life. Freud borrowed his idea of the Oedipus 
from the pre-Socratic playwright Sophocles‟ play, Oedipus Rex. According to the plot, 
the King gradually comes to realize that the tragedies which befall his realm is the result 
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of his killing of an old man Laius, which turns out to be his own father, while Jocasta, the 
mother of his children, also his wife, is no less than his own mother. Freud‟s point is that 
the individual‟s desires are at loggerheads with that of society and that the individual 
must find a way to mediate her/his needs/preferences/desires with that of the culture-at-
large into which (s)he is inducted (Vivian Bar 1987: ix-x).What is the Oedipus complex? 
 
The positive Oedipus complex needs to be distinguished from the negative Oedipus 
complex, not only as a heuristic tool, but also as a means to my reading of selected 
Chinese cinematic texts in Chapter Five (in the context of the negative Oedipus 
complex). The positive Oedipus complex occurs in children, aged 3 to 5 years, while they 
are still blissfully under the impression that (s)he is the most important item in Mother‟s 
universe. In boys it is linked to the development of the castration complex (built around 
threats, both real and imaginary, of having his penis amputated) and the formation of the 
super ego (the onset of morality and the final rejection of the possibility of incest). Freud 
(1986a:399-400) argues that the sight of the penis and the lack thereof (represented or 
symbolized by the sight of the vagina) is pivotal for the onset of the castration complex in 
boys. In girls, of course, “castration” is already considered complete (Freud 1986a:397). 
According to Freud, the girl realizes that she is unable to possess her “first love” 
(Mother), as she does not own a penis and reluctantly turns her desire to her father. Her 
desire for father is tied in with her unfulfilled wish for a penis (so-called “penis envy”) 
and is later translated into her wish for a baby (Freud 1986b). Freud‟s (1986a:395) view 
is that any “painful experience,” associated with the desired parent, for either boy or girl, 
can ignite the slide towards engendered individuation and thus the crumbling of the 
Oedipus edifice. Stanton (1992a:291) points out that several serious problems exist with 
the classic account of the positive Oedipus, two of which I briefly discuss here. It makes 
no allowance for any feminine value and the idea of castration, for example, prescribes 
the nature and exigency of sexual differentiation and the teleological necessity of its 
heterosexual outcome. It leaves no room for the sprouting of gay or lesbian sexual 
identity. 
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The negative Oedipus complex comes in play as the girl-child longs for M/other and she 
desires to identify and eventually “become” her (a positive modeling on the M/other as 
the one I explore in Chapter Five in the context of Colette and her mother, Sido). Jeanne 
Lampl-de Groot (quoted in Stanton 1992b:275) developed this model to explain the 
sexual and psychological development of young girls since it was found that girls do not 
cease to long for m/other during the “Oedipal period.” These needs of daughters‟ for and 
to identify with the mother remain with girls all the way through their development. As I 
will argue in Chapter Five, the negative Oedipus complex changes our understanding of 
the mother/daughter relationship considerably. In the words of Chodorow (1987:140, 
cited in Stanton 1992b:275), “[g]irls do not reject their mother and women [in general] in 
favour of father and men, but remain in a bisexual triangle throughout childhood into 
puberty.” My explanation and exploration of the negative Oedipus complex is important 
for the reasons that I use gender as a tool of analysis in Chapters Four and Five and 
because the female perspective, which I elaborate upon below in the context of Ibsen‟s 
play The Doll’s House, is central to a feminist approach. Kristeva has built on Freud‟s 
work regarding his positive Oedipus complex. 
  
“Abjection” is a neologism framed by Kristeva, as noted above, to explain the process by 
which a child will come to reject the primary care-giver in her/his life (almost certainly 
her or his mother under conditions of patriarchy; Dorothy Dinnerstein quoted in Vivian 
Bar 1987:xv, xxiv-xxv) in order to become psychically separate from the mother and at 
the same time to become a unique person in her/his own right. This process is involuntary 
and a necessary requirement for the independent psychical development in the child and 
thus dubbed “abjection” rather than “rejection”. Individuation comes about in three 
stages, i.e. "undifferentiated", "the mirror", when the child (mis)recognizes herself in the 
mirror, and finally the Oedipal point of secondary identification is reached when the child 
internalizes the image of the parent with the same sex as herself (Elliot 1991:82 n21): the 
engendering of the subject is complete. 
 
Whilst this process is different for boy and girl, both, according to Kristeva, necessarily 
have to reject the mother in order to kick off personality formation as an essential 
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ingredient to the separation ritual. But, according to Kristeva, this abjection ritual is 
particularly problematic for the girl in that her gender identification with the mother leads 
to feelings of guilt and confusion.  
 
            For man and for woman the loss of the mother is biological and psychic 
necessity, the first step on the way to becoming autonomous. Matricide is our vital 
necessity, the sine-qua-non of our individuation... 
   For a woman, whose specular identification with the mother as well as the 
introjection of the maternal body and self are more immediate, such an inversion of 
the matricidal drive into a death-bearing maternal image is more difficult if not 
impossible..... There is no hatred, only an implosive mood that walls itself in and 
kills me secretly, very slowly, through permanent bitterness, bouts of sadness, even 
lethal sleeping pills that I take in smaller or greater quantities in the dark hope of 
meeting .... (Kristeva 2002b:197-198). 
 
This process is particularly problematic for women, according to Kristeva, as women of 
necessity identify with this same body which they also now need to abject and is, 
according to her, a major cause of clinical depression among women. Kristeva‟s views 
are certainly credible as our contemporary gender and identity arrangement is still 
produced around what Juliet Mitchell (1984:300) has called the "fundamental human 
repudiation of femininity." In the words of Luce Irigaray (1985:83), is the daughter "not 
born of a castrated mother who could only give birth to a castrated child?" 
  
Indeed, it would seem that women's inability to separate from m/other lies at the very 
heart of the problematic nature of abjection for women (Elliot 1991:67, Nairne & Smith 
1984:32-35, Kristeva 1982:47). Kristeva, herself a practicing psycho-analyst, calls for an 
urgent, fresh discourse on the relationship between mothers and daughters, as well as one 
on female sexuality in order to deal with this existential crisis for women, and "to nourish 
our societies with a more flexible and free discourse, one able to name...the enigmas of 
the body..." (Kristeva 1982:50). Jane Flax (1991:147) also calls for an "emancipatory 
discourse." Anna Smith (1996:140) agrees with Kristeva that current discourse on the 
mother evidences weak spots, and she recognizes how speaking of m/other is a difficult 
and emotionally charged experience (for women). Jane Flax (1991:142) focuses our 
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attention on the serious scarcity of female/ feminist voices in psychoanalytic and 
poststructuralist engagement in our postmodern world, and suggests that both these 
discourses could be enriched immeasurably by feminist perspective(s). Postmodernism as 
the plurality of often contradictory fashions coexisting comfortably is seen as a rejection 
of the modernist view of authoritarian access to truth(s) traditionally proposed by both 
philosophers and church (Christopher Norris 1995c:708). Despite the welcoming of 
different perspectives in the postmodern world, the editors of The Feminist Memoir 
Project: Voices from Women’s Liberation (1998:22) decry the “keenly felt …dearth of 
memoirs.” Discourse models on women in the West remain unacceptable despite the 
encouragement of the proliferation of perspectives in our postmodern world and the 
demise of so-called elevated platforms of fundamental truth (Norris 1995c:708).  
 
The question remains however, whether or not there is any independent corroboration for 
Kristeva's diagnosis on the origins of the compromised mental health of women in the 
West. 
 
According to Dana Crowley Jack (1993:1-2, Elliot 1991:52, Nairne & Smith 1984:7) 
more than twice as many women than men suffer depression in the United States and 
other advanced industrialized nations in the West. The reasons for this gender 
discrepancy are not simple and are intimately tied up with women's psychosocial 
situation (Nairne & Smith 1984:9-12). Gender inequality and dominance/ subordination 
play crucial roles in what Karen Horney has called "the social construction" of women's 
depression in the West.  Jack (1993:15) is quick to point out that an assessment of the 
reasons for female depression without an adequate grasp of the social context and 
dynamics of gender-specific upbringing is not conducive to a balanced understanding of 
the factors which lead up to depression among women. Dana Jack (1993:14) is alive to 
the suggestion of separate modes of subjectivity for men and women turning on "the 
fundamental patterning of gender on consciousness and behavior".     
 
Applying traditional psychoanalytic theory to women's experience of depression may 
teach us little or nothing (Nairne & Smith 1984:12-13; Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:4). 
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Important ideas relating to depression, such as loss, need, attachment and dependence, 
require a fresh understanding from the woman's point of view (Jack 1993:3, Nairne & 
Smith 1984:13-15). Contemporary agreement among psychologists treating and listening 
to women with depression is that the very core of a woman's identity and emotional life 
settles in her relational network with other people. The crux of the issue is that  
 
                                      [w]omen most often become depressed over disruption or 
conflict in close relationships, whereas men respond with depression to the loss of 
an ideal or an achievement-related goal, or over performance issues.  
                                      (Jack 1993:7) 
 
 
The traditional Western image of the (male) subject, very much entrenched in modern 
philosophy since Descartes, has been one of the (in)famous "lone ranger" – integrated, 
independent, unattached and self-sufficient, mirroring the requirements of individualism 
and toughness favoured by capitalism (Jack 1993:8; Stiglitz 2003:10). For modern 
woman however, her desire for relationship substitutes sex and belligerence as initiative 
for behavior. A woman's self-esteem is closely connected with the quality of her 
relationship with loved ones, but when she draws attention to perceived gaps or problem-
areas she is typically made out to be "too dependent" (Jack 1993:10). 
 
                                   In the current literature, dependancy . . . has become 
synonymous with exaggerated needs for affection and support . . . Mental health 
coincides with the dominant values of the culture: autonomy, in-dependence, 
power, wealth.   (Jack 1993:17-18) 
 
And yet from a feminist perspective, woman's "healthy capacity for intimacy" (Jack 
1993:5) is seen as the very essence of healthy and mature adulthood, whereas her culture 
denigrates her for it accusing her of being a weakling. Western women‟s conception of 
relationships has much in common with the dominant discourse on relationship-building 
in Chinese culture – which is considered to be a crucial skill in that culture. The Chinese 
place stress on the interests of the group as opposed to the Western notion of the 
individual and encourage "interrelationships and interdependency. The Chinese are 
26 
 
brought up with the idea that the group‟s needs take precedence over those of an 
individual" (Xu 2007:148). In Western societies, a woman's desire for bonding and 
intimacy (Jack 1993:6) is understood as reflecting her incomplete separation from Mom 
from whom she was not as readily encouraged to flee as her brother (Smith 1996:116).  
 
One could ask: Is depression among women the result of abjection (as envisaged by 
Kristeva) or the consequence of the inability by both m/other and daughter to appreciate 
and respect psychic boundaries, slipping in and out between self and other? (Elliot 1991: 
53-54, 61.) Indeed, it would seem that women's inability to separate from the m/other lies 
at the very heart of the problematic nature of abjection for women (Elliot 1991:67, Nairne 
& Smith 1984:32-35, Kristeva 1982:47). Does this, admittedly Anglo-American, 
perspective on women's depression support Kristeva's thesis on depression originating 
from abjecting the m/other? 
  
Kristeva, herself a practicing (psycho-)analyst in Paris, has adopted her appreciation of 
the Oedipus complex to facilitate her understanding of the psychological problems which 
beset the m/other-daughter relationship. Kristeva‟s contribution lies in her highlighting 
and perhaps also demonstrating the presumed depressive side-effect which abjection has 
on the female psyche and the alleged difficulties which this phenomenon has for the 
m/other-daughter relationship in its tow. But I have reason to believe that she is partially 
wrong in her thesis that women in the West are beset with depression because of her only 
having to abject/reject the mother and because her identification with the mother 
consequently leaves her guilt-ridden. Women in the West suffer from depression 
precisely because they are both made to attempt separation from m/other, as Kristeva so 
graphically demonstrate in the quotation reproduced above, and because they are unable 
to separate, as we will see from a feminist appropriation of Kristeva‟s idea of abjection 
for women. Taking our queue from Kristeva‟s casting of the problem on the alleged 
origins of depression among women in the West, I may define, and I will attempt to 
show, the problem as having a wider application, than Kristeva‟s more conservative aim, 
so as to include both sides of the coin: Depression as a result of both the daughter‟s 
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allegedly having to abject the m/other (Kristeva‟s contribution) and her psychic inability 
to do so (the contribution of feminist psychologists, as I will indicate below).  
 
The rocky m/other/ daughter interaction forms the very crux of the (de)formation of the 
female psyche in the contemporary West and, according to the feminist understanding of 
the phenomenon, for all women under contemporary patriarchal conditions (Eichenbaum 
& Orbach 1988:36-37, 52, 66). This will include socialist societies such as contemporary 
China. I believe I am supported in my reading thus by Victor Burgin (cited in Smith 
1996:152) who advances the opinion that it is "not woman as such who is abjected, but 
rather woman as privileged signifier of that which man both fears and desires: the 
extinction of identity itself" (my emphasis).  My point is that strife is not inherent in the 
m/other/daughter relationship but a peculiar feature of the construction of woman‟s 
psyche in the West under contemporary conditions of patriarchal oppression. 
 
Western woman‟s psyche is shaped around the “push-pull dynamic” (Eichenbaum & 
Orbach 1988:55, 62) of the m/other-daughter relationship, which in feminist terms is 
understood to mean that m/other attempts to meet daughter‟s needs and expectations, and 
is desirous for her daughter to go out in the world and meet it head-on, on the one hand, 
while on the other hand m/other is resentful towards her daughter for having the 
opportunities she herself never had. Mothers‟ envy of their daughters are well-
documented (Chesler 2009). M/other also fears for her daughter should she not 
understand and know her place in a man‟s world. I am here strongly reminded of the 
words of Heilbrun (cited in Jack 1991:44) that conventional marriage is the "most 
persistent of myths imprisoning women". The family is the primary space in society 
where the values and the prejudices of that culture are reproduced and perpetuated. 
Whereas m/other gives with the one hand she also tends to take away with the other 
(Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:39-48). The words of Carol Gilligan (quoted in Apter 2004: 
224) will resonate with many women from different generations, that the "anger between 
mothers and daughters are legendary; the love is often held in silence".  Nancy Chodorow 
(quoted in Nairne & Smith 1984:35) has argued that because girls see themselves as 
continuous with their mothers, they experience themselves also as extensions of other 
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loved ones. Consider in this regard Freud‟s observation (cited in Vivian Barr 1987: xiv-
xv) that whereas a woman looks for a husband that resembles her father, it is the 
(troubled) relationship with her m/other that she reproduces in her relationship with her 
husband. As Phyllis Chesler (2009) points out, the m/other/daughter “bond”, insofar as it 
is a bond, is pivotal to a woman‟s relationship with each and every woman she engages 
with during her entire life.  
 
The mother-daughter relationship, as it has formed and taken shape under conditions of 
patriarchy, is central to and at the very core of the female psyche in modern times in all 
cultures bearing the patriarchal yoke (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:40-41). Both the 
abjection of the mother leads to feelings of depression and resentment as well as the girl-
child‟s inability to separate from mother. Both these dynamics are the harbingers of many 
developmental and performative problems, including but not limited to depression, 
confusion, feelings of worthlessness and despair among women wherever the phallus 
holds sway (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:55, 60). From the very first day of her birth the 
young girl in the West, and in the East, is taught that not all her needs, expectations and 
dreams will be met (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:40-46). By the end of  her first year, she 
has already diverted those feelings and needs which are unlikely to be met into a minime-
version (little girl) of herself, internalized and well entrenched in her psychic make-up, 
that will remain with her until the day she dies (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:40, 42, 44-
47, 49-51, 53-54, 57).  Needless to say, m/other also retains her own minime-little girl of 
unmet hopes, needs and expectations. 
 
Those deflected negative feelings are likely to reflect her mother‟s (and her daughter‟s‟ 
should she have one in time to come) own little girl-pathology almost exactly and makes 
perfect sense in terms of being a defence mechanism (Beneria 1998:263-264). This 
psychic diversion is replicated by that most feminine activity of all. M/other ensures that 
she transfers to her daughter a feminine craft of the utmost importance: the ability to care 
and nurture (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:56). But this also comes at a price which will 
demand of the young woman that she always put the needs of others before that of her 
own in ways which are bound to reinforce her fractured and unsatisfying sense of self 
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(Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:42, 48). When mother looks at her little girl she literally 
sees a part of her own body in ways which she is never able to experience with her son 
(similar to the mother/son dynamic in the Chinese context but without the side-effects, as 
I will attempt to show briefly in chapter five). Whereas her son is able to separate and 
move on in the world (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:39, 41), her daughter‟s psychic 
boundaries remain obscure and as a result her daughter is bound to remain needy and 
incomplete.  
 
In other words, women‟s tendency towards depression stems from both the need to and 
their inability to break from their m/others on a psychic level and, the reverse side of the 
coin, from guilt and anxiety, should she be able to draw some line of demarcation 
between her and m/other (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:49, 52-53, 60). M/others are also 
seen as complicit agents enforcing patriarchal constraints on their already vulnerable 
daughters and this treachery is not easily forgiven (Elliot 1991:59; Lionnet 1991: 139-
140). M/others‟ often impossible demands and expectations of their daughters lead to 
feelings of rejection, only readily dissolved at the death of mother (Elliot 1991:43-44, 56; 
de Beauvoir 1969:28). These demands and expectations do not only relate to m/other's 
expectation of her daughter to conform to an ideal of femininity found wanting by her 
daughter, but also to the daughter's desire to please and appease her m/other (Elliot 1991: 
32, 61-62; Apter 2004:155-156). 
 
 A woman‟s sense of self under the conditions which contemporary patriarchy imposes 
on her, is rickety at best and her psychic boundaries with mother fuzzy and ill-defined 
(Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:55, 62). Eichenbaum and Orbach, two feminist 
psychologists which many years of experience counseling women, report that  
 
                                      Many women never feel free of their mothers. They are not 
separate people, but experience mother as living inside, judging, binding, tempting, 
and disappointing.  
                                      (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:60) 
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Looking at the mother-daughter dynamic from both angles, we can now appreciate how 
the  
         
                                          psychological attachment and lack of separation between 
mothers and daughters and daughters and mothers continue through generations of 
women. The daughter becomes involved in a cycle that is part of each woman‟s 
experience: attempting to care for mother. As the daughter learns her role as 
nurturer, her first child is her mother.  (emphasis added)     
                                          (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:57) 
 
From a feminist understanding of the psychology of woman (and the endless 
reproduction of that psychic deformity), our current thinking is that the girl-child‟s 
inability to separate from m/other, rather than the latter‟s alleged abjection by her 
daughter, is pivotal to the (de)formation and development of the female psyche in almost 
all contemporary societies. These spaces are infused with patriarchal values and prejudice 
which subjectivize women as inferior “nurturers and carers” in the first place. Dana 
Cowley Jack (1993:27-30, 53-54) loses no time in pointing out that what leads women to 
depression in their intimate lives with men is precisely not their yearning for dependence 
of their partner (as is so often contended), but rather their perception of losing themselves 
and their autonomy in the relationship – their sense of self, and their 
powerlessness/inability to redirect their lives. Finally, note how almost inseparable 
m/other and daughter are from one another. The daughter is the mother‟s first care-giver, 
read mother, and the mother is the daughter‟s first infant. 
   
In the preceding section, I have, following a suggestion of Kristeva‟s,  explored the 
notorious mother/daughter strife in Western culture as an example of the dearth of  
healthy maternal discourse. Women are not only alive to their inferior position in society, 
but actively devalue themselves both in the public sphere and in their private lives (Elliot 
1991:112). On this point, Amy Kesselman (1998:39) recalls refreshingly how her 
conversion to feminism, and that of her three close friends, in the late sixties blew away 
the clouds of self-doubt and female self-depreciation which they happened to have 
harboured in themselves. Is hysteria, a disease reputedly exclusive to women, not 
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precisely the rejection of femininity as an aberration from the mean? In referring to a 
"deformed psyche," I obviously imply a “correct” psychological orientation which does 
reflect a particular political thinking, taking the male model as the norm. Jane Flax 
(1991:136) also takes the psychological deformity of women as her point of departure.  
 
But not all feminists have taken such a negative view of the costs of cultivating caring as 
a female virtue. They point precisely to the ability to build healthy relationships and the 
security which these affiliations entail (cited in Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:67n8). My 
opinion is that caring as a human character trait within the context of a healthy self-
esteem is entirely feasible, but this does not vitiate my claim that, under patriarchy, 
caring is held up as a virtue for subjects who are deemed to be incapable of the autonomy 
and self-directedness characteristic of the male subject. I will return to this topic in 
Chapter Five in my analysis of the third film directed by Zhang which I read. What value 
would an examination of Chinese culture have to potentially enrich the alleged absence 
of discourse on motherhood in the West? 
 
I have no doubt that excellent research has been done in the West on precisely this 
problem (the fraught mother-daughter dyad). But the possibility of finding a curative 
maternal dialogue in the West is compromised. Consider in this context Emily Martin‟s 
(1989:4, 11) apt words, that her enigma was how to find a rock from which to survey the 
overwhelming familiarity of her own culture. It requires no plea that China is one of the 
oldest surviving civilizations and as such, being a culture very different from our own 
(Dawson 1971:372), may be able to provide us with insights which our own cultural 
blind-spots are unable to fill (Wilson 1992:25). Dawson (1971:376-378) suggests four 
reasons why the study of Chinese civilization is bound to yield great rewards to the 
student.  I will note only two of his suggestions. According to Dawson (1971:377) the 
most important of these for us in West in the twentieth century is the huge investment the 
Chinese have made in the "satisfaction of human needs and the problems of human 
relationships". Luce Irigaray (2004:6) remarks that Western philosophy, in its much 
acclaimed love for wisdom, has overlooked the quest for the “wisdom of love” and the 
enormous value of tender relationships.  
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 Similarly Dawson proposes that a Eurocentric-trained mind could benefit by using 
Chinese culture as a level from which to survey our own civilization. Jo Freeman 
(1998:175) recalls how she as a middle-class white woman observed the refreshing 
features of African American women occupying and negotiating an entirely different 
space in their communities, which is so different from the "clingy vine" white woman 
stereotype. This is what I hope to achieve by examining the mother-daughter relationship 
in a different cultural setting. Not only is a Chinese woman‟s psychic make-up almost 
certain to be differently constructed by the discourses, institutions and practices 
prevailing in those societies (Spelman 1990:14), but, as Jo Freeman (above) points out in 
her observations of African American women, Chinese women may very well occupy an 
entirely different sort of social space and employ different ways and means to negotiate 
her social role (Susan Mann 1997:9).     
 
The importance of good quality interpersonal relationships (Smith 2008:145; Xu 
2007:148; Dawson 1971:372, 377), ranks high in Chinese societies. Trust (quanxi, 
meaning trust and a warm relationship) is not easily gained, but once earned opens many 
doors in Chinese culture (Xu 2007:151). It comes as no surprise then that the Chinese 
place a high premium on sincerity and integrity (Bloomfield 1983:170). Having lived and 
worked in a Chinese environment myself for the past five years, I can personally vouch 
for the ability and willingness among Chinese generally to suspend judgment on personal 
matters, which allows for the unfolding of the interpersonal space necessary for 
relationships to take hold and very often bloom.   
 
In the Western world, relationships have rarely featured as a respectable item on the 
philosophical agenda (Solomons & Higgins 1996:290) but it is one of great concern to 
feminists (English 1981:3). I have already referred to Luce Irigaray‟s (2004:6) remark, 
that Western philosophy, in its much acclaimed love for wisdom, has overlooked the 
quest for the “wisdom of love” and the enormous value of tender relationships. The 
absence of reflection on the value and importance of human relationships from the index 
of serious philosophy can perhaps be explained against the perception of philosophy as 
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having a strong (Western) masculine gender-bias (Ainley 1995a:273), whereas women 
are traditionally seen as the guardians of meaningful, healthy intimate relationships and 
therefore automatically liable to exclusion from male-centred reason (Ainley 1995b:918). 
 
It is interesting that reason, traditionally seen as a male preoccupation in the West, is 
accorded a fairly low status in Chinese civilization (Graham 1971:54-55), although the 
latter, as we have seen, is by no means free from misogynist strands. In far greater 
demand, than reason, is the pithy and economically worded saying or aphorism. Margaret 
Mead (quoted in Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988:35n23) found that what is valued in one 
culture as a male pursuit, may be devalued in another as a female interest. Graham 
(1971:55) suggests that the common indifference to reason could be the result of the 
peculiar linguistic layout of the members belonging to the Chinese family of languages 
(Cantonese, Mandarin, Hakka, to mention only a few). We may deduce from this that 
reason's male colouring in the West is nothing but a cultural construct and nothing 
inherently inevitable.  
 
Small wonder then that under contemporary patriarchy women have not only had their 
experiences denigrated and side-lined, but until fairly recently women have not had the 
opportunity to articulate their stories, and a space for the expression and proliferation of 
specifically female (as opposed to strictly feminine) narratives are sorely needed (Shefer 
& Boonzaier 2006:6, 8, 11).  Furthermore, as Susan Brownmiller (1976:113-114, 139) 
shows, women‟s experience or priorities (notably rape, abuse or child-care arrangements) 
are often relegated to the mundane or considered trifles by male observers and an exit 
needs to open up and encourage a base or a forum where women can generate their 
specific (and by no means homogeneous) “herstories” (as opposed to male histories).  
 
Women‟s absence from the historical record is one reason why it is important for 
feminists that women be given voice and encouragement to express themselves and to 
explore both their feelings and commitments, as these discursive fields are often 
compromised and confused because of the prevalence of male-generated ways of 
knowing (Shefer & Boonziaer 2006:9; Winslow 1998:237). This idea of an exclusively 
34 
 
“female perspective” is of central importance in feminist methodology and epistemology. 
Let me clarify the difference between methodology and epistemology. The former is the 
ways and research tools we employ to gather the information and evidence required for 
our research and concerns itself with how the research should proceed both in terms of 
her/his choice of which medium (the theoretical orientation) and the tools to be employed 
to tease out the information desired (Brayton 1997:1-2). Epistemology, on the other hand, 
is an enquiry into what knowledge is, whose knowledge is credible and how we can claim 
to really know anything at all (Dancy 1995:245-248; Frazer 1995a:241-242). 
   
   How does a female perspective differ from that of a male? Hendrik Ibsen (in Michael 
Meyer 1982:13) made these "Notes on A Tragedy" in preparation of his writing of his 
famous play A Doll's House (originally published in 1879). Ibsen jotted down these notes 
and it is beautifully illustrative of a women's point of view as opposed to that of a man's. 
It also shows that men are capable of having empathy for women and that the 
understanding of a women's perspective is not confined to creatures living on Venus. 
Ibsen wrote that the female lead 
 
 [i]n the play ends up by having no idea what are right and what is wrong; natural 
feelings on the one hand and belief in authority on the other lead her to utter 
distraction.  
  A woman cannot be herself in modern society. It is an exclusively male society, 
with laws made by men and with prosecutors and judges who assess female 
conduct from a male standpoint. 
   She has committed forgery; which is her pride for she has done it out of love for 
her husband, to save his life. But this husband of hers takes his standpoint, 
conventionally honorable, on the side of the law, and sees the situation with male 
eyes.   (Ibsen in Meyer 1982:13).          
 
 But not only does the woman's perspective and understanding of her world(s) differ most 
radically from that of men (even men in her own culture), Susan  Mann (1997:200) is 
able to demonstrate that center-staging women's views in the Chinese context implodes 
the former male understanding of, for example, the unimportant social and political role 
of Buddhism (one of the major world religions [or “non”-religions] diversified into 
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several appropriations, as is well-known) during the Qing-era (the period of Manchu rule 
over China). Formerly the male historical grasp situated Buddhism on the periphery of 
Chinese society during this period but a female point of view has demonstrated that it 
was the encouragement and support of women whom allowed the monks to persevere and 
survive despite relentless Confucian persecution.  
 
  The irony of the phenomenon is that it left women in peace to pursue their own spiritual 
development in both Daoism and Buddhism while the hapless monks took the rap. And 
yet the present-day survival of Buddhism in China may be, partially at least, due to the 
courageous efforts of women who saw in it a means of withdrawing from and enriching 
their own lives in the context of a particularly harsh, bleak patriarchal culture. Put in 
another way, Chinese women during the Qing-era were able to develop their own (sub)-
culture surreptitiously and find meaning in it in a society otherwise supercilious of and 
oblivious to women's needs, dreams and desire. In the same vein it may, for example, be 
properly questioned, a line I do not wish to pursue here, whether European women had a 
renaissance. Thabo Mbeki suggested a couple of years ago that African societies (other 
repressed m/others rearing their heads?) might be experiencing a contemporaneous 
renaissance.  But there happens to be an excellent reason why examining the narratives of 
the lives of Chinese women could be enormously appealing for our project.  
 
Susan Mann (1997:10-11) suggests that unlike the life cycle of Western women, the 
psychological trauma which awaits the Chinese female is, for our purposes, significantly 
different from that of her Western sister.   Whereas Western men have the opportunity to 
abject mother and strike out in the world as a person in his own right and independent of 
mother, in the case of the Chinese woman she is the one whom is prepared from the day 
she is born to leave home, breaking with everyone and everything she has known and join 
her husband‟s family. Unlike her Western sister but very much like the male in the West, 
the Chinese daughter needs to “abject” mother, in the full Kristevian sense of the word, 
and go into the world. As I already remarked above, it is curious that the Chinese son has 
an intimate and psychically intense relationship with his m/other, one of psychic 
continuity, reminiscent of the Western daughter‟s relationship with her m/other. The 
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Chinese male‟s relationship with his wife is marginal at best. I will return to this topic in 
Chapter Five in the context of my analysis of selected Chinese cinematic texts. Women in 
the West are hungry for accounts of women who have real and meaningful relationships 
with men other than those considered "superficial and unsatisfying" (Kesselman et al 
1998:48).  
 
  In the case of the Chinese women we have then an excellent opportunity to study the 
reverse of the psychic formation of her Western sister under conditions closely 
resembling patriarchy as we have come to know the institution in the West. I am mindful 
here of Susan Mann‟s (1997:222-223, 225) warning against the tendency among Western 
China scholars to equate the domination of Western women with that of Chinese women 
as birds of the same feather. She is also at pains to point out that the long Chinese 
eighteenth century (1680-1839) featured definite spots of liberty for certain Chinese 
women, notably well-read poets, and served as a precursor to the women‟s liberation 
movements (in China) of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
  
  For these reasons I have elected to read texts performed by Gong Li and analyze a 
cinematic dissenting discourse on gender in mainland Chinese society, after concluding, 
at the end of Chapter Four, that institutionalized discourse is unsatisfactorily. I am not 
unaware of the limitations placed on their narratives being mediated through the mindset 
of a white middle-aged male with feminist leanings. But, as the London Feminist History 
Group (Vivian Bar 1987:xii) has pointed out, this arrangement (i.e. a male reading) may 
have a correcting feature which a strictly female frame of mind might lack. 
 
  In conclusion, I have explored the stricken mother/daughter relationship in the West as 
an example of the alleged scarcity of discourse on motherhood. At the same I have 
attempted to show that Kristeva‟s Freudian assessment of the resolution of the Oedipus is 
only true for males and not even all contemporary males everywhere. Boys in the West 
are able to abject m/other without much fuss and enter the world of language and power. 
For girls, as highlighted by Kristeva, abjection is not at all a given and is entirely a 
different matter from that of boys. A feminist perspective on abjection holds that girls/ 
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women may never be able to separate successfully from m/other. But these models are 
only valid for the West.  In other cultural contexts, such as China, the process may 
actually be reversed, as I have attempted to show.  
 
My conclusion also underlines the value of an interdisciplinary approach, much favoured 
among feminist (philosophical) writers, as opposed to a strictly philosophical tendency 
(Flax 1991:11).  A gender-sensitive feminist understanding of women‟s psychology 
shows that the resolution of the so-called Oedipus-complex, as indicated, is different for 
women under contemporary patriarchy in the West.  Placing women centre-stage shed 
entirely new light on the issue of women‟s state of depression in the West and the 
possibility was raised of reading a Chinese women‟s dissenting discourse, following 
another suggestion by Kristeva, in an attempt to infuse the worn-out discourses on 
m/otherhood in the West, notably the m/other-daughter relationship, which features as the 
foundational stone upon which women‟s psyche, in the West at least, is constructed. In 
the next chapter I will explore my preferred methodology before turning, in Chapter 
Three, in the context of an attempt to espouse the topic which drives current (feminist) 
film theory, to film reception by a gendered audience, the haunting of cinema by the 
repressed maternal “uncanny”. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CROSS-CULTURAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS AS A METHODOLOGY OF 
CONSIDERED CHOICE 
 
In this chapter I will explain in some detail what a cross-cultural feminist 
methodology entails. I will also attempt to justify briefly why this approach is 
preferable over other worthy candidates. As the problem I posed in the first chapter 
concerns the (presumably irresolvable) strife between mother and daughter, as an 
example par excellence of the lack of maternal discourse, uniquely given birth under 
conditions of patriarchal oppression, I consider a feminist approach preeminently 
justified. As this deeply-rooted concept of m/otherhood is based on exploitation and 
oppression, nothing but a feminist, albeit a critical feminist approach, will do. The 
issue of whether a man can sensibly do feminist research is a contentious one in late 
twentieth century feminism and I retrace the outlines of that debate as it has a certain 
relevance to both the credibility (I employ gender as a tool of analysis) and viability (I 
acknowledge the centrality of a female perspective, as I showed in the previous 
chapter, Chapter One, in the context of Ibsen‟s play The Doll’s House and Freud‟s 
neglect of the negative Oedipus Complex) of my project. Once this issue is laid to 
rest, I traverse a number of feminist methodologies in order to situate my own choice 
within a rational frame work before proceeding to discuss critically the various 
elements which make up the body of a cross-cultural feminist analysis. Can a man do 
feminist research?  
 
Feminists are interested in the many different and often hugely divergent views and 
opinions of women as they formulate these in (a) world(s) shaped along patriarchal 
and misogynist parameters. Kasper (cited in Brayton [on-line publication]) opines that 
"the essential meaning[s, CL] of women's meanings can be grasped only by listening 
to the women themselves." How are Chinese women‟s herstories to be teased and 
traced out?  More to the point, can only women understand other women‟s discourse? 
 
39 
 
 
Frazer (1995:805) suggests that research is gender-skewed, as I argued in Chapter 
One, just as Orbach & Eichenbaum (1988:84n3) are of the view that men can engage 
in feminist counseling with women provided that the gender power imbalance and 
other gender-related issues are constantly negotiated during the professional 
relationship. Toril Moi (1997), who is also the author of an impressive biography on 
Simone de Beauvior, insists that just as it is possible for a white person not to be a 
racist, the white person can nonetheless never be black. By the same token, a man 
may have sympathies for women‟s lot, but he is still unable to be a woman. By this 
analogy I understand Moi to mean that no man (or white person for that matter) can 
ever really understand what it means to be “the other”. Against the background of 
Moi‟s attack on male researchers aspiring to do feminist research, I develop Lim‟s 
argument, argued broadly along the same lines as that of Moi, in the next paragraph. 
In fact, I mention it here because I wish to flag Lim's own argument to demonstrate 
how a male perspective can credit the hunt for female counter- 
herstory(ies)/discourse(s). Herstory is literally the opposite of the orthodoxical 
exclusively male view of history. 
 
Lim (1998) is able to illustrate in impressive fashion how, coming as she does from a 
Chinese patriarchal culture in an expatriate community in Southeast Asia under 
British tutelage, to the United States (and having to spurn a marriage offer, unheard 
and undulated in Chinese societies) in order to pursue her studies as a single 
unattached woman, has given her that special mix of differing influences/discourses to 
understand cultural phenomena in a different setting. This unique blend of subjectivity 
has not deprived her of the ability to be sensitive to cultural nuances and the 
willingness to read across cultural genres (Yanagisako & Delaney 1992:14). This 
exercise would almost certainly have been impossible for Lim without her unique 
background and the special, significantly irreconcilable, discourses converging to 
structure her subjectivity. Joan Nestle (1998:348) identifies with this experience when 
she recalls how a decade of feminist consciousness and two decades of queer living 
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(these two discourses are not compatible in mainstream feminism), made her into a 
woman sensitive to the complexities of  female sexuality.  
 
Kristeva is also alive to the introduction of such incongruities into the researcher‟s 
subjectivity so as to develop a critical edge certainly distinguishable from 
conventional male critical thinking. She writes that for her doing (traditionally male) 
philosophy (generally drenched in misogyny) it might have been necessary to be 
 
a woman to attempt to take up the exorbitant wager of carrying the rational 
project to the outer borders of the signifying venture of men . . . 
                                    (Kristeva 1980: p. x) 
 
So, even if Lim and Moi are right that males cannot be feminists, men, reading 
feminist literature with a feminist consciousness of sorts, can and do bring a 
perspective to feminist research which most women lack. Considering the great 
diversity and also necessarily conflicting views among feminist theorists, the question 
is which feminism?  
 
The multiplication of feminist perspectives seems both healthy (Rooney 2006:9-10, 
Frazer 1995:805) and unstoppable (Amy Ling 1991:744-745). I will define three 
contenders for methodology, poststructuralism, postcolonialism and psychoanalysis, 
all from a feminist perspective, before enumerating briefly on my reasons for 
selecting a fourth candidate, cross-cultural feminist analysis, instead.  
I have attempted to define poststructuralism in the previous chapter and I will not do 
so again here. It remains for me to explain how poststructuralist feminists engage with 
cultural artifacts. Poststructuralist feminists investigate the ways in which images of 
women are encoded in representations, literary productions and films, for example, 
both in terms of fixity, hierarchical prioritizing of gender (such as male/female) and, 
on the other hand, endless proliferation of alternatives, meant to undermine such 
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stereotypes (Doane and Hodges 1989). Feminisms have been guilty of both extremes 
(Doane and Hodges 1989: xiii-xiv, 3-14). In attempting to find space exclusive to 
women, radical feminists have merely reversed the power strategies inherent in the 
traditional gender arrangement. The effort to subvert language games is also doomed 
to failure since, as Derrida (1978:92) and others (Brossard in Jagose 1994:58) have 
shown, it is not possible to step outside of language to access “self-referential” truth. 
Doane and Hodges (1989:12) argue that feminist poststructuralists subject “cultural 
codes that oppress women” to a structured analysis aimed to understand how realities 
and gendered identity are shaped by cultural forces. I consider poststructuralist 
feminism a powerful candidate for my project and had it not been that I engage with 
Chinese culture to shed light on a social and political problem in the West, I might 
have chosen this as my methodology.  
What is postcolonialism? Desai & Nair (2005:1-3) prefer to think in terms of 
postcolonialism(s), rather than simply postcolonialism, to describe a tremendous 
interdisciplinary output of “scholarly interest in colonial relations and nationalisms” 
since the 1980s, of which one critical concern is “the role of indigenous traditions in 
shaping a postcolonial modernity.” What is postcolonial feminism? According to 
Rosemary George (2006:211) the postcolonial feminist aims at “interrupting the 
discourses of postcolonial theory and that of liberal Western feminism, while 
simultaneously refusing the singular „Third World Woman‟ as the object of study.” It 
is worth remarking that stereotypes of Third World Women exist in both African and 
Asian societies. Interesting and exceptional women from the Third World are acutely 
aware of female stereotypes in Asian societies (Mohantry 2006:52; Suneja 2002:40-
43) and critical of the fault lines along which Third World societies have been 
structured. This consideration, among others noted in this chapter and others, 
impresses one with how a cross-cultural investigation can yield up insights about the 
researcher‟s own culture, which might otherwise have remained obscure.  
It is a grave mistake indeed to think of Third World women as passive victims and not 
active critical agents of their own and other cultures. The First World includes the rich 
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industrialized nations of Western Europe, Australia, North America, Israel and Japan. 
The Third World refers to the developing world formerly ravaged by Western 
colonialism. Having considered what postcolonialist feminism entails, let us now turn 
to Freud and psychoanalysis. 
 
What is a psychoanalytic feminist literary reading? Feminists practicing 
psychoanalytic readings find great glee in applying psychoanalytic tools and “using 
Freud‟s own weapons against him, find[ing] example upon example of unconscious 
self-betrayal” (Elizabeth Weed 2006:261 quoting Jane Gallop). Feminists interrogate 
psychoanalysis. Questions such as Freud‟s famous query “what does a woman want?” 
are invoked “as if it were a feminist question, ultimately refusing all answers because 
all answers seem addressed to the wrong question” (Weed 2006:263). Psychoanalytic 
feminism is set on leveling the playing field. Questions can be sensibly asked only if 
we have examined our assumptions critically. One such question is explored in 
Chapter One in the context of gender as the foundation of third wave feminism, 
namely not “what is wrong with women?” but rather “how did the assumption arise 
that women are the problem” in the first place. 
 
Although it is not my intention to deny the great merits inherent in each of, or a 
combination of these methods, the latter of which is hopelessly beyond the scope of 
this effort of mine, I am nonetheless of the considered opinion that none of these three 
approaches, if the researcher had to restrict her-/himself to only one, can trump a 
cross-cultural feminist analysis. I will argue this point in the course of the discussion 
of the diverse elements which make up my preferred methodology. 
 
It is accordingly incumbent upon me to outline briefly the limitations and 
shortcomings of my methodological approach and the epistemological failings as I see 
it.  Not only is self-reflexivity throughout the duration of reading and writing of 
research encouraged in a feminist context (Boonzaier & Shefer 2006:5), but any 
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political reading/project has both visible and invisible parameters which cannot be 
breached (Joan Nestle 1998:345).  
 
To illustrate, I offer two examples of each. Firstly, Doris Lessing (1998:55) recalls in 
the second volume of her memoirs Walking in the Shade, that many communists (she 
includes herself in this group) remained in the party long after they themselves knew 
they should have left. Rosalind Coward (1993:192-200) remarks that many women, 
despite their being well versed in feminism and despite years of consciousness-
raising, are still unable to break the habit of idealizing men and pandering to their 
needs. In both examples, both the Communists and the women in question, 
“knew/know” the dishonesty of their situation, but they were/are unable to act on that 
“visible” knowledge.  
 
Secondly, Hazel Rowley (2007:40-41) retells the story of how Sartre and Simone de 
Beauvoir were upbraided by the Hungarian intellectual Georges Politzer for their 
inability to understand why their concept of freedom (“an almost absolute individual 
freedom”) does not apply to all of mankind but is a feature peculiar to the prejudice 
inherent in their bourgeois social standing. Factory workers (and women, as De 
Beauvoir came to realize later) may not have the time, money, energy or inclination to 
live their lives “authentically” (as the rich or the middle class might have done), but 
which Sartre insisted was a universal imperative. Another example of the invisible 
parameters in the “reading” of a situation which cannot be breached, is Erica Jong‟s 
view, related to Susan Mitchell (1997a:33-34) in an interview, that (most?) men in a 
patriarchal society are simply unable to see past their own comforts to grasp the pain 
or the need of women around them.   Nor can a reading of either a printed or a visual 
text in any event be "neutral" (Deirdre Burton 1996:225-226), and I suggest a case has 
been made to justify placing the circumscribed value of my contribution in context. 
 
 An interdisciplinary approach is almost a given in late twentieth-century feminist 
research and writing since the second wave took off in 1966. Gerda Lerner (1981) 
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argues that since women have been left out of largely male accounts of social reality, 
feminisms must deal with all aspects of the world as defined by men. Accordingly, the 
serious feminist researcher cannot neglect insights from any discipline provided only 
that it can show a fair relevance to the issue at hand. Anthropology, sociology, 
philosophy, literature, psychoanalysis, linguistics, postmodern theories and history do 
not only shape feminist thinking in the twenty-first century, feminisms have also 
infiltrated and marked almost all academic curricula taught at tertiary level (Rooney 
2006:10-11). 
 
The point I am driving at is that, since my project is written up for a first research 
degree (Mouton 2001:16), having as its purpose the demonstration of competent and 
independent research skills (a pupilage), it makes pragmatic sense to limit my 
approach to one methodology. Given feminisms' accent on the interdisciplinary nature 
of research directions, my one-dimensional approach could be construed as a serious 
impediment to method. However Thomas Mann (1993) may point to a possible 
amelioration of the situation in proposing that interdisciplinary reading is essential for 
a proper appreciation of a research presentation in this present historical moment of 
immense knowledge explosion (both electronically and in printed texts). Fortunately, 
an interdisciplinary reading, which he warmly recommends, is patently evident from 
these pages. It is of course also true that, as Andrea Hurst (2004: 39-40) indicates, a 
researcher is bound not to remain entirely within her/his avowed methodological 
boundaries. This is also my experience as I will show in the next chapter. Moreover, 
discourse and discourse analysis, both defined in the discussion below, are 
poststructuralist concepts and although I do not pursue a poststructuralist feminist 
approach, I nonetheless employ poststructuralist ideas in the present effort. 
 
As all three methodologies of feminism(s), namely post-structuralism(s), post-
colonialism(s) and varieties of psychoanalysis, appear to be unsuitable as a single 
methodological approach and as I have permitted myself only one exclusively, I have 
instead selected cross-cultural feminist methodology and method. Lisa Heldke (2002: 
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111) defines this method as “exploring and evaluating concepts and practices from a 
culture other than one`s own, using tools from one`s own culture.” According to Niall 
Ferguson (2012), interplay between different cultures is one of the prime motivators 
of historical transformations. Such comparisons between vastly different civilizations 
(the West and China being the case in point) may quite likely show up elements in the 
researcher‟s own world which are likely to have remained hidden. I argue that as I 
intend to seek guidance in another culture on a culture-specific problem in the West, 
cross-cultural feminist analysis, though admittedly also a single methodological 
approach, has an advantage over the other approaches. This is because of it having 
developed the “know-how” which enables it to draw sensible cultural comparisons, as 
well as the tools possibly to extract the desired information so as to shed intelligible 
light on a “blind-spot” (arguably maternal discourse) in the home culture, which is the 
West. 
 
Before stipulating and answering Heldke‟s manifold, and in my view superfluous, 
objections to cross-cultural analysis, I need to develop the concept of cross-cultural 
inquiry in greater detail. Cross-cultural feminist analysis is premised on five precepts 
(of which the final one gives it its claim to being feminist). It will be observed that the 
requirements are closely related and that the discussion of the separate elements will 
inevitably overlap. 
 
Firstly, discourse is a tool of which its social investigative use was perhaps most 
strikingly highlighted by Michel Foucault. Discourse is defined as language marked 
by the intersection of language, power and knowledge, which is “meant to defuse the 
distinction between ideas and practices or text and world that the [overarching, CL] 
culture concept too readily encourages” (Abu-Lughod in Yanagisako & Delaney 1992: 
15-16).  She draws attention to the analytic advantages of Foucaultian discursive 
constructions over the poverty which texts “in themselves” have to change the world 
for the better. Foucault‟s now famous insight, discussed in greater detail below, holds 
that discourses flow into and shape one another, crystallizing in institutions and 
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industries, which produce subjects and the knowledge which supports their making. 
What is discourse? 
 
I will use the ideas of both Foucault and Lacan to explain discourse and discourse 
formation. After attempting to link the interrelationship between knowledge, power 
and discourse, I will also define discourse analysis. 
 
Foucault is able to demonstrate a compelling link between knowledge, (language as) 
discourse and subjectivity, and I will attempt to explain his concept of discourse 
within the context of that discussion. In his inaugural lecture, Foucault (1972) outlines 
in some impressive detail the three main divisions or rules (which are further 
subdivided into three, three and four rules respectively) permitting discourses to take 
root and circulate through society; any human society. The three main rules for the 
„control‟ of discourse are exclusion, internal control and conditions of deployment. 
The sub-rules are prohibition, the distinctions between reason/ insanity and 
truth/falsity; commentary, the writer and disciplines and, finally, ritual, clan (or 
societies of discourse), dogma and societal applications of discourse.  
 
Power is exercised through its dispersion into different discursive formations and 
Foucault‟s explication of the interaction between (the network of) different discursive 
operations is, as Bert Olivier (2011:38-39) points out, highly informative as it shows 
how the different rules, set out above, support and reinforce each other, in different 
contexts, in the exercise of power in society. I will attempt to show this interaction by 
way of two examples. 
 
Firstly, only initiates of the clan, namely members of the medical or legal profession, 
for example, properly admitted to the professional body in question, are allowed to 
make “statements” on an issue relating to their disciplines which are accepted as 
credible by society at large (Foucault 1972:216). Remarks by non-members, 
irrespective of their inherent merits, are rejected out of hand or not considered at all. 
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Foucault (1980:112) refers to this phenomenon as “the politics of the scientific 
statement.” 
 
Secondly, on the issue of commentary (Foucault 1972:220-221), consider, against this 
background, Darwin‟s quest, as is well known, to prove, not to test (since Darwin was 
convinced of its literal truth) the Biblical account of the origin of life on earth, namely 
that all life forms have remained essentially the same unchanged since creation, as 
literally true. Yet his “commentary” (and that of Wallace) on the grounding text of the 
“writer” (God), who allegedly inspired the original drafters of the Bible, turned out to 
be so convincing that it replaced the canonical text on the origin of life. There is 
hardly a biologist in the world today who does not subscribe to some form of 
Darwinism (Blumberg 2009:30-33, 35). In this curious fashion, the intended 
commentary (Darwin‟s ideas of slow incremental change leading to infinite variation 
in both animal and plant life forms) has come to replace the original Biblical account 
of the origin of life. My Darwin example will also make clear how discourse, in this 
case discourse on the origin of life, can accommodate radical change without 
disintegrating, despite the absence of so-called “objective truth.”  
 
The notion of objective knowledge, something on which Foucault and feminists agree, 
is a convenient fiction pivotal to the maintenance of a primary text, such as the Bible, 
which functions to keep power structures in place. Knowledge is discursively 
produced, as I have shown above, and only allows for the “accreditation” of 
statements which are compatible or “in line” with the interests of the powers-that-be. 
In his account of the origin and evolution of modes of punishment, particularly the 
prison in the West, Foucault (1995) shows how “subjects” are formed by judicial 
discourse (the members of the clan include judges, lawyers, social workers, and 
correctional staff), and the knowledge hence produced determines what constitutes 
instances of deviancy that should be classified as “criminal” and which instances not. 
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The same may be said to apply to Foucault‟s (1973) account of the production of 
insane “subjectivity” (although it preceded the work on punishment) and how the 
medieval exclusion of the leper to the fringes of society was eventually replaced with 
the exclusion (or rather “confinement”) of the “insane” (literally deprived of reason – 
the only legitimate language of discursive knowledge). In the context of the 
production of the discourse on femininity, I argue that the issue turns on the practice 
of m/otherhood (I am indebted to Jane Flax (1996) for this interesting neologism, 
which I explain below in my discussion of the second requirement) and the mass of 
conflicting discourses within the force-field of which “femininity” is constituted in the 
West. This is why Leslie Rabine (1991:880) can justifiably refer to contemporary 
women in the West, and one may add across the globe in this time of increasing 
globalization, as experiencing “madly, disarticulated, schizophrenic lives.” Naill 
Ferguson (2012:18) defines the West as an idea with fuzzy boundaries immensely 
expanded in the twentieth century. What should be kept in mind here is that the right 
to utter statements of consequence on (or in) a discourse (or “discipline” in Foucault‟s 
language) is, as I have attempted to clarify, intrinsically tied up with the holding of 
power, the perception of legitimacy and the production of subjectivity. 
 
Foucault‟s work on the relationship between knowledge, power, discourse and 
subjectivity has opened new avenues of inquiry into how power is exercised and 
proliferates in the interaction of discourses in the network of social relations. Not 
surprisingly, his work has had extensive interdisciplinary application in social studies 
(Haste 1993:18, 19n19). Against the background of our foray into Foucaultian theory 
of discourse, we may now proceed to consider Lacan‟s profitably. 
 
Lacan‟s account of discourse is worth traversing for its conceptual clarity of 
exposition both in terms of the constitution of subjectivity and the relationship 
between the different discourse types (Olivier 2012; Lacan 2007). Lacan (2007:13) 
understands discourse to operate as a “naturalizing” exercise whereby a distinct 
psychic format takes shape, and he identifies four discourse models. 
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The master‟s discourse represents the slice of social reality into which the subject is 
inducted by her/his acquisition of language precisely in the act of normalizing 
approved behaviour and suppressing undesirable elements into the realm of the 
unconscious. Master‟s discourse is analogous to film editing where miles of reel are 
synchronized into a systematic and coherent narrative which skims over 
inconsistencies and alternative versions from that of the dominant perspective, exiled 
to the unconscious. The discourse of the university has only one aim, namely the 
search for and attainment of systematic, supposedly unitary non-contradictory 
knowledge, to back-up the power-claims of the master with findings to bolster its 
credibility. In this respect the university discourse is in the role of the slave to the 
master. 
 
In contrast to the discourses of the master and the university, which aim at compiling 
a smooth uncomplicated version of reality, that of the hysteric and the analyst, 
responsive to dominant power, address the “cracks” in the official account provided 
by the first two discourses. The discourse of the hysteric is an unremitting calling into 
question of the legitimacy, limits and credibility of the organization of society and the 
knowledge put forward by the discourses of the master and the university so as to 
justify an ideology based on “objective truth”, which, as I have indicated, is a mirage, 
yet necessary from an ideological point of view. The discourse of the analyst brackets 
the authoritarian claims inherent in the master‟s parameters earmarked in the 
individual‟s life. By critically examining the parameters which motor the subject‟s 
needs and desires, made possible by the analyst‟s mediating role, the subject is able to 
recognize new avenues open to her/him previously thought unattainable because of 
the weight or perceived inevitability of the master‟s directives in her/his life. 
Mediating between hysteric and master/university, therefore, the analyst‟s discourse 
allows new “master‟s” discourses to be “produced”, with the difference, that these are 
no longer regarded as being unshakeable and absolute, so that each can be 
interrogated in succession by the hysteric.  
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Both Lacan and Foucault point to how power play and the formation of subjectivity 
are outcomes of discursive movements in our social reality. How is discourse to be 
analyzed so as to bear sensibly on our understanding of how discourse shapes and 
structures our social world? 
 
John Heritage (2006:146) defines “critical discourse analysis” as a technique to 
understand the text within its social context as any socially or politically entrenched 
discrimination, whether in terms of class, gender or race, reproduced by the prevailing 
power structures and the ideology which informs it.  
 
As I opted for a discourse analysis, along primarily gender lines, of contemporary 
Chinese society, it is worth taking note of the critical element which features in 
Heritage‟s definition. On the role of gender assignment, Louise Kaplan (1993:167) 
writes that  
 
[o]ne of the most powerful instruments of social order is its doctrine of normality, 
especially its convention of gender normality. 
 
The illusion of natural gender role assignment is reproduced by the discourse of the 
master, as Lacan explains, and problematized by the discourse of the hysteric, who is 
unable to find the stability promised in normalcy. However, we do find discontinuity 
in the questioning of certain topics. Helen Haste (1993:107) argues that few sites 
evince such “complex and deep-seated resistances” to change than do traditionally 
fixed gender categories. She suggests that finding new, fresh ways to question 
established gender configurations is imperative (Haste 1993:101). In chapter 4, where 
I attempt to outline the nature of the master‟s discourse in contemporary China, but 
not Taiwan, I note the often violent ways in which both men and women have reacted 
to tinkering with traditional gender classing. Heritage‟s notion of a critical edge to 
discourse analysis can be observed with some clarity in Foucault‟s view of the same 
exercise. Foucault (1972:224) writes that what is at issue in discourse analysis is  
51 
 
 
 
 determining the conditions under which it [discourse] may be employed, of 
imposing a certain number of rules upon those individuals who employ it, thus 
denying access to everyone else who do not satisfy these conditions. 
 
From Foucault‟s understanding of discourse analysis we gain a keen sense of how the 
power embedded in discourse entitles certain individuals to interact and contribute to 
further discourse formation and reinforcement while excluding others who do not 
have discursive access to such power. In Chapter Three I will introduce Bourdieu‟s 
ideas of “heterodox” and “orthodox” discourse and the room it leaves for agency. 
Female agency is an important concept since it is women themselves who, in the final 
analysis, must decide on whether or not to sever the so-called “necessary” link 
between m/otherhood, the female and femininity. I should perhaps stress that I am not 
arguing that women should not be mothers under any circumstances, but rather that 
the choice for or against motherhood is to be exercised in an autonomous and genuine 
way. Against the backdrop of the above discussion on the nature and forms of 
discourse formation being the first requirement to employ in a cross-cultural feminist 
analysis, I now turn to the second requirement, namely culture. 
 
Secondly, culture fuses contradictory and oppressive discourses into a normalizing, 
seemingly cohesive social structure (Yanagisako & Delaney 1992: 15-19). The task of 
a cross-cultural reading is to show up the cultural production of normality. One way to 
accomplish this is to put different contradictory discourses in conversation with one 
another. In the previous chapter I have attempted to show how the discourses on race, 
class and gender produce desire in both the male and female subject for the woman of 
“lesser” class or race. Yet underneath the desire for the maid is really a cry for the lost 
m/other, understood as a lesser being devoted to our welfare, to take care of or service 
the subject‟s needs for nurturing. Hence Flax‟s (1996) coining of the term “m/other”. 
Discourse and the social realities which it turns out do not fall from thin air. It has a 
history and a point of origin. I turn now to the third requirement.  
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Thirdly, cross-cultural feminist analysis is a method devised to read against the 
cultural grain of normality and to show how cultural practices and discourses have a 
historical origin which is not premised on inevitability (Yanagisako & Delaney 1992: 
9-14). This is vintage Foucault. In his histories of the treatment of the insane and the 
prison, discussed above under the first requirement, Foucault demonstrates 
convincingly that none of these social categories fall from thin air but is the result of 
historically conditioned discourses. 
 
Fourthly, this  reading, though bound to be considered profane, especially in a gender 
and sexually repressive society such as the Chinese, cannot be universalized, but 
“must take into account specific systems of classification and meaning” based on a 
sound understanding of the discourses (invariably conflicting), practices, institutions 
and cultural (de)formations peculiar to the culture in question. I shall give one 
example to illustrate the danger of overlooking the rationale of this requirement. 
Susan Mann (1997:27) reports that foot-binding is exclusively to be found in the Han 
Chinese tradition. This is particularly significant if we also know that officially no less 
than 56 ethnic groups are recognized by the Chinese government. As for a slice of 
woman’s perspective on foot-binding, when the Manchu rulers during the Qing-
dynasty outlawed the practice of foot binding, it was the women themselves who 
subverted the edict while the Han men were left to their own devices in their being 
forced by law to don their hair in the hated and humiliating long pigtail-style! (Mann 
1997:27-28). As men were more likely than women to appear in public, it was of 
course easier for women to defy Manchu law than it was for their men. My point is 
that foot-binding applied to only one ethnic group in China; it was finally outlawed in 
1911. It was violently discouraged by the Manchu and certainly made no sense among 
the Cantonese in the south where women were expected to work the fields. Unless we 
are sufficiently well-versed in Chinese culture and history, we will be unable to see 
the forest for the trees.  
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Foot-binding and female femicide (both infanticide and suicide by young females, 
notably to escape an undesired marriage or the stigma of early widowhood) are two of 
the most infamous “orientalist” discourses about China (Jayawardena 1986a: 174-
175), which circulates, even today, in the West and we need to be sufficiently 
intellectually vigilant to understand these myths in their cultural context. If we damn 
Third World women for their own choices, then where does it leave women as free 
agents of their own lives and fortunes? On the other hand, women who opposed foot-
binding may have been subjectivized into doing so by the discourse, so that they 
became the agents of the discourse, to their own detriment. The issue of agency and 
women will be taken up again in chapter four.  
Edward Said (1979) defines orientalist discourse as those discursive arrangements 
which made an appearance since the West began its conquest, subordination and 
colonial exploitation of the rest of the globe. The exclusive aim of orientalist 
discourse is to justify such exploitation by portraying and stereotyping the third world 
native as in need of the white man‟s “civilizing mission”. Postcolonial feminists 
(Chow 2005) argue that male exploitation of women is reproduced in the colonial 
oppression of third world peoples. I now turn to the last requirement, which is the 
feminist angle to this methodology.  
 
Fifthly, how is a cross-cultural investigation feminist? This approach is 
methodologically feminist because of my intention, apart from a consciousness 
sensitized by my immersion in feminist literature, to use gender as a tool in probing 
discourse formatting in contemporary Chinese culture. Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol 
Delaney (1992:20) pursue the line that all humans are psychologically shaped by 
ethnic, religious and nationalistic discourses but that gender cuts through all these 
categories to form a very fundamental form of oppression. (Very few exceptions of 
exclusively female groups exist, such as the anti-marriage unions formed by 
Cantonese women during the nineteenth and early twentieth-century, and radical 
feminists during the Second Wave in the West [Jayawardena 1986a:174; Yanagisako 
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& Delaney 1992:21n4]). This is the reason, they argue, why a cross-cultural feminist 
analysis, with a pro women-line, has a special critical edge to it as a research 
methodology. Understanding gender differentiation as basic to current feminist 
inquiry, we are now in a position to grasp the emphasis on the real-life problems 
women encounter every day under conditions of patriarchal oppression, outside the 
luxury of examining the salient features of texts as opposed to context (Warhol & 
Herndl 1991:x).  What is gender? 
 
At the end of her interesting paper on the intellectual differences between the sexes, 
Lucia Jacobs (2000:87) concludes that “if brain structure and function are constrained 
by the ecology of the species, it may be that sex differences in cognitive traits are no 
more and no less important than the peacock‟s tail.” Her point is that presumed greater 
mathematical ability among men is just a rose by any other name, to borrow from 
Shakespeare, since its ultimate aim is directed towards sexual selection in competition 
among men. Said in another way, a briefcase and a gold card in the modern world 
function in the same way as a peacock‟s tail in the animal world – as an enhancer of 
sexual appeal. Against Jacobs‟ (strictly biological) findings on the minimal distinction 
of cognitive functioning between the male and the female of the species, I turn now to 
a consideration of the feminist views of Flax and Hathaway on gender. Rather than 
define “gender,” Flax (1987:627) points to the following questions in an attempt to 
defamiliarize the reader of the conventionality of the concept: 
 
What is gender? How is it related to anatomical sexual differences? How are 
gender relations constituted and sustained (in one person‟s lifetime and more 
generally as a social experience over time?) How do gender relations relate to 
other sorts of social relations such as class or race? Do gender relations have a 
history (or many)? What causes gender relations to change over time? What are 
the relationships between gender relations, sexuality, and a sense of an 
individual‟s identity? What are the relationships between heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, and gender relations? Are there only two genders?  
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Central to Flax‟s incisive interrogation as to the “nature” of gender, we find instead of 
an exploration of the salient features of the “genders,” impatience with the 
conventional unproblematic view of the hierarchical dichotomy male/female. As Flax 
prepared the ground in respect of denaturalizing the notion of gender, I proceed to 
consider next Donna Haraway‟s (1990) theory of gender. 
 
In my exploration of Foucault‟s theory on discourse, earlier in this chapter, I pointed 
out how discourses cooperate to shape subjectivity and literally produce “subjects”. 
To illustrate, criminals, once they leave the prison “network” (which, as I indicated, 
consists of social workers, magistrates, psychologists, religious and sport personnel, 
etc.), are labeled “ex-convicts”. Foucault has influenced feminist understanding of the 
construction and eventual formation of gendered subjectivity. Both Jane Flax, 
discussed above, and the work of Haraway, of which I offer an overview below, owe a 
debt to Foucault in the development of their views on gender. In this way, Haraway 
(1990) comes to explain how people adopt genders, either male or female, and she 
calls this social phenomenon a “gender identity paradigm,” which, as we know from 
Foucault‟s ideas on discursive shaping of subjectivity, is a process necessarily specific 
in time and space.  
 
This means that a girl born in traditional Chinese society during the Qing period, a 
historical time briefly explained above, will have different parameters or discursive 
investments (such as chastity, the possibility of femicide, sacrifice and familial 
obligations towards an extended new family) directing her psychic construction than a 
girl born to a slave in America‟s deep south before the Civil War. In the latter instance, 
an entirely different range of intersecting discourses (bodily integrity, ceaseless 
manual labour, constant fear and insecurity, fragile family life [liable to be destroyed 
in a moment‟s notice]) might be the ones determining her female identity. Haraway‟s 
“gender identity paradigm” will depend on the discourses “at play” in a specific 
society at a given historical point in time, as I attempted to delineate for women in 
twentieth century mainland China in Chapter Four. Haraway argues that since 
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feminists have begun to examine the concept of gender, gender as a notion started to 
change. This is another way of saying that identity, such as that to which gender 
contributes, is not static since it is constructed through discursive movement. In 
Haraway‟s example, when feminists started talking about “gender,” the notion started 
its slide towards meaning indeterminacy.  
 
Hence, Haraway postulates that the task for feminism is not to uncover the truth of 
female “nature,” since this in itself is a slippery venture, but instead to attempt 
grasping how different discourses converge to make available paradigms which allow 
for the making of different womanly subjectivity in time and space (and which is a 
great deal more productive). I attempt to do this in Chapter Four in my exploration of 
gender discourse in modern China. Gender, as I attempted to demonstrate, is of great 
importance to feminist thinking and research.   
 
Feminists‟ thinking, whatever their other disagreements, have in common their 
passionate interest in the lives and life stories of real flesh-and-blood women (and not 
the stereotype of either virgin or whore, passive and silent), and feminists understand 
the world we live in to be arranged, at its most fundamental level, along gender lines. 
“Its overtly political nature,” claim Warhol & Herndl (1991:x) “is perhaps the single 
most distinguishing feature of feminist scholarly work.” How does a cross-cultural 
investigation with a feminist edge hold up against critical examination? 
 
Heldke (2002) cautions against the many difficulties with which a cross-cultural 
(feminist) methodology is allegedly fraught. In particular, she points out the danger of 
First World (Western) feminists adopting an imperialist attitude towards women in the 
Third World by ignoring their unique agency as beings in their own right and pointing 
out their special oppressions. Angela Davis (1990:119, 138) reports female 
circumcision seems to hold a particular fascination for Western women, while they 
remain blind to their own culture-specific deformations, notably plastic surgery, to 
enhance Western women‟s corporeal appreciation in the eyes of their men. However, 
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Heldke (2002) acknowledges, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, that Third World 
feminisms also inquire into and evaluate other Third World cultures critically.  
 
Finally, Heldke (2002) is alive to the phenomenon, increasingly encountered in our 
global village, which the Cuban poet Nancy Moreyon calls “enculturation” (Lionnet 
1995:14). Enculturation explains how different civilizations can and do shape and 
influence one another, just as a married couple chisels at one another‟s psyche in the 
course of their marriage. Enculturation is an important perspective in a century which 
promises to center increasingly in the East, China or India, or both, as we move into 
the twenty-first century and a multi-polarized world, as opposed to a hegemonic 
unipolar Americanized one (Zakaria 2011; Jacques 2012 ). 
In this chapter, I have discussed the methodological and epistemological approach to 
the problem formulated in the first chapter. Using gender discourse-analysis as a tool, 
I intend to examine the apparent dearth in discourse on the mother in the West by 
using a cross-cultural feminist approach. I will devote the next chapter to the politics 
of film production, but only in the sense of my showing how gender structures 
audience viewing, and the submerged discourse on m/other which it breeds in its 
wake. Although the three Chinese films which I analyze and discuss later are by no 
means comparable to outstanding feminist productions available in China (Barlow 
2002:156), I have attempted to show in the first chapter that any cultural production 
can be put to (a) feminist reading(s).  
The general anti-logocentric and anti-ocular drive in much of twentieth century 
French philosophy, including the work of Foucault (Flynn 1993), which ironically 
reproduced its thought in the publication of (legible) books, was responsible, at least 
in part, for a movement away from a bookish civilization to a consciousness, 
especially among younger people, of media technologies (the internet, film) (Levin 
1993).  
As it might be objected that watching film is just as ocular-centred as the enjoyment 
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of the printed text, I argue that the dominance of sight in humans, in preference to the 
other senses, since the 1850s, was increasingly eroded until vision shared the “stage” 
with hearing and the body (and the sensations stimulating its various organs) in 
general. Claudia Gorbson (1987) finds traces of the m/other‟s presence in the musical 
track as this harks back to the moment before time when the child was still immersed 
in the m/others‟ bodily fluid and no talk of separation could even be entertained. No 
wonder that the introduction of sound had a far more profound effect on the popular 
appeal of cinema than that of colour (Sklar 2002:156). Finally, Linda Williams (1995) 
demonstrates convincingly that the rash of pornographic images, mechanically 
reproduced,  all over Europe, since the middle of the nineteenth century, was 
indicative of a move away from the privileging of the eye over the other senses to the 
involvement of the body (and bodily sensations) in general as well.  She writes about 
the “rupture of the dematerialized, decorporealized, unified centered vision of a 
theatrical scene and the plunging of the observer‟s own body into a transparent 
immediacy of eroticized self-presence” (Williams 1995:36). A wider range of senses 
than merely sight assists the viewer in her observations of cinematic images as the 
importance of the appearance of a fully blown “screen culture” (Marchetti 2006:5) 
and various multi-media technologies in the late twentieth century testify. It is to an 
examination of film that I now turn.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUBMERGED MATERNAL DISCOURSE IN THE MOVING PICTURE 
In the first chapter I highlighted Kristeva’s claim that Western civilization (in fact all 
contemporary patriarchal societies) reflects a serious absence of discourse on m/other. 
In the present chapter I develop this idea further with reference to Freud’s (1968a, cited 
in Chisholm 1992:436-437) idea of the “uncanny”, which he explores in his famous 
essay with the same title. The etymological root of the German “Die Unheimlichkeit” 
literally means “ill at ease” or, more specifically, “a strange feeling of not being at 
home.” For Freud the uncanniness of recognizing something ambivalent in the 
intimately familiar lies in feelings related to, but not quite the same as, horror and fear 
that it evokes under certain circumstances, such as the realization that something has 
repeated itself inexplicably. This is a notion to which I will return with Kaja 
Silverman’s understanding of the eruption of the uncanny upon the male look catching 
sight of the nude female form (even if it remains fully clothed) and its relevance for 
viewer reception.  In the context of maternal discourse, the uncanny feeling of “not 
being at home”, while this is exactly where the audience is (at home, watching the 
movie), takes on special significance.  
Nietzsche (1977), born a generation before Freud, was also, like Freud – who linked it 
with what he called “the repetition compulsion” – acutely aware of the “eternal 
recurrence of the similar”, albeit arguably with different implications. Finally, Hélène 
Cixious (1981, and see also Kristeva 1982) demonstrates impressively how a 
resurgence of women leading up to the end of the “Phallic period” (patriarchy?) is 
bound to be an explosive event bent on changing the social and political landscape 
beyond recognition.  
My argument, for which I am indebted to these scholars, is that our present historical 
juncture made it possible for a whole range of so-called others (feminisms/feminists, 
China, Islam, Third World identities and literatures, etc), formerly repressed in the 
Western consciousness (Said 1979, M. Barr 2011, Cixious 1981), to make a come-back 
and show themselves with renewed vigor.  
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The reasons why these others are able to return and demand an audience from the West 
now, have been explored by both Jacques (2012), Kristeva (1982, 1986a: 134-145) and 
Ferguson (2012). At the risk of oversimplifying their respective positions, I will attempt 
to paraphrase briefly their views. The momentum of Western modernity (the historical 
era of grand, encompassing theories) has run its course and, according to Ferguson 
(2012), since the 1970s the West has actually begun stagnating. It is the realization of 
this historical moment which has moved the West to open its arms and mind to those 
others displaced and injured in the course of its own advancement (hence the legacy of 
colonialism and its continuing aftermath, in, among other things, postcolonial studies). 
Consider in this context the joy and jubilation which swept mainland China when news 
of 9/11 broke (Kurlantzick 2007:28). This incident of venting suppressed anger and 
resentment against the West is both little known and shocking to Westerners.  
 
In this chapter I intend to continue my argument that m/otherhood is one of those 
repressed entities haunting the West’s imagination. Having said this, I will also change 
course and argue for discourses on, or representing “others,” to be understood as 
discursive alternatives to the dominant discourse (metaphorically understood as the 
West). 
 
In Chapter Two I have pointed out that Foucault has shown how discursive formations 
are shaped with the fusion of power and linguistic meaning. According to Balbus and 
Hartstock’s (in Thakur’s 1997:21) reading of Foucault, his view of the necessary link 
between language and power in discourse only applies to dominant discourse and not 
alternatives or counter-discourses (which is not allied with power but has subversion at 
its core). This is of course not strictly true as dissident discourse also necessarily 
requires the meeting of power and language ; “subversion” implicates power no less 
than domination does (consider the power games which feminists played out during the 
Second Wave, referred to in the previous chapter) and Foucault does not neglect to 
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point that out.   Feminists (notably Nancy Hartsock cited in Sawicki 1994:296-297) 
have justifiably criticized Foucault for his bleak portrayal of the possibility of bringing 
overriding discourse around to a new dispensation. Bias is embedded in privilege and 
Hartsock locates Foucault’s in his position as a white, male (and one may add) 
academic European. Foucault is accordingly unable to appreciate the pressing need of 
the colonized to envision a better tomorrow, and his concern for alternative discourses 
without this context leaves him as little more than a rebel without a cause (unless one 
argues that Foucault’s aim is merely diagnostic and not prescriptive. There is also the 
argument that Foucault, as a gay man, was never without the lived-reality context of an 
“other” in relation to mainstream heterosexual, patriarchal discourse.     
Mainstream discourse can and does change depending on time and space, as I hope to 
have shown in the previous chapter in the context of Darwin’s commentary on and 
replacement of the Biblical account of the origin of life on earth, and as I will attempt to 
do again in the next chapter, in the context of the shifting nature of gender discourse in 
the space of a hundred and fifty years in contemporary Chinese history. Despite its 
changing nature, dominant discourse can always be recognized by the fact that it is 
legitimized as the only possible reality by the political, scientific and economic 
institutions which prop it up and perpetuate it through a variety of interconnected 
institutions and myths. One such institution in the contemporary world (both East and 
West) is m/otherhood which is shrouded in myths such as the “ideal mother” and “her 
revered status.” 
 
For an understanding of the nature of subversive discourses, we need to turn our 
attention to the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), a contemporary of Foucault who 
moved in the same Parisian circles. Just as mainstream discourse is known by its 
power-colouring, rebel discourse is a result of and a reaction to the oppressive features 
of the former. As Thakur (1997:61) argues, a great many possible positions resisting 
overpowering discourse can conceivably exist, but because such stances have not been 
articulated, they have not entered the world of discourse which could direct people ’s 
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lives. Bourdieu (1977:164-165) employs the terms “orthodox” and “heterodox” 
discourse for mainstream and subversive discourse respectively, and I will also use 
these concepts.  
 
Is there any evidence of a heterodox discourse on m/otherhood? Kristeva (1986a: 
163-174) insists that the reverence for Virginity in the West (as so beautifully 
articulated by the Virgin Mother-figure in Catholicism) is a resurfacing of the 
suppressed discourse on maternity. In the context of Chinese societies (mainland China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), evincing strains of Confucian institutionalized 
discourse on gender, discussed in the next chapter, I argue in Chapter Five that the 
strong mother-son bond is another resurgence of such maternal discourse. By the same 
token, I am of the considered opinion that the “Holy Cow” phenomenon in Hindu 
culture represents a similar dynamic in a harsh patriarchal climate of child brides, 
widow immolation and mother- in- law tyranny. According to Hindu 
mythology/ideology 330 million gods live in each of the hundreds of millions of cows 
which traverse the Indian countryside and towns. The cow is our mother, a Hindu 
would say, and is revered to such an extent that in a country of enormous poverty and 
hunger, nobody would think of hurting a cow under any circumstances (Ackerman 
1995:135-136). Sadly, legal challenges to India’s ban on the export of beef products 
(hide, leather, meat), notably by the EU， since the early 1990s, have seen the 
establishment of many abattoirs on Indian soil (Shiva 2002). So although these 
discourses on m/other may not be heterodox on the face of it, they are remarkable for 
their very existence and ability to circulate in a political environment which seeks to 
suppress discourse on m/otherhood at all costs. 
 
 Why the perceived need to suppress discourse on maternity? Kristeva (1982: 39) gives 
us a clue. She suggests ominously that the regulation of female sexuality (and hence 
female fertility) is a matter of great importance to modern states, as family units are the 
building stones of the state (both socialist and capitalist). This is reminiscent of Engels 
(1970/1884), who predicts the disappearance of the family unit, which he claims will 
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precede that of the state, too. But the most convincing argument for the suppression of 
maternal discourse is, to my mind, that advanced by E. Ann Kaplan (1983a).  
 
According to Kaplan, the gaze originated in the shared mother-child gaze based on love, 
caring and mutual respect, but it falls squarely outside the dualistic structuring of 
privilege (male/female, black/white, true/false; etc), briefly outlined in Chapter One, 
and thus had to be suppressed as it disrupts dominance, exploitation, mastering. I find 
convincing support for Kaplan in Chesler’s (2009:17) cross-cultural investigation of 
misogyny, distrust and hatred between women for one another, and her argument that 
the defining feature of patriarchy is “mother-blaming” (even among feminists) whereas, 
in former times, “mother-adulteration” (a historical concept in terms of which the 
girl-child adored and veneered the mother) was the essence of the mother-daughter 
nexus. The flowering of discourse on maternity (in which we have seen manifestations 
of great discontent in the first chapter) might conceivably endanger its (maternity’s) 
institutional continuity unless one were to argue, as does Foucault, discussed in Chapter 
Four, that both such suppression and/or its proliferation is part and parcel of its 
repression (apparent liberation is but a new bind). It is characteristic of colonial 
discourse (but not rebel discourse, unless it too becomes institutionalized and thus 
ceases to be rebel discourse) that it demands a monopoly on truth.  Thakur (1997:62-63) 
points out that master discourse’s discomfort with co-existing alternative maternal 
discourses is understandable as these other discourse streams are bound to place a 
question mark over the former’s exclusive right to arbitrate gender issues. 
 
I will argue that cinema is a privileged site to draw material from for an analysis of 
gender, specifically with the aim of studying certain selected issues on m/otherhood. 
Why? Moving pictures, build around a narrative, are positively “spooked”, as I will 
attempt to demonstrate below, by the excluded/abjected m/other on a number of levels. 
The implication is that narrative film is yet another site where the suppressed discourse 
on m/others is threatening to appear as a rash of fresh discursive versions. This will also 
give me an opportunity to address the issue of reception, by a gendered audience, of 
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cinematic productions of narrative, and in particular if and how gender skews such 
experience. Since the 1970’s film theory has changed its focus from attention to the 
visual text to an investigation of audience response (Stoltzfus 1996:3-4); hence my 
discussion of film theory will be devoted largely to this issue. What necessitated this 
shift in focus?  
 
Ben Stoltzfus (1996:4, 6-8) argues that any text demands of the reader to unlock its 
secrets. Art turns on the reader’s fantasies and desires which are submerged in the 
unconscious. Only interpretation can conflate the reader’s understanding, which 
necessarily differs from reader to reader, with the meaning(s) tied up in the text. Freud’s 
(quoted in Stoltzfus 1996:3) suggestion in his seminal The Interpretation of Dreams 
(1968c/1900: 21) that all dreams (read: texts) have traces of “distortion, condensation 
and displacement” (Stoltzfus), has found a sympathetic hearing with the appeal to a 
cultural context (of reception), rather than a bare text, in late twentieth century literary 
approaches.  The power imbalance between the sexes also makes imperative an 
examination of the differences, if any, in gendered response. Accordingly the move 
from textual analysis to reader response theories, implying also the influence and 
import of cultural context, followed this trend in Western academia. Context is 
inextricably linked with discursively produced and structured social and political 
realities, and this brings me to my final point.  
 
Finally, I will attempt to isolate a mainstream institutionalized (orthodox) discourse on 
gender in post-Maoist China. This will be done in the next chapter, but I indicate my 
intention here to show the continuity of purpose and overlap between chapters. The aim 
of this last exercise is to enable me in Chapter Five to analyze three Chinese narrative 
films of Gong Li’s with the aim of possibly identifying a heterodox discourse on 
m/otherhood in terms of a discourse analysis of gender-representation in the films 
concerned. The aim of such an identification exercise is the search for a discourse 
model which could resuscitate failed maternal discourse, particularly that between 
mother and daughter, in patriarchal societies.  
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These cinematic productions have a Chinese Mandarin sound-track (English subtitles) 
directed by the talented Zhang Yimou. Zhang is arguably one of the most popular and 
controversial Chinese directors of his generation (Cook 1990:819). Gong Li is certainly 
the best known Chinese actress in the West (Zhang Zhen 1999:46-47). The three 
narrative films are Raising the Red Lantern (1991), Curse of the Golden Flower (2006) 
and Yu Dou (1990).   
 
What is narrative film? David A. Cook (1990: 917) quotes Beckett’s play, Waiting for 
Godot, to recall that a narrative is a storyline with a beginning, an end and middle (but 
certainly not necessarily in that order.) 
 
Why narrative film? Stories have an uncanny ability to unlock truth(s) embedded in 
the lives of people, which seems to escape statistics or political dogma (Wolf 2006:4). 
Why do stories display this remarkable feature? Lacan (cited in Stoltzfus 1996:5, 8, 10, 
17) articulates a possible answer for narrative’s unconventional ability to poke beneath 
the surface of the conscious/text. When Lacan, as reported by Stoltzfus,  says famously 
that the unconscious is structured like a language, he refers to the textual difficulties 
(lapses, inconsistencies, distortions) in any text (be it written or visual) as representing 
a mouthpiece for the unconscious to speak the m/other. The other/mother literally 
ensconces itself in the nooks and crannies of the text. If repression is the price we pay 
for culture and language (as Freud (1968d) argues in Civilization and its Discontents), 
our engagement with artistic productions (literature, films) allows us the opportunity to 
rendezvous with our unconscious. Narrative is the story of our lives, and rendering an 
account of it, through art, allows us access to the lost Garden of Eden, or, said in another 
way, reunion with the lost, abjected m/other. 
 
 The unconscious is structured like a language precisely because, in as far as it 
manifests itself in texts, it is a representation of our repressed desires and wishes which 
are prohibited from presenting themselves in language - literally (governed by) the Law 
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of the Father. The latter often poses as institutional discourse set on snuffing out 
marginalized realities or experiences. It is precisely fleeting marginalization which I am 
interested in as this is the breeding space of heterodox discourse. 
 
The passage from orthodox to heterodox discourse, or vice versa, is reminiscent of the 
initiation rites through which my own methodology has had to pass. It is interesting that 
just as I have completed the neat and elaborate methodology (and unconventional 
epistemology in its tow), explored at some length over the previous two chapters, my 
preferred form of media from which I will cull my material (narrative cinema),  
demands that my methodology breaks down. Andrea Hurst (quoted in Chapter Two on 
this point) warns that no researcher can hope to keep her/his subject matter contained 
within one exclusive methodological context. The spill-over to a methodology 
(psychoanalysis) which one has just rejected on “rational” grounds is likely to come 
sooner rather than later. Is this yet another instance of the return of the repressed hinted 
at in the beginning of this chapter? 
 
Whereas my methodological approach of choice is a cross-cultural feminist analysis, 
my argument in this chapter is partially based on the premise of a (repressed?) maternal 
discourse hovering just under the surface of all cinematic genres in general. To 
demonstrate this idea, I will need to employ several psychoanalytic concepts 
(scopophilia, fetish, voyeurism) which are stock- in-trade currency for a 
psychoanalytical reading of cinema. E. Ann Kaplan (1983a:310-311) explains 
scopophilia and voyeurism as related needs in the psyche of the male viewer. With the 
former, men’s enjoyment of their penis is translated into the pleasure of observing 
others making love. Secondly, male audience is literally made up of voyeurs peeping 
through the key hole watching parents having sex. Men’s irrational fear of women, 
discussed in greater detail below, is the driving force behind the need to eroticize the 
female figure as a stand-in penis so as to minimize the dread men experience when 
observing a woman (Kaplan 1983a:312). This feverish hunting for the penis in the 
female body as a whole is equivalent to a fetish.  
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According to Freud (1968b) a fetish is a male attempt to disavow or deny his fear of 
castration, restaged when he observes the “lack” of the penis in the naked female form, 
by latching onto an emotional “prop” (any partial or inanimate object such as a shoe, a 
lock of hair, a foot) for sexual satisfaction in his mental association of that object with 
the presumed “lack” in the female body. In pre-modern China the so-called “three- inch 
golden lilly” (the female bound foot) commanded considerable attention as a fetish 
pandering to male fantasies (Bonavia 1982:76). But so can a piece of clothing or even a 
shoe double as an auxiliary of that which is perceived to be missing (Grösz 1992a). 
Consider the spectacular attraction of the female icon.   For reasons illuminated in this 
chapter, cinema taps into the repressed materials in the “cavities” of the psyche. Despite 
the relevance of psychoanalysis for cinematic interpretation, I rejected psychoanalysis 
in the previous chapter as largely unsuitable for my project for, among other reasons, 
the fact that the Chinese inhabit a “sex positive” culture (where, unlike the situation in 
the West, sexual activity is not linked to sin or shame, but seen as a natural ingredient of 
life) and as such can arguably not exhibit neuroses on those grounds. However, Freud’s 
doctrine of original/originary repression (of primitive instincts, which “create” the 
unconscious) does lay the foundation for neuroses generally in Chinese culture, in the 
sense of “the (symptomatic) return of the repressed” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 
“Repression”). Before turning to Chinese cinema in Chapter Five, let me first consider 
Lucy Fischer’s (1996) proposal that a sunken metaphor of m/otherhood is present 
across all Western cinematic genres from horror to comedy.  
 
As part of her reasoning that genres are a great deal more overlapping than what their 
initial categories as either male-oriented (crime for example) or female-oriented 
(melodrama for example) seem to suggest, Fischer (1996:7-8) quotes Stephen Neale’s 
findings that studios aim to placate and please members of both genders so as to make 
as much money as possible. Hence Westerns are structured so as to “privilege, examine 
and celebrate the body of the male.” In the same vein, Fischer notes that melodrama 
demands an effeminate male as its centerpiece. 
68 
 
 
Building on these insights, Fischer is able to conclude that a submerged maternal 
discourse is irrecoverable across all cinematic genres in Western cinema. In an attempt 
to demonstrate her thinking, I will note only a few of the many examples she cites to 
bolster her argument. In her own words, no “single text has systematically explored the 
representation of maternity across diverse generic patterns” (Fischer 1996:6) (emphasis 
in the original). 
 
In horror films, Barbara Creed (Fischer 1996:22) has isolated the discourse on m/other 
in productions such as The Brood (1979) and Psycho (1960) in the guise of “monster 
birthing” and “dismembering moms” respectively. The ideology behind these 
representations is that m/others are responsible for children’s upbringing and that they 
are solely to blame if social ills befall the ir “brood” in later life. Constance Penley 
(1986:72) considers science fiction films such as Terminator (1984) and Back to the 
Future (1985) as cultural products which aim to generate childhood fantasies fixating 
on m/other. The dream implicit in travelling through time is of being present when your 
parents conceive you (a fly against the wall) and therefore of being fused into a person 
consisting of both your mother and your father. This improbable state of affairs harks 
back to the primal scene scenario when the child happens upon the m/other (and father?) 
engaged in sexual intercourse. 
 
I will consider melodrama briefly before attempting to situate m/other in the narrative 
feature of cinema generally. What is melodrama?  Annette Kühn (1994:260) defines 
melodrama as family saga, built around family members’ performance, depicting 
discomfort and disagreement with one another. I refer briefly to one well-known 
example of melodrama, Von Sternberg’s Blonde Venus (1932). 
 
Ann Kaplan (1983b in Fischer 1996:15) casts Josef von Sternberg’s Blonde Venus in 
an anti-maternal frame. Kaplan suggests that although Helen (Marlene Dietrich) is a 
mother, the director’s (Von Sternberg) unease with portraying her in a motherly role 
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shows unmistakably. Kaplan (1983b:53-54) labels this directorial dynamic as a way of 
“repressing Motherhood.” According to Kaplan, Dietrich serves as nothing less than 
Von Sternberg’s fetish! Whether the same is true of Zhang’s management of Gong Li 
(they broke off their collaboration after a romantic attachment between them faded) in 
the many brilliant cinematic productions they produced  together, is an interesting 
question I will not pursue in the present contribution.  
 
While a repressed m/otherhood arguably fuels the director’s desire, narrative is an 
engine which drives most cinematic productions in the West. In an interview Raymond 
Bellour (Bergström, in Fischer 1996:24-25) observes that films produced for mass 
consumption (a continuation of the role which the novel fulfilled in the nineteenth 
century) are built around the Oedipal fantasy of the hero’s forbidden desire for his 
m/other. But this desire must of necessity be re-directed and recast in a heterosexual 
mould away from the m/other towards another woman or women. 
 
Teresa de Laurentis (1984) has followed up on Bellour’s astute thinking on the hero’s 
motives by arguing that the female presence in the narrative is structured in such a way 
as to present the protagonist with a puzzle which he is meant to solve (or resolve in each 
and every narrative) in the course of his struggles with the real world. On his path of 
advancement towards “victory,” there is always a hindrance which, in whatever form or 
shape, marks the womb.  
 
 In this brief survey of horror film, science fiction, melodrama and narrative cinematic 
features generally, I have attempted to show that m/other’s presence (or the discourse 
on m/otherhood either in a dominant or alternative mode) is never far from the surface 
of a motion picture. Mom literally spooks the silver screen on a number of levels. 
Fischer (1996:9), confirming this claim from a somewhat different angle, remarks that 
“a submerged association between genre reception and motherhood is to be found in a 
critical discourse that positions the film consumer as an anxious, insecure child.”  This 
idea of hers is certainly most profound. Discourse on m/otherhood (which Kristeva 
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found to be mostly absent if at all present) is an inescapable presence around which 
cinematic productions, almost without exception, are structured. This is not the only 
surprise which maternal discourse on the silver screen has in store, however.  
 
As I have already mentioned, discourse on Mum also circulates on a number of levels. 
Let us now turn to the viewing experience so as to see to what extent discourse on 
mother is available there too. 
 
Bertram Lewin (quoted in Baudry 1976:116) develops his idea of a dream montage 
which is a surface space and irreplaceable for the generation of representations in all 
dreams. It recalls the m/other’s breast which soothed the infant to sleep after suckling.  
It also supports our infantile wish fulfillment of becoming one again with the source of 
all security – the womb. The images on the screen are then complimented with the 
context and atmosphere in which these images are consumed (the dark, comfortable 
theatre and the cinematic effects, such as sound, which allows us to identify and to be 
involved, in mind and body, with the narrative) which precipitates the welcoming of the 
“regressive state”.   
 
Jean-Louis Baudry (1976) has drawn heavily on Lewin’s dream montage to allow for 
the flowering of his own argument that the film reel, the night-like atmosphere in the 
theatre room and the projection hardware itself, answer to the need of the audience for 
psychic backsliding to a mythical state of reunion with the lost, abjected m/other. 
Baudry links these typical cinematic experiences with two seminal texts in the Western 
canon, namely Plato’s image of the cave and Freud’s thinking on the interaction 
between dreams and the unconscious. 
 
Baudry builds his argument around Lewin’s idea of the screen montage (which 
doubles as the screen on which dreams are projected as well) and superimposes upon 
that Freud’s premise that sleep resembles the emotionally secure space/time in the 
womb. Baudry ties this view of cinema as a safe m/otherly haven to that of the chained, 
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shackled inmates of Plato’s fictional cave. These prisoners can only view the 
representations on the wall of the cave in politically uninformed terms as inevitable and 
natural reality. Baudry concludes that cinematic imagery is nothing if not a dream to 
which the audience cannot but succumb. In all three these settings (the cave, the dream 
and the theatre room) the consumer of representations expresses an unsaid yearning for 
a return to the womb, i.e. reliving the “origin-ary” experience of m/other. 
 
 Robert Eberwein (1984:42, quoted in Fischer 1996:26) draws attention to close-ups 
(a close shot of any object, notably the face; Cook 1990:910) as a powerful trigger of 
our most basic memory of that “archetypal mass we can recall only dimly … The face 
in the close-up is, in essence, the mother’s face, the breast, the primal unity of infancy.” 
Maternal discourse (whether conservative or liberating) is never far from our 
enjoyment of representations. 
Laura Mulvey (1989a/1975) does not invoke the m/other as such in her understanding 
of the dynamics of male audience, but considering the three aspects she pays attention 
to in articulating her position, maternal discourse is clearly albeit implicitly in 
attendance (Fischer 1996:26-27). The three items on this maternal agenda is fetish, 
scopophilia and voyeurism. Mulvey positions the male cinematic consumer as a small 
insecure boy desperate to cope with his overwhelming fear of m/other and managing 
this dread by either fetishization or being a voyeur, watching her with hostility through 
the key hole (represented by the “frame” of the silver screen, the camera lens). As for 
the cinematically represented female body, Mulvey sees her as the object of the male 
gaze, which she is, only being capable of identifying with her own subjugation, 
although a number of commentators, myself included, differ with her on this score. 
Consider, for one, the example of “Cowboy Western” movies broached earlier in this 
chapter. In this cinematic genre, so the argument goes, the gloried male body is the 
spectacle on which its appeal and success hinge, implying that here, no less than where 
the female body is represented, the image representing the male is the object of the gaze, 
male and female. 
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Support for Mulvey’s hypothesis has not been slow in coming. Ann Barr Snitow 
(1983a, and see also Rabine 1991) analyses the reading pattern of hundreds of millions 
of women in the Western world and concludes that women in advanced industrialized 
countries indulge in “mass market romance” (premised on the traditional hero 
sweeping the waiting, fretting, anticipating woman off her feet). She argues that 
romance is pornography for people prohibited from consuming pornography. Snitow 
identifies four steps. (a) The hero is a walking penis which (b) the woman wants and  
likes but (c) the penis is too hard and (d) it needs to be tenderized as she may only 
accept it on her own terms. Sex, in other words, is only socially sanctioned if she can 
sport the ring on the finger. Does this mean Mulvey is correct in her rigid model of 
gendered viewer-/readership? It certainly correlates with the dual hierarchy (namely 
white/black, truth/ false, below/ on top, male, female etc.) around which Western reality 
is structured, which I discuss briefly in Chapter One in the context of the mind/body 
split in Western culture. 
Snitow is a diagnostician of why many, perhaps even most, women are drawn to 
“Mills & Boons” romance and she does not investigate women who fall outside of this 
reading milieu. She postulates that romance of this ilk taps into a repressed area of 
women’s psyche. Although Snitow is writing within a Western context, I will argue in 
the next chapter that this psychic niche is present in all women where the dominant 
discourse on gender mandates traditional femininity, as it does in both the West and 
contemporary Chinese culture.  Similarly, E. Ann Kaplan (1983b) has qualified 
agreement with Mulvey’s exposition and she argues on the basis of Nancy Friday’s 
popular work on female sexuality, in the West, that dominance and submission are both 
viable possibilities for women (the latter adopted more regularly than the former). 
Kaplan’s position differs from Mulvey’s in that she sees the female audience as 
assuming either a “male” or ”female” role, whereas Mulvey can see women viewers as 
only able to slot into the “oppressed role-playing” of the, presumably, female character. 
Correctly, in my view, Kaplan points out that in a minority of cases men can also 
occupy this instance of “female posturing”.   
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In my opinion, Kaplan’s understanding of sexed reading/viewing is preferable to 
Mulvey’s. Ginney Dougary (1994) articulates my unease with Mulvey’s text. Dougary 
makes out a case that the either/or scenario (on top or on her back) is a stereotypical 
grasp of how women negotiate patriarchal structures. The sexual turn-ons for women 
are not widely known. Unlike men, who may share the same fantasies along the same 
broad strokes, “women [are] seen to speak in many tongues” (Dougary 1994:15). She 
quotes British film director Phillipa Giles who believes that narrative is akin to 
penetration (and satisfying for a male audience) while women express great fondness 
for brewing ambiance and yet have “uniformly un-uniform” ideas over what triggers 
them off sexually – significantly often politically “unacceptable”. 
 
Women, although perhaps generally thought to be either master or slave, are capable of 
and keen on exploring a great number of possibilities of desiring outside of the 
approved binary hierarchy. To be fair to Mulvey (1989b), she revised her earlier 1973 
stance (although her paper was only published in 1975) to argue that women are able to 
identify, to a limited extent according to her, with either a male or female image on the 
screen. Mulvey bases her argument on the bisexual permutations implicit in young 
female development. 
   
For Mulvey (1989a), female cinematic icons (Marlene Dietrich, Charlize Theron, Gong 
Li) stand as fetish drivers. Recall that a fetish consoles the male spectator over the 
so-called “lack” observed in m/other and his attempts to deal with this trauma. Consider 
extensive make-up, costume design and cinematic aura in this regard. This is 
particularly true of films produced in mainland China by the so-called Fifth Generation 
directors, which includes Zhang Yimou, as we will see in Chapter Five. Support for 
Mulvey’s position is fast in coming. As pointed out earlier, E. Ann Kaplan (1983b) 
takes issue with Von Sternberg’s management of his favorite female lead (Dietrich) and 
she has no scruples calling it a fetish. Fischer (1996:26), after considering Mulvey’s 
line of thinking, feels justified to postulate that “mother marquee haunts the cinema.” 
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Apart from the mobile fetish grabbing our attention, related syndromes such as 
voyeurism and scopophilia underline the advantage of the visual text (cinema) over that 
of the printed text, as these ocular predilections cannot be indulged to the same degree 
and with the same intensity as is the case with the moving picture. Freud (1968d, cited 
in Grösz 1992b:447) suggests that perhaps the most powerful reason for humans’ 
preference of sight over other senses is our upright posture (bats use radar, Rhinos and 
moles prefer smell by far over sight, dolphins and whales eco- location). John Beebe 
(2001), writing from a Jungian perspective which aims to align the complementary 
male and female halves of any sign, is of the view that cinematic representations have 
great appeal to our trust, since it is humans’ preferential choice of sense, and 
accordingly they find pleasure in ocular testimony. Bert Olivier (2002:47, 50) makes a 
strong case that we live in an “audio-visual” world, especially among younger people, 
and that viewers tend to model their behaviour on that of cinematic icons. This 
observation applies cross-culturally, increasingly so in our globalized world. 
   
Gaylin Studlar (1985, quoted in Fischer 1996:27) has built on Mulvey’s work, though 
Studlar introduces a dimension absent with Mulvey,  by propounding the view that the 
spectator is also drawn in by a masochistic move on the screen. She argues that during 
the pre-Oedipal stage (before the child acquires language and before s/he is subjected to 
the Law of the Father) M/other is a most awesome Goddess whilst the father does not 
even feature as a presence. M/other is a strong, most powerful and frightening centre 
structuring the child’s life and meaning. Invoking the image of this genie on the wall 
(the female icon on the screen) cannot but stir up overwhelming infantile fears and 
“evinces certain deep-seated male anxieties concerning the female’s power over him” 
(Fischer 1996:42) (emphasis in the original). 
 
In the delightful early film The Pipe Dream (1905) a gigantic woman dressed in a 
white dress (a virgin mother?) smokes a cigarette against a black background. In her 
outstretched hand cowers a tiny man pleading his cause. Her laughter is bone-chilling 
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whilst she blows smoke onto his profile. This is a most powerful image of male 
infantile fears of women. Is there support in the literature for this view? 
 
Karen Horney (1973/1932) points out the life- long significance of the small boy 
registering his m/other’s “private body parts” and how he understands with increasing 
dread how his own genitalia are way too small to fit. How great the risk he runs of being 
humiliated and scorned! The psychic significance of those early childhood experiences 
in the shaping of a hostile attitude towards women in later life should not be 
underestimated.  Support for Horney’s argument is expressly advanced by Nancy 
Chodorow (1989:6) who remarks that she is  
 
…yet to find a convincing explanation for the virulence of masculine anger, fear, and 
resentment of women, or aggression towards them, that bypasses – even if it does 
not rest with – the psychoanalytical account, first suggested by Horney, that men 
resent and fear women because they experience them as powerful mothers.  
 
I opened this chapter with reference to Freud’s exploration of the idea of the uncanny 
being able to provoke terror upon sight of the already familiar. Horney and Chodorow’s 
work finds relevance in Kaja Silverman’s (1988:17-18) demonstration of how the 
uncanny horror, which sight of the female (cinematic) image evokes in the male viewer 
(in particular evident in the need to fetishize in order to substitute the “lack of the penis” 
in the m/other, and the rider of impending castration), cannot have its origin in the 
female form, since its uncanniness suggests a “prior trauma” nestling in the 
unconscious.   It is my argument that stereotypical representations (whether as Virgin or 
Fallen Woman) of the All-Powerful M/other, such as her representation in The Pipe 
Dream, are at the root of dominant discourse, shaping gender relations and generating 
meaning for all the agents caught up in that slice of reality. This is a conclusion I have in 
common with both Dinnerstein (1989) and Chodorow (1987), who argue that 
traditional gender roles are the result of early childhood rearing at the exclusive hands 
of women.  In the chapter following the next, Chapter Five, I will employ an analysis of 
heterodox discourse on gender in my reading of selected Chinese texts after first 
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attempting to identify mainstream institutionalized discourse in the Peoples’ Republic 
of China (PRC) in Chapter Four, which is the next chapter.  
 
For my purpose of locating a dissenting discourse, or that of the hysteric, in Lacanian 
terms (Lacan 2007, Olivier 2012), I dissect three narrative Chinese films in which Gong 
Li is the female lead actress. It is precisely the limits of the observer’s own cultural 
experience which motivates an examination of an alien culture. By the same token, 
utilizing a research model from one’s own culture to examine cultural artifacts from 
another culture, is bound to show up the limits and blind-spots of the culture from 
which we hope to learn something (Thahur 1997:197-199). 
 
In conclusion, I differ from Kristeva’s finding that the West is devoid of (rebel) 
discourses on m/otherhood, although Kristeva (1986:180-185), assuming I read her 
intentions correctly, seems to refer to the absence of dominant discourse (on maternity), 
rather than dissenting discourses, in the wake of the wane of Christianity in the West, 
according to Kristeva, and the softening of the obsession with virginity in its train. I do 
agree with her that a colonizing institutionalized discourse on gender is at work in 
Western civilization, which attempts to suppress maternal discourse (Kristeva 1982:39, 
Kaplan 1983a:163-164). Kristeva’s own example of the virginity ideal articulated in 
Catholicism (and Eastern Orthodox Christianity) is a rebel discourse reacting against 
and made possible by the oppressive nature of the patriarchal master discourse (Lacan 
2007, Olivier 2012). Repressed/suppressed mainstream discourse on m/other has 
spawned a great many alternative discourses, as I have attempted to demonstrate in the 
case of cinema. But let us now proceed to review the features of the historical course of 
dominant discourse on gender in Chinese societies, particularly in mainland China. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORTHODOX DISCOURSE ON GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY MAINLAND 
CHINA 
 
Zhang Zhen (1999:27) advances the postulate that Western commentators on Chinese 
cinematic productions always undertake to provide a cultural setting for their 
reading(s), but these promises are more readily honored in the breach than in the 
observance. I have more reasons than one to sketch out orthodox discourse on gender 
in mainland China. Not only is an understanding of dominant discourse on gender 
essential, as I argue below, to grasp the alternative rebel sprouting in its shadow (I 
analyze one such hysterical discourse, in the Lacanian sense of the word, as I 
explained the concept in Chapter Two), but I will also attempt to live up to the 
undertaking of Western reviewers to flesh out our readings of Far Eastern films with 
an appropriate social context. I will briefly review the introduction of film to China 
before attempting an overview of modern institutionalized discourse on gender (the 
orthodox version). Several markers on the nature of discourse generally will precede 
this synopsis of gender discursive machinations over the past 150 years of modern 
Chinese history. Curiously enough the Chinese have never considered film, though 
quintessentially Western, a foreign invasion (Cook 1990:816), although they have had, 
and still do have, their reservations over Buddhism (Cole 1998), which came to China 
from India around two thousand years ago.  
 
Film was introduced to China about the same time that the first attempts were on 
show in the West (Cook 1990:816) and became wildly popular. Referred to as 
“shadow play” (ying she), the first home-grown efforts were in circulation during 
1905, slightly ahead of Imperial Russia‟s 1908. However, as indicated above, cinema 
is a quintessentially Western invention. Film, the seventh art form, the first of the 
twentieth century, was vetted for perfection of those slights which marred the other art 
forms (painting, sculpture, music, literature, theatre and architecture) (Turner 1993). 
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My point is that cinema aims to provide a real- life experience enmeshed in a Western 
grasp of reality which privileges “the world as the object of a single individualist‟s 
point of view” (Wood 2012:12).  It is of great interest to see how and to what extent 
this cultural artifact, transported onto foreign soil, is able to capture, represent and 
elaborate on the discourse on gender in Far Eastern cultures, intensely 
group-concentrated as opposed to the Western reality of individualism, as previously 
mentioned. 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen how cinema strengthens and pampers the male, 
and to a certain extent also the female, psychic formats in the West. Patriarchy 
demands such structural massaging so as to perpetuate gendered and 
power-imbalanced social relations. But both gender relations and psychic molding 
require mediation by the prevailing ideology.  
 
What is ideology? According to Althusser (1971), ideology transcends both history 
and culture irrespective of the agent‟s cultural setting or the historical moment in time. 
Althusser distinguishes between what he calls Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs) 
and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). Althusser (1971:138) argues that the former 
of these institutions, as the name denotes, have “repression” rather than ideological 
indoctrination as their distinguishing hallmark, although ideology would nonetheless 
be a secondary objective. In the case of the latter, ideology would be the first 
objective and repressive measures of lesser importance. Regarding the former, he 
identifies a number of different arms to government as exercising power through 
violence in this rather distinctive way. Althusser‟s  examples include the various 
branches of the police services, the courts, the prisons and other forms of involuntary 
detention and, failing these lines, the armed forces. The following institutions utilize a 
much more refined form of mind control as can be observed from the examples 
Althusser cited for this category: churches, schools (both private and public), 
approved political parties, the media (television, film, newspapers) and cultural 
organizations.  With regard to the last example of Althusser‟s, the Federasie van 
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Afrikaanse Kultuurvereeningings (FAK), a cultural organization with tremendous 
power under South Africa‟s previous regime, comes to mind. How does the RSAs and 
the ISAs cooperate in serving the interests of the master ideology? As Gramsci (1971) 
noted, repression is the state‟s last line of defence  (although his theory is not as 
sophisticated as that of Althusser ‟s, who builds on his work) and for most subjects this 
might never be an option since the deployment of ideology adjusts most individuals 
sufficiently so as to eliminate the “need” for violence. Althusser (1971:142), himself a 
student of Gramsci‟s, suggests that every one of the various ideological structures 
work hand in hand to ensure a thoroughly saturated ideological environment. 
 
Ideology has as its singular aim the production of “well-adjusted individuals” which is 
achieved by mechanisms, such as those examples I have listed above, which we 
accept as familiar props in our everyday life. If we compare Althusser‟s conception 
with that of Foucault‟s theory of discourse, discussed in Chapter Two, a decided 
resonance is detectable. Foucaultian discourse shapes subjectivity in very much the 
same way as does Althusser‟s various forms of ideological apparatuses.  David 
McLellan (1995:7) argues that ideology should not be thought of as relics such as 
Fascism and Communism which presumably belong to a bygone “Age of Ideology” 
of which the contemporary world has no need.  Ideology is so hard to define 
precisely because all “views about ideology are themselves ideological” (McLellan 
1995:2). Engels (in McLellan 1995:16), not Marx, was the composer of the infamous 
left-wing conviction that ideology is “false consciousness,” an idea subscribed to by 
both feminists and Althusser. But, as I will attempt to demonstrate below, the inner 
workings of ideology are a great deal more subtle. McLellan argues that ideology is as 
much part of our lives today, since ideology and domination are birds of the same 
feather, as it has been at any point in the history and for this reason ideology cannot 
be divorced from our contemporary world view. Hence, 
  
…although in principle there could be an end to ideology, it is certainly nowhere 
in sight – not even on the horizon. This is because ideology is best viewed not as 
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a separate system of signs and symbols that could be contrasted with – and 
eventually replaced by – another, e.g. science of some sort. Ideology is rather an 
aspect of every system of signs and symbols in so far as they are implicated in an 
asymmetrical distribution of power and resources. And of which system is this 
not the case?  
                        (McLellan 1995:83) 
 
  Ideology and cinema have, since the latter‟s inception around the early 1890s, had a 
close relationship and since the very first productions saw the light of day, feminists 
and political agitators, both East and West, have identified the moving picture as a  
powerful political weapon (Cook 1990:776-777, Wallace 1992:105, Kühn 1996). Amy 
Fischer (1996) has demonstrated how one repressed/suppressed other, the m/other, 
chose cinema as the site for insurgency. I have attempted to develop this idea in 
Chapter Three. 
Mother aside, Edward Said (1988) argues, towards the end of the first section of his 
influential book, Orientalism, that the rationale behind the construction of Western 
discourse(s) on the Orient is the conviction in the Other‟s inherent inferiority and the 
firm belief that the lion‟s share of the world‟s resources is the West‟s due for the 
burden of its continuing civilizing missions. Hence, the Arab oil wealth is “an affront 
to civilization” (Said 1988:307). No doubt, China‟s economic superpower status is 
ticking off the same fears and anxieties in the Western mindset (Barr 2012). For a 
white, Western male to make “sense” of gender discourse in contemporary Chinese 
culture, discourse on race is inextricable interlinked with that of gender. Rey Chow 
(2005) shows how the efforts of the expatriate Chinese intellectual, be it male or 
female, posing as “an oriental expert,” to speak for Chinese women in China, smacks 
of imperialism, the latter essentially a discourse on race. In the Western mindset, both, 
Chinese generally and women in particular, have the same status: minority, and 
expatriate Chinese intellectuals, it seems, are no less susceptible to this ideological 
trap than those in the West. 
In the next chapter, I set out to use three Chinese films (Chinese Mandarin soundtrack 
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with English subtitles) directed by Zhang Yimou, after first delineating the changing 
parameters of institutionalized orthodoxy in China over the past 150 years in this 
chapter, to elicit one among several counter-discourses on gender. I have managed to 
identify five stages in the historical evolution of mainstream discourse on gender on 
the Chinese mainland. As is the case with Taiwan, so too Vietnam and Korea, situated 
on (mainland) China‟s border, have cultures heavily skewed in favour of Confucian 
morals (Jayawardena 1986b:212, 1986c:214-215, 225). In a manner reminiscent of 
Aristotle in Western antiquity, Confucius stressed the inherent inferiority of woman to 
man and emphasized the desirability of conformity, for the former, to the ideals of 
traditional femininity. In her examination of the lives of women during the Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911), China scholar Susan Mann (1997:34, 44) identifies two 
particularly haunting aspects of femininity glorified in traditional Chinese (Confucian) 
culture: the imperative that women must marry and the celibacy of the long-suffering 
widow. Regarding the former, Mann builds on the scholarship of Ted Telford and his 
reference to a “marriage crunch” which exacerbated the scarcity in women. As to the 
latter phenomenon, Mann refers to this as the “chaste-widow cult” which the Chinese 
thought of so highly that it was even exported to regions newly incorporated into the 
empire. The control over female sexuality has always been a concern for patriarchy 
and this feature of Chinese society makes the analysis of discourse on gender so 
interesting.   
In discussing the shifts, ebbs and flows of institutional discourse on gender in 
contemporary China, I would urge the reader to keep five markers on the nature of 
discourse firmly in mind for a more nuanced understanding of the “interaction” of 
ideology and (dominant) discourse (terms which could also be used interchangeably) 
in Chinese history of the twentieth century.  
Firstly, it would be wrong to assume that institutionalized discourse on gender in 
China is necessarily detrimental to women‟s concerns. Twice in the recent history of 
China, between 1911 – 1949 and during the Cultural Revolution, did so-called 
orthodox discourse on gender evince a libratory character. During both these periods 
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it happened to be in the interests of the Party to enlist the radical support of women 
for the Party‟s political causes and, taking their cue from Lenin, the rights of women 
were advanced, without reservation as in other periods, for party political purposes. 
Kristeva‟s (1982:46-47) views on the explosive potential of women within the context 
of their exploitation in revolutionary movements, come to mind. Lenin (quoted in 
Cohen 1970: 444) wrote famously that 
The experience of all emancipation movements shows that the success of the 
revolution depends on the extent to which the women participate in it. 
Mao himself is said to have been impressed with the indispensible role which young 
women played during the revolts in Hunan (Jayawardena 1986a:186).  
Secondly, all discourse streams that offer alternatives to that of the mainstream are not 
necessarily liberal. Consider the fact that in post-apartheid South Africa 
counter-discourses on race co-exist both to the left and to the right of the dominant 
thinking of the day. In the Chinese context, two heterodox discourses against 
Confucian discourse on gender (female chastity, child marriages, foot-binding) are 
those of female suicide, especially among young women unwilling to wed by force 
and widows (since remarriage was forbidden), and the anti-marriage clubs joined by 
many women (pledging not to marry and refusing to live with men) in Canton 
(Jayawardena 1986a: 174-175). I have also noted and used these two examples in 
Chapter Two, albeit in another context.  
Thirdly, it must not be readily assumed that discourse formation is always necessarily 
compelled, as Althusser has demonstrated in my brief examination of his theory of 
ideology. As Gramsci (1971) noted, after pondering the Catholic C hurch‟s remarkable 
claim to loyalty and popularity among the ordinary masses, prevailing ideology 
mediates any understanding of power imbalanced relationships, such as that between 
the sexes, by smoothing over any “apparent” contradictions with the sole aim of 
making power gaps, including that which makes gender, appear natural, pre-given and, 
ultimately, stripped of any viable alternatives. Consent or agreement with the 
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dominant order is the state‟s first strategy of offensive. Violent, coercive options, 
floggings or imprisonment, are seen as a very last resort, as we have seen above. In 
Althusser‟s view, expounded above, repressive measures are taken only if normal, 
everyday ideological aims (such as that represented by the media, schools and religion) 
fail. 
In the Chinese context, the Communist party has not hesitated to ban or outlaw 
alternative discourse, be it violently or less overtly, with the result that master 
discourse in China is, as Thakur (1997:188) points out, easily identifiable. Individuals 
who are able to see the forest for the trees (the characters Empress Phoenix and Song 
Lian in the films Curse of the Golden Flower [2006] and Raise the Red Lantern [1991] 
respectively, analyzed in the next chapter) are either bought to the brink of insanity or 
killed or otherwise censored so as to render them silent. This is particularly true in the 
Chinese context where Chinese authority has always been meticulous to bring 
transgressors of social rules violently, if need be, in line.  
In the opening scene of Maxine Hong Kingston‟s novel Woman Warrior (2010), set in 
recent China, the protagonist relives the scene where the villagers rampaged through 
the home of suspected adulterers and she is comforted by the fact that they escaped 
with their lives. Similarly, in the film Yu Dou (1990), Yu Dou‟s (Gong Li) lover 
Tianqing (Li Baotain) warns against the murderous wrath of the community, should 
they be discovered. Yu Dou is a young woman in a Chinese village who attempts to 
escape the cruel sexual beatings of her husband and in the process finds love, and a 
child, in the arms of her husband‟s cousin. In my application of a cross-cultural 
methodology, I have identified the work of Bourdieu and Foucault on discursive 
formations, in terms of dominant and dissenting versions, as useful since 
contextualizing discourse helps us to “read across genres” to see social reality as 
historically-driven, not divinely ordained and immutable. All the same, cinematic 
features such as sound and continuity editing, a process of splicing the different shots 
together in such a flowing sequence that it seems “natural” (Wood 2012:3-8), make a 
striking analogy between cinematic technique and the inner workings of ideology. 
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Fourthly, Foucault (1978) has propounded the brilliant argument that the so-called 
“repression” thesis, according to which it is understood that dominant or master 
discourse “exiles” undesirable alternatives, such as gay and lesbian identities and 
cultures, to a utopian or dystopian space somehow removed from “objective reality”, 
is misguided and the deception that this is the correct position, is in itself part of the 
overall “planning” which guides the construction of dominant discourse. In Volume 
One of his famous The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978:4-5) takes to task the 
generally accepted view that sex is simultaneously repressed and exiled to some space 
beyond power formations. Foucault argues against the general understanding of 
power as merely repressive since this represents “a sentence to disappear, but also a n 
injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an 
admission that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing 
to know” (my emphasis).  
Foucault‟s point is, provided I read him correctly, that a stra tegy of liberating us from 
the restrictions which orthodox discourse on sexuality places on us, will achieve 
nothing as this will merely play into the hands of an even greater trap which lies in 
waiting for us. Said in another way, attempted emancipation is precisely what the 
powers-that-be “expect” as our reaction to our supposed “sexual repression.” In 
Foucault‟s (1978:10) own words, “[critical discourse employed to expose repression 
is] in fact part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless 
misrepresents) by calling it „repression‟.” I am reminded of the historical curiosity of 
Lenin‟s socialist party which had at most 1% support among the electorate in 1917, 
and yet he called his party “Bolshevik ” (meaning the majority) and the other parties 
“Mensheviks” (the minorities); hence, the correct situation was exactly the reverse of 
what Lenin set out to demonstrate to the public. If power is not repressive, how is it to 
be understood? 
Foucault (1978:93-94) propounds that power is not merely repressive but certainly 
also productive since it “is exercised from innumerable points” and “power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
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everywhere”. What are the implications of Foucault‟s astounding thesis that the 
repressive appearance of power is really a side-show since repression is an inbuilt 
mechanism of power‟s more insidious workings, that of production itself? Judith 
Butler (1990:30) has built on Foucault‟s scholarship and she advocates understanding 
of the possibilities of sexual liberation shaven of its utopian fervor: 
If sexuality is culturally constructed within existing power relations, then the 
postulation of normative sexuality that is “before,” “outside”, or “beyond” 
power is a cultural impossibility and a politically impracticable dream, one that 
postpones the concrete and contemporary task of rethinking subversive 
possibilities for sexuality and identity within the terms of power itself.  
If Foucault and Butler are correct about our inability to reconsider discursive 
possibilities outside of the dominant “think-tank” (that our every move has already 
been anticipated), how does Kristeva‟s complaint about neglected or suppressed 
maternal discourse feature in this novel new world? If, as I argued in Chapter Two, 
lesbian and gay culture and identity are indeed indirect productions of mainstream 
patriarchy, then the appearance of “neglected” or “suppressed” discourse on m/other 
has precisely the same function as contemporary discourse on sex, as Foucault so 
aptly showed. That is, it is “produced” by mainstream discourse in a movement of 
“(m)othering” which retroactively reinforces the dominant or mainstream discourse.  
Its purpose is none other than an inducement from “above” to ponder m/other and 
perhaps in the same movement, to rescue her from the all- female hell at Avīcī (the 
non-returning hell of Buddhism) as is expected of the son in Chinese Buddhism, a 
subject to which I will return in the next chapter, Chapter Five. The only avenue of 
escape is the poisoned well intentionally overlooked by our jailers. However, as I will 
show in the next paragraph, the possibility of resistance is predictably not closed to 
us. 
Finally, no colonizing discourse can completely capture a particular social reality and 
block out all counter- or alternative responses since there is no sealed-off reality and 
the many different social realities known to us, in terms of co-existing cultures for one, 
are all social constructs (minimally in the sense of discursively organized social or 
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cultural domains) and none able to lay credible claim to “objectivity.” Thakur (1997: 
33n16) makes reference to the work of Wertheim and his concept of “counter-point” 
to explain resistance to dominant or master discourse. He highlights the fact that no 
public accepts ideological hegemony (a term for which we are indebted to Gramsci), 
completely. Joan Cocks (1989:64, cited in Thakur 1997:26) argues that it is precisely 
because we are able to observe the process of our subjugation in action that we 
appreciate that dominant discourse evinces “cracks and holes”, i.e. opportunities for 
alternative positions to that of the dominant point of view. 
 I will return to this idea again in the next chapter in the context of my discussion of 
Blumberg‟s (2009) idea that “freaks” or “monsters” in nature serve a far more 
important role in the overall understanding of systemic functioning than merely 
entertainment value. He uses the example of conjoined twins who function perfectly 
well as a complete unit desp ite our abhorrence of such deviations to “normality”.  
Blumberg advances the fascinating argument that, within the context of 
developmental evolution, such oddities as conjoined twins point to an important 
aspect of discourse, although he does not use the term, which shows up internal limits 
or caps to further differentiation. This is another way of saying that ideology is not 
all- pervasive and that it is indeed possible to forge resistance between the cracks 
which the master discourse and its handmaiden, that of the university, so desperately 
attempt to cover up.     
An examination of the more apparent features of orthodox, institutionalized discourse 
on gender is crucial for an understanding of the counter-discourses which it spawns. 
Discursive groupings produce “subjects”, in the West, and “groups,” in the Far East  
(Berque 1997:138-139), who generally have no hand in the texts in which they are 
inscribed. But it is precisely the Other, which is excluded or objectified by discourse, 
that has an interest in showing up the impermanence or fleeting nature of the social 
and political arrangements which have been superimposed on them. 
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It is exactly the social commentary or counter-discourse by the Other, Chinese women 
as a case in point, which interests us. The importance of a study of orthodox discourse 
lies in the fact that people live and are enjoined by such discourse.  Their psychic 
awareness is shaped by the many discursive formations – gender, class and ethnicity, 
etc. – which converge on a subject (as I have argued in Chapter Two). As active 
agents they are able to negotiate and respond to the effects of the molding inherent in 
discourse streaming (Thakur 1997: 30-31, 103-104, 151-152, 183-184). The radical 
change or overhaul of social relations between men and women, mediated by 
patriarchy, is to a large extent only possible through the agency of women themselves. 
Shoshana Felman (1993:126) wrote that “[o]nly women can empower women‟s story 
to become a story” as “each woman‟s story can become a story only through women‟s 
collective perception of themselves” (emphasis in the original). Bear in mind also the 
views of Lenin and Mao, discussed later in this chapter, on the essential contribution 
of women in times of revolution. 
 
Felman‟s argument is thoroughly feminist of course. Women can recognize the 
common features of their oppression by sharing their experiences. 
Women are not innocent victims but according to Chesler (2009) often not only 
collaborate with existing patriarchal structures of oppression but also devise new 
ways to visit exploitation and subjugation on other women. No doubt this is done as a 
means of survival but at the same time these women, and the “other” women counting 
as their victims, partake in the oppressive discourses shaping their social and political 
agency. As I have suggested in the previous chapter, women, perhaps more so than 
men, are able to take up many different responses to colonizing discourse(s). 
Discourse analysis of the kind differs from that of liberal feminism, which equates the 
“message” in the text with an authorial intention, and of socialist feminism, which 
sees the text as pure, unadulterated ideology, and instead proposes that meaning is 
generated in a culture-specific space through discursive formatting of the social world 
(Thakur 1997:17).  
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 While Foucault has demonstrated the ways in which the combination of power and 
language ignites discourse, Bourdieu‟s contribution lies in the importance of agency 
to facilitate the possibility of change and in answering the question, if and how 
systems change over time, the social context so notoriously absent from Foucault. 
Edward Said (1988:9-10) has gone as far as to call Foucault‟s work so ignorant of 
cultures other than European that it reads as if only Germany and France  exist. It is to 
the institutionalized discourse on gender, in the context of China over the past 150 
years, say from the Treaty of Nanjing (1942), signaling the end of the First Opium 
War, to the present time, that I now turn. 
 
1. Pre-revolutionary China 
 
The low social position which women held in traditional Chinese society is well 
documented (Thakur 1997:35). Her status was and, as we will see, still is to a large 
extent, governed by Confucian teachings which stress the “three obediences and the 
four virtues”. Education for women, such as it was, aimed to foster these values in the 
hearts and minds of young women.  The three obediences are obedience to father, 
husband and, in the case of widows, son. The four virtues are proper work, conduct, 
talk and demeanor in general (O‟Hara quoted in Thakur 1997:35). Female passivity 
and modesty (read sexual stunting), were valued (R. Chow 2005:599). 
 
  The extended family is the very essence of economic/social life and hierarchical in 
the extreme: male lorded it over female, old over young (Cohen 1970:434). Women 
could only pursue activities ordained by her gender: prostitution, which, unlike the 
position in the West, was socially tolerated (Chou 1971:47), match-making and 
(mid)wifery. Sexual satisfaction was of no concern to a woman, and both polygamy 
and concubinage, an institution legitimizing keeping a sort of unofficial wife, mostly 
entertained for sexual ends, flourished among the rich (Thakur 1997:36). The 
regulation of female sexuality, as I noted above, was and remains strict and may be 
the hinge (read reproduction), on which her continuing subjugation turns. 
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  A woman had no intrinsic value in herself but may gain such as a source of labour 
for her husband and mother- in- law (Cohen 1970:436-437). The latter‟s violence 
against her son‟s wife (in psychoanalytical terms a “projection” of her own resentment 
at the similar treatment meted out to her earlier) is legendary and Cohen rightly sees it 
as a way in which the oppressed themselves lend continuity to the system. A wife may 
hope for some sort of social status if she can produce a son, reproductive labour as 
opposed to productive labour, but she is embarrassed, and often traumatized, by the 
arrival of a daughter. Among the poor, a daughter would most likely be sold off either 
as a wife or a prostitute. This is a practice still widely in existence in Modern China 
and South East Asia (Jaschok & Miers 1994:20, Barlow 2002:151). No doubt this is 
also true for other economically depressed regions along (mainland) China‟s 
borderlands (Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, Burma).  
 
  It would be a mistake to assume that these broad strokes on gender discourse (the 
discourse that maintains and reproduces the cultural practices discussed here) in Old 
China applies to all strata of society and to all ethnic groups equally (Susan Mann 
1997:2-4, Cohen 1970:437). It does not. Women from rich families in the North and 
eastern seaboard were generally secluded in the home while in the south of China, 
among the Cantonese, the Fujianese and the Hakka, a nomadic group, women were 
expected to work in the fields. Foot-binding and widow suicide were well-known 
among the Han, China‟s largest ethnic group, but both institutions were frowned upon, 
and in fact outlawed, by the last dynasty, the (Manchu) Qing (1644-1911) and were 
certainly not practiced in the south. 
 
2. Democratic China 1911-1949  
           
Loss of face, significant in any Far Eastern cultural encounter, including the Chinese, 
who are intensely group-orientated, is something which, since the humiliating 
conclusion of the First Opium War (1839-1842), increasingly crushed the Qing 
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Dynasty. It was the Treaty of Nanjing, signed in August 1842, opening Chinese 
markets and culture to foreign Western influence, which propelled China ”with drugs 
and violence” (Lowell 2012 :11) into the modern world. Add to the humiliation of the 
Opium Wars, the devastation of the Taipeng Rebellion (1850-1864), possibly one of 
the most violent civil wars of the last two thousand years. 
 
The aftermath of the Opium Wars was significant in that it opened the Chinese 
heartland to Western influences, schools and churches, and to social and political 
ideas, individualism for example (Jaschok & Miers 1994:19) – something which the 
Chinese attempted to avoid at all costs.  
 
  The result of the social and political chaos that ensued was that many ideas 
formerly held in doxa, accepted without thought, were questioned and had to be 
rationalized and either rejected or accommodated in heterodox or orthodox discourse 
respectively. 
 
  Times of social and economical upheaval are conducive to radical questioning of 
accepted notions, notably hierarchical heterosexual relations between the sexes, 
otherwise considered natural and pre-given (Goffman 1971:166,199; Bourdieu 1977). 
 
By the turn of the century, questions of gender, prominent being the abolition of 
marriage and education for women, became burning issues (Cohen 1970:439-440). 
The need for women to become independent persons in their own right, was stressed. 
Anti-Confucianism, anti- imperialism, nationalism and the women‟s movement 
operated side by side and fertilized each other.  
 
  By 1911, when Sun-Yat San called out the first Chinese republic, a day still 
celebrated every year in Taiwan, women‟s organizations already bloomed and many 
young women took to the streets to demand the vote. T. T. Chow (Thakur 1997:40) 
comments that women‟s radical agency dealt the “authority of Confucianism and 
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traditional ethics ... a fundamental and devastating stroke.” 
 
  Another marker of social change was the enormous influence of literature to 
mobilize people to effect social change. Notable are Ibsen‟s plays, notoriously A 
Doll’s House, which was translated into Chinese early 1918.  It caused a rash of 
Chinese Noras to walk out on husbands and children (Jayawardena 1986a:184-185, 
Thakur 1997:41). These early stirrings suggest that women increasingly engaged in 
gender discourse as active agents of their own destiny. 
 
After the founding of the Communist Party in 1921, many initiatives sought to 
improve the lot of women since the communists, inspired by Lenin, knew that the 
enthusiastic participation of women is essential, as noted earlier in this chapter, for the 
success of a revolutionary movement (Cohen 1970:443-446). By 1927, the flash 
points between the Communists and the Nationalists, led by Chaing Kai-chek and 
supported by the Old Guard and the new mercantile middle class, highlighted 
disparities in gender discourse (Thakur 1997:42-43, Cohen 1970:441-443). While the 
Communists desired total revolution (divorce by consent, emancipation of all women, 
assuming this to be possible, and restructuring of the family), the Nationalists clung to 
the old Confucian model which encouraged traditional gender roles (polygamy, 
arranged marriages, female sexual slavery).  
 
  In violent backlashes against the new system, Nationalists amputated the noses and 
breasts of thousands of young women touched by the new gospel of freedom before 
killing them (Thakur 1997:43, Cohen 1970:442-443).   Not surprisingly, liberal and 
liberated Chinese women in the first decades of the twentieth century found a new 
home with the Communist Party.  
 
 But, as Cohen (1970:445-446) points out, even among the Communists, both before 
and after 1949, with the founding of the new China, the changing pattern of gender 
interaction led to dissatisfaction among men and women. This is a phenomenon not 
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unknown to the women‟s movement in the West. Women adopt many different and 
often incompatible strategies to cope with oppression and these strategies are not 
always emancipatory (English 1983:477-483). The same is certainly true of Chinese 
women too (Thakur 1997:197). 
 
  In general, although Party sentiments did question traditional arrangements along 
sex lines, it did not care to remove decisive gendered power-disparity. This is true, 
though to a lesser extent,  even before 1949, when women were needed during the 
civil war against the Nationalists (1927-1937) and in the war against the Japanese 
(1937-1945).  Women‟s concerns were sacrificed when and if it clashed with the 
party‟s revolutionary agenda.  
 
3. People‟s Republic of China (PRC) 1949-1966 
 
The inauguration of the PRC on 1 October 1949 gave the Party the means, which 
authority, since the days of the First Emperor, had always assumed in Chinese society 
anyway (Bonavia1982:104-106), to sanction discourse-formatting on a wide range of 
topics – including gender discourse (Thakur 1997:47-50). In the words of Bonavia, 
there is “no honour in defying the Emperor.” The same applies to the Communist 
Party. 
 
  What is interesting and different about discourse in the Chinese context, are the 
following two considerations. Firstly, Rey Chow (2005) makes a compelling 
argument that “class consciousness”, the defence of the underdog, is part and parcel of 
institutionalized socialist discourse, necessarily so in view of the communist rhetoric 
it employs to court the masses in China, and that a critical view should be able to latch 
onto something different than merely “injustice”. Secondly, whereas the historical 
course of orthodox discourse in the West is highly subtle in its operation and 
movement, not so in China. Throughout history, respect for authority has always been 
deeply ingrained in the Chinese soul and that has not changed with the Communists 
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coming to power. By the same token, the Communists have not hesitated to set the 
parameters of discourse on gender by any means possible, both coercive and 
otherwise (Thakur 1997:188). It is accordingly not difficult to seek out orthodox 
discourse in the Chinese context, as I noted above. 
 
  Initially, the new Marriage Act of 1950 gave young women the opportunity for 
divorce on a large scale but the state nonetheless kept the institution of the family 
intact. The viability of family was never in dispute (Thakur 1997:48). Once again the 
emancipation of women was deferred and women were drawn into productive labour 
as a precondition for their “liberation” (Cohen 1970:454-455). One is tempted to ask 
how women are to be liberated if the basic family structure remains unquestioned and 
if gender roles are not critically examined but merely “complicated”? 
 
  By the 1960s the new orthodoxy on gender relations had become crystallized. 
Divorce had acquired a social stigma and family a renewed glorified status (Cohen 
1970:461). The role of the female became overburdened. On top of her traditional 
duties of wife and m/other, were added production and that of the communist cadre 
eager to keep her revolutionary consciousness at an acceptable level (Sheridan cited in 
Thakur 1997:51-52).  Nobody paused to consider the time and energy management 
involved in juggling these diverse roles. 
 
  The ubiquity of crèches and communal eating halls could not mask the fact that 
housework was still seen as the woman‟s job (Cohen 1970:455-456). Their 
involvement in labour certainly had great beneficial value for women but work was 
still delineated along sexual lines (Thakur 1997:50-51). 
 
  Social stability and a belief in a natural division of the sexes, as evinced and 
entrenched by protectionist labour legislation so-called, won the day in the first two 
decades of institutionalized discourse after the Communists came to power. 
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4. Cultural Revolution 1966-1976 
 
The Cultural Revolution was ordered by Mao Zedong to rein in revisionist and 
rightest elements (Cohen 1970:465). It led to violent interrogation of authority and a 
general reevaluation of Chinese culture and values. Untold misery was visited on 
hundreds of thousands of people and priceless cultural treasures were destroyed by 
youngsters styling themselves as Red Guards (Thubron 1988:80, Wickert 1984: 
32-33). Emphasis was placed on revolutionary vigour rather than expertise (Schurman 
quoted in Thakur 1997:52), something reminiscent of feminist claims in the West that 
women know what is best for themselves, abortion being a case in point (Brownmiller 
2000:5-7). 
 
  As before, women were seen as an important stepping stone in furthering the aims 
of the revolution. Orthodox discourse was being realigned to cater for gender equality, 
spearheaded by Mao‟s fourth wife, the controversial Jiang Qing (Cohen 1970:469, 
Thakur 1997:52-53). Men were being publicly chastised for not doing their bit with 
homework and the anti-Confucius campaigns of 1972, coinciding with the height of 
the women‟s movement in the West, attacked feudal ideas on woman‟s place in the 
family. Ideas on gender in habitus have become articulated and institutionalized in 
mainstream Chinese discourse. The difference is that for the second time within the 
same century, and in the same culture, institutionalized discourse on gender had truly 
emancipatory potential.  
 
5. The Post-Mao era 
 
Most of the gains made during the Cultural Revolution on women‟s issues were rolled 
back after Mao‟s death in 1976 (Thakur 1997:53-60). Jiang Qing herself was 
denounced and imprisoned (Bonavia 1982:120-121). She died by her own hand in 
1991 (Chang & Halliday 2005:633). 
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  A new discourse on old- fashioned femininity and the values of family life was 
given official sanction (Thakur 1997:53-54). With no mention of sharing the tasks of 
childcare and household, it fell, once again, on women by default. This new (and 
simultaneously old) Chinese discourse on sexual role-playing is a disappointing blend 
of old feudal ideas (woman‟s role as mother/wife, the importance of a son rather than 
a daughter) and more progressive socialist thinking (woman‟s role in production and 
her revolutionary agency). Perhaps it is not “reform” (as it was said of reform 
pertaining to South Africa‟s apartheid discourse) of gender relations which is called 
for, but a serious attempt to dismantle gender disparity by other radical means. Tani 
Barlow (2002:150) does not, save perhaps for one reservation, overstate her case in 
labelling the position of Chinese women today as “complex, situated, revolutionary 
historical formations.” It is complex because of its many layers (wife, mother, worker); 
moreover, it has a peculiar Chinese historical twist to it, and the demand for 
revolutionary zeal in women into the bargain gives it a further dimension lacking in 
Western democracies.   In the period after Mao‟s death, political activism notably 
declined (Bonavia 1982:42). 
 
  From this brief and condensed overview of the changes, both progressive and 
revisionist, in Chinese women‟s lives over the past 150 years, the importance of such 
an overview for the present study, inadequate as it may be, becomes apparent. The 
strong thread in this time line has been the assumption, among both men and women, 
that Chinese women need to be told what they desire (Cohen 1970:470). This is 
evident both during the period between the founding of the PRC and the Cultural 
Revolution (1949-1966) and in Post-Maoist China, in the latter instance not least in 
the attempt to rid society of the vestiges and legacy of the Cultural Revolutio n. The 
point I am driving at is well conceived by Naomi Weisstein (1969), which is that 
attempting to understand human behaviour without the benefit of the context of 
expectations and assumptions, embedded in the master discourse, is an exercise 
devoid of colour. 
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   Said in another way, we need to understand how women are situated in a 
particular social milieu (context) before we are able to appreciate how and why 
women, from a variety of different positions and motivations, respond to the 
mainstream discourse. As I pointed out before, this is the crux of discourse analysis: 
context (Thakur 1997:24). Yeazell (2000:17) remarks on the “cycle of disenchantment 
and re-enchantment” which the clash between text and context produces in Orientalist 
discourse. Orientalist discourse is knowledge, in the service of power, produced by 
Western and, increasingly, native “experts” on the Middle and Far East, and dissipated 
through the medium of texts (R. Chow 2005, Said 1979). “Discourse”, said Foucault 
(Thakur 1997:16) famously, “does not act at the behest of power. It is power.” 
 
  Responses to master discourse, as I have indicated at the outset in this chapter, can 
take on either an orthodox or a heterodox character. In view of the unsatisfactory 
nature of dominant discourse on gender in contemporary Chinese society, I intend to 
examine two responses thereto, heterodox discourses as embodied in two cinematic 
artifacts featuring Gong Li, produced in collaboration with Zhang Yimou. Why the 
choice of the Post-Mao era? The Cultural Revolution was a time of considerable and 
even devastating social, economic and political upheaval in China. Add to this the 
horrors of the famine (1958-1962) which, by some accounts, claimed the lives of as 
many as 40 million Chinese. As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, both Goffman and 
Bourdieu draw attention to how, in times of crisis, ideas, previously held in doxa and 
believed to be immutable, once questioned are either rationalized by the prevailing 
orthodox discourse or rejected and rationalized in turn by one or more 
counter-discursive movements.  
 
  These are my reasons for selecting motion pictures from the Post-Maoist era, rather 
than from before this period, principally because the former was a time when the 
ravages of the Cultural Revolution was still fresh in the minds and the hearts of the 
Chinese. Zhang Yimou himself, together with the talented Chen Kaige, director of the 
internationally acclaimed Farewell My Concubine (1992) (generally regarded as Gong 
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Li‟s best performance of her career), were members of the so-called Fifth Generation 
of Chinese film students graduating from the Beijing Film Academy in 1982  (Ni 
2002). Significantly, they were the first group to emerge after the havoc and 
devastation of the Cultural Revolution. As I have mentioned earlier, times of social 
revolt are perfect for the examination of ideas normally considered beyond question.  
The Fifth Generation lost no time in breaking with the socialist-realist tradition, in 
which socialist causes were celebrated (uncritically), and opted instead for bright 
colours and depth of character (Ni 2002).  
 
In the preceding pages of this chapter I have attempted to outline, necessarily briefly 
by nature of my project, the social, political and historical conditions which made 
possible contemporary dominant discourse on gender in China, namely an orthodox 
formation emphasizing traditional femininity (caring, self-sacrificing) as we know it 
in the West. This is an appropriate juncture, before moving on to analyze three 
cinematic productions where one encounters Gong Li, to consider two objections, 
within the context of contemporary China set out above, to the methodology 
employed here, namely a cross-cultural analysis. In the first place, the Chinese 
experience of social reality may be so far removed from “ours” (regarding feelings 
such as love, shame, fear and the like), that a comparative study of their lives would 
teach us little or nothing (Moore 1992). In the second place, Chinese women arguably 
have a different psychic structure from that of European women in the West, for 
example, and divining wisdom from the former in an attempt to enrich the latter, 
might be a case of comparing apples with oranges. The nub of these objections is that, 
as Edward Said (1979:115) put it so lyrically, our attempts to learn from the Orient 
smack of a “secular post-Enlightenment myth whose outlines are unmistakably 
Christian”, i.e. a civilizing mission by another name. 
 
Regarding the first objection, anthropologists and psychologists are conceivably 
divided on the validity of the issue (notably Yik 2010), whether or not peoples of 
different cultures share the same range of elements which make up a significant 
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emotional life. Michele Yik (2010:216) argues convincingly that certain emotions are 
indeed peculiar to the Chinese peoples (despite being made up of a great number of 
different ethnic groups, as I demonstrated in Chapter Two) and she pleads for further 
research on the topic. Charles Lindholm (2005:42-43) concludes that, although 
emotions do differ in certain respects, both in terms of the importance which a culture 
attaches to them and of how they blend with other emotions, not just cross-culturally 
but also between individuals from the same culture, these emotions are nonetheless 
extracted from the same psychological pool.  
 
 As for myself, having lived and worked for almost five years in a semi-Chinese 
environment, the expatriate Chinese community in South Africa, I have no doubt that 
the Chinese, both men and women, experience essentially the same typical emotions 
(happiness, anger, fear, misery) as do people in the West, although the range might 
differ. This range may include affective items deemed of far greater value in Chinese 
society than in West, such as the idea of “sincere regret for past misdeeds” (which, 
incidentally, is why ex-convicts in Chinese societies are quickly reintegrated into 
society, unlike the position in the West), and minimize or exclude others, such as 
romantic love, but the point is the same. My point is that the Chinese experience and 
express the same basic range, noted above, of emotions as do people in the West.  
Admittedly, allowances must be made for the influence of enculturation (a very 
necessary skill for survival) on Chinese in diaspora communities around the world. 
The academic consensus is that a stark cultural relativist position is erroneous 
(Lindholm 2005:42).   
 
Regarding the second objection, which is that peoples from different cultures have 
different psychic structures, this is a difficult objection to deal with and the debate is 
not new (Moore 1992:3-4). The anthropologist Malinowski, author of the (in)famous 
text Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927), and Ernest Jones, Freud‟s 
biographer, debated in the 1920s whether psychic structures, the Oedipus Complex 
being the case in point, apply universally to all cultures or whether variants exist. 
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Jones argued in favour of the former position while Malinowski had anthropological 
evidence for the latter. 
 
My own view is that, irrespective of the true parameters of psychic structures in 
different cultures, a comparative investigation of social issues, cross-culturally, can 
and does have value. I have support for my view, analogically, in Bert Olivier‟s  (1998) 
argument, written in the context of South Africa‟s apartheid history, that it would be a 
mistake to read Fugard‟s “Master Harold” and the boys as not implying that his 
dramatically enacted insights into the effects of apartheid on human relations apply to 
each and every totalitarian regime, however much it may differ in time and place from 
that of South Africa‟s under apartheid. I argue that, however much psychic structures 
may differ, culturally speaking, from one another, we are bound to find insight and 
existential sustenance in the lives of others. 
 
At the outset in this chapter I promised not to neglect the social and cultural setting of 
the three films starring Gong Li, which I offer a reading of in the next chapter, and I 
trust that I have adequately sketched the historical conditions which prec ipitated, and 
continue to shape, contemporary discourse on gender in Chinese societies (Hong 
Kong, mainland China, Taiwan, Singapore). When Bonny Cohen (1970:470) thus 
complains at the end of her insightful and very informative paper on the institutional 
restrictions placed on women in modern communist Chinese society, and laments that 
“China is not our model,” she had no idea that her contribution, despite her 
misgivings over its value for Western women also in search of freedom, would serve 
as a building block for my own examination of heterodox discourse on gender in that 
same society. In the words of Faucault (1978:95), “where there is power, there is 
resistance.” Dominant discourse on gender, which Cohen traced out so faithfully for 
us, is always, but always, shadowed by rebel discourses, though the eerie possibility 
exists, as Foucault demonstrated so brilliantly, that our avenues of resistance ha ve 
been prepared in advance by the enemy. 
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Against the background of China‟s contemporary master discourse on gender, set out 
in the preceding pages of the present chapter, I now turn to an analysis of three of 
Gong Li‟s films, seeking to isolate a possible heterodox discourse on gender. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 GONG LI AND DISSENTING DISCOURSE ON GENDER IN CHINESE CINEMA 
 
 
Slavoj Žižek argues passionately in his In Defense of Lost Causes (2008) for the resurrection 
and redemption of failed attempts. He substantiates his argument with reference both to the 
view that reason has exhausted its potential to guide our actions (a “leap of faith” is required 
to exit “the horizon” of our understanding), that some of history‟s most spectacular losses 
make for fruitful reconsideration (notably Breuer‟s famous case of Anna O.) and, finally, 
tying up with a theme I explored in both Chapters One and Three, the return of the repressed.  
(In the context of psychoanalysis „repression‟ is the right term.) The “Other” (read: lost 
motivations) demands accommodation in the present. Regarding the last item, I am referring 
to discourse on m/other which has, on various sites (Western cinema, for example) and in 
different cultures (the cow as m/other in Hinduism, the “virginity cult” [Kristeva] in 
Catholicism, the mother/son dyad as it has manifested itself in Chinese Buddhism) attempted 
to restage a lost battle, that of repression under differentiated patriarchal structures. In a 
curious passage he summates his case for the celebration of renewed ventures in the 
following striking way: 
 
Perhaps this attitude is today more relevant that ever: the situation is “completely 
hopeless,” with no clear “realistic” revolutionary perspective, but does this not give us a 
kind of strange freedom, a freedom to experiment? One has only to throw away the 
deterministic model of “objective necessities” and obligatory “stages” of development? 
One thus has to sustain a minimum of anti-determinism: nothing is ever written off, in 
an “objective situation” which precludes any act, which condemns us fully to 
biopolitical vegetation. There is always a space to be created for an act – precisely 
because, to paraphrase Rosa Luxemburg‟s critique of reformism, it is not enough to 
wait patiently for the “right moment” of the revolution. If one merely waits for it, it will 
never come, for one has to start with “premature” steps which – therein lies 
the  ”pedagogy of the revolution” – in their very failure to achieve their professed goal 
create the (subjective) conditions for the right moment. Recall Mao‟s slogan “from 
defeat to defeat, to the final victory,” which echoes in Beckett‟s already-quoted motto: 
“Try again, fail again. Fail better.” (Žižek 2008:361) (emphasis in the original). 
 
According to Žižek‟s seductive reasoning, the only difference between failure and success is 
developmental, that is, losing is a necessary precondition on the road to eventual victory.  
Siegfried Kracauer (1969) argues along the same lines as those of Žižek though he does so 
half a century before. Kracauer considers that photography/cinema powerfully links the idea 
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of fleeting features of reality with historical changeability. In the context of a cross-cultural 
methodology, history and culture are certainly interchangeable. To illustrate, I argue in 
Chapter Two that time and space allow for variation in gender formation. Vivid imagery in 
the form of cinema or photography will reveal to us only belatedly the broad outlines of a 
new historical epoch the nature of which may only become clear at a much later stage. Hence 
the importance, according to Kracauer, of rejoicing in and not neglecting the failed causes of 
yesteryear, particularly if these causes are captured on film. 
 
In this chapter I aim to analyze three cinematic productions from the Peoples‟ Republic 
within the context of Žižek and Kracauer‟s plea for the importance of reviving and reliving 
the forgotten moments of abandoned causes. In the three films I analyze here, the issue of lost 
causes is certainly a haunting one. In Raise the Red Lantern (1991), the female protagonist 
goes bonkers amid the continuous strife and infighting among the concubines in Master 
Chen‟s house while in Yu Dou (1990), the title character has her lover killed by her son (who, 
unbeknownst to himself, thus kills his own father) as an act of filial loyalty towards an 
assumed father. Finally, in Curse of the Golden Flower (2006), Empress Phoenix‟s palace 
revolt against her hated husband fails spectacularly in the sense that her lover, the Emperor‟s 
first son from a previous union, and her beloved son, Prince Jai, are both killed in the last 
scenes of the film. In each of these films the role of the female lead, or fetish icon as I argue 
in Chapter Three, is performed by Gong Li, who insists to the Crown Prince in a memorable 
scene that “the [eponymous] golden flowers have a right to bloom”. When he cautions her 
that nothing can change, she counters with “but I would like to try [all the same].” 
 
In the three films of Gong Li‟s, mentioned above, which I have selected for scrutiny, I am 
interested in a possible maternal counter-discourse by utilizing gender as a tool of analysis, as 
articulated by the female lead, Gong Li herself, in a specific role in each of these films.The 
Chinese practice is to place the family name before the personal name, but in view of the 
tremendous impact which globalization has had and continuous to have on all cultures, as 
well as the Westernizing of Chinese diasporic communities across the globe, certain Chinese 
individuals have expressed a preference for the Western fashion in c iting their name, i.e. the 
given name before the family name. Where the individual‟s preference is known, I have 
followed that and if not, I have done the sequence of the name according to the Chinese 
custom. To return to my selection of Gong Li‟s films for analysis, two of the three films I 
have in mind are Raise the Red Lantern (1991) and Curse of the Golden Flower (2006). Each 
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of these two motion pictures will be analyzed around a separate though related idea, the 
mother-daughter relationship in patriarchy and the mother-son relationship in the Chinese 
context. Central to these topics stands the social construct of the m/other. The hue running 
through both analyses is my attempt to shed light on maternal discourse in patriarchal 
societies and the need, as I demonstrated in Chapter One, for its reinvigoration. In the last 
film starring Gong Li, analyzed in this chapter, Yu Dou (1990), which in fact is 
chronologically speaking the first of the three directed by Zhang, I change course by arguing 
that the mother is herself a neglected daughter and reading the narration in the light of 
Constance Penley‟s profound insight of how the parameters of the debate between the 
genders change when the mother turns around “to return the look”. Significantly, in Yu Dou, 
Gong Li (as the female lead), in a bathing scene which has elicited considerable critical 
comment,  turns around to show her abused and battered naked body to a male peeping- tom 
observing her lustfully through the key-hole. The reader will immediate recognize the key-
hole as representative of the camera, the screen, the wall of Plato‟s cave. The hue running 
through my analysis of all three films is that a constructive relationship between mother and 
her off-spring, both son and daughter, is indeed possible, and if this is not in the interest of 
patriarchy, it is certainly in the interest of all daughters of mothers and mothers of daughters.  
 
In an interview with Gong Li, posted on-line [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Uaooj-
FL9U], she remarks, in the context of a question about her collaboration with director Zhang 
Yimou, that in all her roles she performs a strong female character which is (a) oppressed, 
presumably by patriarchy and feudalism, and (b) she is expected to rebel, which she does. In 
my analysis of the first of the two films, Raise the Red Lantern (1991), one of her very first 
productions with Zhang, I examine the mother-daughter bond, and Curse of the Golden 
Flower (2006), Gong Li‟s very last collaboration with him, I read in the light of the powerful 
mother-son relationship in Chinese societies. My conclusion is that powerful insights gleaned 
from the latter relationship can be applied very fruitfully to a revitalization of the former. An 
intertextual reading (in which the themes of the three films are put into dialogue with one 
another) is accordingly in order. 
 
Following on the hint of Gong Li‟s, highlighted above, I intend to focus on the female 
protagonist‟s heterodox discourse on gender as it is articulated by Chinese women, in an 
attempt to make sense of and respond to orthodox discourse in contemporary Chinese 
societies. In Chapter Three I have attempted to show how women, perhaps in far greater 
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numbers than is the case with men, are able to respond to orthodox discourse in a great and 
varied range of manners. The heterodox discourse which Gong Li articulates is only one 
among many possibilities, but I argue that it is good answer to the dearth on maternal 
discourse in patriarchy.  I turn now to an examination of the two cinematic productions 
referred to above. An outline of the narrative thrust in each film will be interwoven with a 
cross-cultural analysis. 
 
I read the first offering, Raise the Red Lantern (1991), set in rural Northern China of the 
1920‟s, to draw out the implications of the mother-daughter problematic, in what appears to 
be true for all patriarchal societies, against the backdrop of Phyllis Chesler‟s (2009) thesis, 
that this relationship forms the very foundation of a woman‟s relationship-web with each and 
every other woman she is likely to encounter in her life.  
 
The narrative, briefly, opens with a young woman, Song Lian (Gong Li), addressing her 
mother, who does not appear on the screen, nor is she heard to reply, to the effect that there is 
no need to go on speaking as she is ready to leave for her new home and husband. Song 
Lian‟s monologue with her absent mother is captured in a close-up frame of the young 
woman‟s face which, ironically, as I explained in Chapter Three in the context of film theory 
on audience reception, evokes the viewer‟s earliest memory of maternal presence (though the 
m/other is missing from the close-up scene) – her face, her breast, her caring, her body, her 
love. 
 
In Raise the Red Lantern, Song Lian is married off to a rich man, Master Chen (Ma Jingwu), 
a merchant, to be his third concubine (xiao lapo) after his principal wife Yuru (Jin Shuyuan). 
Yuru‟s son, her first born with Master Chen, is roughly the same age as Song Lian, his 
youngest “wife”. Susan Mann (1997:9) warns that certain institutions in Chinese culture 
differ greatly from a similar form known in European diaspora societies. One such is 
marriage. Maria Jaschok and Suzanne Miers (1994:10-14) comment on forms of marital 
servitude in Guangdong, the mainland province of the Peoples‟ Republic  surrounding Hong 
Kong. They distinguish four types of marriage institution not known to the West, and I 
caution that we need to bear in mind that the forms discussed here relate to only one ethic 
group (the Cantonese) living in the PRC. It has been suggested by credible authority that at 
least four hundred ethnic groups, non-Han minorities, made their home in mainland China 
after 1949, though it is also true that the Han is by far the majority amounting to around 90% 
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of the Chinese peoples (Mullaney 2011:1-3). Nonetheless, the Cantonese marital experience 
is valuable for our purposes in that it shows the magnitude of the cultural difference in this 
respect from that of the West.  
 
Jaschok and Miers identify the following forms of marriage as having existed among the 
Cantonese during the twentieth century at some point or other. Some, such as the san po tsai, 
explained below, became extinct in the 1960s when rapid industrialization sucked up 
subsistence farming and eradicated the cause of this form of marriage, which was rural 
poverty. According to the authors many forms of female bondage, peculiar to the Chinese 
theater, and marriage, continue a new life in Chinese diaspora communities throughout 
Southeast Asia and the world at large. Apart from the most desirable marital institution (from 
the woman‟s point of view), marriage as a principal (first) wife, and that of the concubine, 
which they do not discuss, Jaschok and Miers name (naming is an important appropriating 
activity in Western feminism) four Cantonese forms of marriage. These are san po tsai, mui 
tsai, zi shu nu and ham sui mui. The pinyin Romanization of the Chinese characters are not 
from Mandarin, but, as I pointed out above, from Cantonese. It might not be incidental that 
four is the most unlucky number in the entire Chinese system of numerology. 
 
 
San po tsai refers to the practice, which persisted in Guangdong well into the 1960s, of 
parents selling little girls to another family with a son of roughly the same age as the little girl 
in question. The girl would leave her natal family immediately to live with her new family 
but the actual marriage would not be concluded before it could be consummated.  The 
motivation for the “marriage of minors” was grinding poverty which would take the young 
girl off the hands of her parents and obliterate the financial costs of bringing her up while at 
the same time it eliminated the necessity of wedding gifts to the bride‟s family of origin at a 
future date. Since the bride to be was abandoned by her family, this form of marriage was 
greatly abhorred.  
 
 
Mui tsai, unlike the case of san po tsai, though an equally despised practice, was an 
institution widespread throughout the entire mainland China and Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia, until killed by the Communist government with the introduction of the 
Marriage Law in 1950, which I discussed in Chapter Four in the context of my attempt to 
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outline an orthodox institutionalized discourse on gender in the Peoples‟ Republic. Mui tsai 
refers to the institution whereby parents sold off little unwanted girls for monetary gain but 
with the promise, in return, that their new family will seek a proper match in marriage for 
their daughter at the appropriate time. In practice these children were cruelly exploited and 
often ended up in situations other than that promised their parents, such as prostitution. 
Although the mu tsai as an institution comes across as a practice founded in servitude rather 
than marriage, I propose firstly, that marriage is an institution of bondage in subjugation and 
secondly, the secondary motivation for the transfer of the girl from her natal family to her 
receiving family was indeed the hope, given body in the promise to that end expressly 
extracted from her new family, to find the girl a suitable husband. As will be seen in the next 
paragraph, in my discussion of so-called compensation marriages, mui tsai were often pressed 
into service as “substitute wives,” for purposes of bed and table, by unwilling wives 
themselves. 
 
Zi Shu Nu (“compensation marriages”) was a remarkable form of marriage in that it allowed 
the wife respite from sexual duty and possibly an unblemished afterlife (sexual activity and 
childbirth, as we will see below, constituted major obstacles to a woman‟s spiritual 
advancement in Chinese Buddhism). Although legally married, the wife would avoid sexual 
contact with her husband by procuring one or more mui tsai to satisfy his sexual needs. It 
other documented instances of zi shu nu the legitimate wife might delay altogether going to 
live with her husband and prefer to delegate this unfortunate task to a mui tsai. 
 
Finally, the marriage known in Cantonese as ham sui mui (“protected women”) designated 
those Chinese women who eschewed marriage to Chinese partners and instead eloped with 
Western men, ostensibly for financial security otherwise out of their reach in the face of harsh 
patriarchal conditions at home. These marriages were shunned by both Western and Chinese 
observers and yet these liaisons, as Jaschok and Miers (1994:14) point out, brought some of 
the “Eurasian families” of Hong Kong in existence. 
 
To return to the heroine of Raise the Red Lantern (set in Northern China), Song Lian: 
disposed by way of a pre-arranged marriage as a (third) concubine, she purposely avoids the 
spirited wedding sedan, decked out in colorful red, the intention being to carry the bride to 
her new home, and prefers to walk to her new home. My point is that marriage is a trap for 
which women are trained and prepared from birth, as I argue in Chapter One, and Song 
107 
 
Lian‟s spurning the sedan is a beautiful way of showing up the sham which marriage is. A 
feminist might remark that women can least afford to marry for romantic love since marriage 
is precisely a deal in which she trades her sexuality and (re)p roductive labour for food and 
board. Emma Goldman said infamously that free love is an anachronism since love is not free. 
I have attempted to show in Chapter One how women in the West are psychologically “set-
up” to crave love and approval. This is true of China as much as it is of the West. To borrow 
from Spivak (2005), in the context of Charlotte Brontë‟s “imperialist” treatment of the Creole 
woman Bertha Mason in her famous novel Jane Eyre, the patriarchal institution of marriage, 
be it the Chinese version or the Western, cannot contain either the sexual energy or the 
romantic/affectionate needs of women. 
 
 
Turning again to Song Lian and her joining Master Chen‟s household as his third concubine 
(in the film she is euphemistically referred to as “Fourth Mistress”), upon her entering Master 
Chen‟s home, one of the first people she encounters is significantly Yan‟er (Kong Lin), a 
servant girl roughly her own age, appointed to serve her. I said significantly since Song Lian 
and Yan‟er‟s relations are the pivotal point on which the narrative movement of the film turns. 
Although Yan‟er has been allocated to see to Song Lian‟s needs, Yan‟er has dreams of her 
own, such as becoming one of Master Chen‟s “women”, even a concubine, herself. As one 
can understand, this dream of hers is not one to endear Song Lian to her or the other way 
around. 
 
From Yan‟er‟s perspective, her dreams of becoming a Mistress of the House, are not entirely 
based on fantasy, as Song Lian is to discover in an early rude awakening – Master Chen has 
the habit of groping Yan‟er. Whereas the Master seems to have an insatiable sexual appetite, 
his fondling of the servant girl Yan‟er sets off a series of tragic events. Additionally, there is 
only the subtlest suggestion that there is a sexual attraction between Song Lian and the 
Master‟s oldest son (born from a prior union). These sexual dynamics of competition between 
his “women” (since Yan‟er, at least in her own estimation, deems herself entitled, if only in 
part, as a result of Master Chen‟s designs) is the structural motor which drives the narrative 
and it is a compelling one. As I will show below, the brooding hatred between Song Lian and 
Yan‟er leads to two deaths, including that of Yan‟er herself, and the complete derangement of 
Song Lian in the final scene. 
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Both women‟s hatred of her (sexual and reproductive) rival – although Yan‟er is not in the 
running for the last item – creates a condition of discursive overlapping. The intersection of 
class, race and gender provides a fine opportunity to study gender discourse in a more 
nuanced setting since, as Delaney, C. & Yanagisako, S. (1992:17-19) argue (discussed below), 
observing a single discourse in isolation is not nearly as profitable as a study of the 
intersection of that discourse with another. How does the clash between Song Lian and Yan‟er 
allow for a discursive confluence? I will attempt to demonstrate this as the narrative unfolds. 
 
Yan‟er is a girl from a poor family, as she is repeatedly reminded by her mistress (Song Lian), 
whereas Song Lian is a woman with a university education of sorts. The discourse of class 
intersects at this point with that of gender to produce a truly explosive situation, although it 
should immediately be added that the discourse of class is also interchangeable  with that of 
race, as I intend to show below. 
In the cinematic narrative, which differs in certain respects from the printed literary version, 
Song Lian deceives Master Chen, in an attempt to capture his exclusive attention (just as his 
Third Mistress, meaning his second concubine, does with her operatic singing at any hour of 
her choosing or her constant complaints of being sick), by claiming to be pregnant and 
thereby playing on the Master‟s hope for a son from his youngest wife. Song Lian‟s 
announcement of being pregnant also reaches the ears of less sympathetic house–dwellers, 
not excluding Yan‟er, with whom she is already in competition. A new element is added to the 
envy between mistress and her maid in the form of the Second Mistress,  the first concubine 
Zhuoyan (Cao Cuifen), who promised the master a son during a sensual back-massage to win 
his exclusive affection (clearly a mammoth task). Zhuoyan conspires with Yan‟er to destroy 
Song Lian, although their actual conspiracy in not committed to the record, this eventually 
becomes apparent to the viewer as the flow of the different scenes exposes the plot. Once her 
deception is discovered – Yan‟er as the maid is entrusted to see to Song Lian‟s underwear and 
discovers the secret in this time-trusted way – she is denounced to Master Chen. 
The subtle interconnection between the scenes and how they support one another in building 
not only the narrative but also the gripping tension as events unfold, is a certain marker of 
Zhang‟s artistry. In an early scene, just after her arrival at Master Chen‟s home, Song Lian (an 
astute observer) noticed, during a game of mahyang, quite by accident how the second 
concubine, the beautiful soprano Mei Shan (He Caifei), flirts with the family doctor and she 
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draws the correct conclusions from her casual observation. The point of my slight digression 
is that when Master Chen is alerted to Song Lian‟s fake pregnancy, he instructs the family 
doctor to call on Song Lian to validate her alleged pregnancy. Revenge is to follow, as we  
will see below. Her deception is discovered and a furious Master Chen orders semi-
permanent black lanterns to be raised on her wing. Black lanterns are a stark symbol which 
communicates in no uncertain terms cessation of conjugal relations of the master o f the house 
with the concubine in question. But it also implies disgrace and social death in a community 
where fecundity (the possible conception of a son) and the Master‟s goodwill are pivotal for 
acceptance into the fold of the clan and for social mobility. Red is a particularly important 
colour in Chinese culture since it alludes to luck and fecundity. Black lanterns rather than red 
lanterns – the significance of the title becomes obvious in terms of the scene where the black 
lanterns are in fact hung and the concomitant excitement it generates. 
The sequence of events and scenes from this point leads to a fast-paced, disastrous 
“conclusion”, inasmuch as the final scene is a conclusion in terms of female sexual economy.  
The narrative takes an ominous turn when Song Lian suspects Yan‟er‟s involvement in her 
denouncement and ransacks her room, no doubt with impunity, for evidence of evildoing. The 
evidence she seeks does not evade her attention. In fact the two pieces of evidence she 
discovers in Yan‟er‟s room have a brazenness and vicious twist to them shocking even to 
Song Lian. Yan‟er has given body and substance to her dream of becoming, unless she can 
already be considered as being, one of his “concubines” (judging by his sexually predatory 
behaviour), one of Master Chen‟s mistresses by filling her room with old (possibly discarded) 
red lanterns. In the light of the increasing significance which red lanterns, especially seen 
against the backdrop of the counterbalance which the black lanterns achieve in the film, gain 
in a world where a woman‟s estimate has no horizon beyond her economic indicators of 
fertility and sexual availability/desirability, Yan‟er‟s somewhat unorthodox discursive 
reaction to her exclusion from the master discourse, is nonetheless an orthodox discourse. 
Her dreams of desire to be a wife, even be it a mere concubine (xiao lapo, literally a “small 
wife”), does not break with the tradition of a submissive heterosexual wife, even if she, 
inevitably, will have to share her master with other women, within the context of patriarchal 
oppression. Raise the Red Lantern therefore introduces yet another dimension to the spectacle 
of patriarchy and is valuable for our understanding of the nuanced nature of subjugation. That 
is the grisly idea of the oppressed, women being the case in point, oppressing one another in a 
reproduction of oppression on a micro-management everyday level. I will return to this idea 
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below in the context of Chesler‟s and Brownmiller‟s theories on the livid aggression and 
competition between women.  
But if Yan‟er‟s filling her room with red lanterns is not enough to scandalize the house, Song 
Lian also makes a second, grislier and considerably more chilling, find which is a hidden doll, 
cursed with many needles stuck to its tiny body, earmarked with the legend “Song Lian.”  As 
Chen is out of town, presumably on business, the task to pronounce on Yan‟er‟s fate falls to 
the Master‟s wife, the so-called First Mistress. She rules that the “old custom” is to prevail. 
This means that Yan‟er is to remain standing in the open courtyard for a specified number of 
days, come rain (and snow) or shine. Predictably she collapses from the strain and dies. 
Pitiful is the sight of her family, whom she might have been supporting on her wages as they 
clearly are destitute, collecting her body for burial. Meanwhile, Song Lian‟s revenge has not 
run its course yet. As I indicated before, as an astute observer during a game of mahyang in 
an early scene, she discovers the chemistry between Mei Shan, the second concubine, and the 
family doctor, and draws the correct conclusions from the incident. 
Song Lian realizes that only the doctor‟s examination, prompted by Yan‟er and Zhuoyan‟s 
conspiracy, could have given the lie to her deception, and alerts the right people to rumours of 
the liaison. Mei Shan is caught in the act, red-handed so to speak, with the good doctor, and 
the third mistress is killed in a small building conspicuously distant from the main dwelling. 
Viewers are made aware of the notorious nature of the aforesaid small building in our 
awareness of the rumours, that in former times other errant females have met a similar fate in 
that room. Longshots of the building emphasize its ominous distance from the main buildings.  
The death of Mei Shan is not an outcome Song Lian anticipated. This is made abundantly 
clear in the foreboding manner in which Song Lian approaches the small structure in the 
dwindling snow. Yet this is the result of the competition between Master Chen‟s women for 
his affection and certainly also for his material advantages. Perhaps in part as a result of her 
knowing that she caused the death of two equally oppressed women, though Yan‟er had less 
to commend her than either Song Lian or Mei Shan, Song Lian goes insane, and in the 
penultimate scene she is heard to curse hysterically that “women are no better than cats or 
dogs in this house”. Lacan‟s theory of discourse, traversed in Chapter Two, names rebel or 
dissenting discourse as the discourse of the hysteric and the name seems particularly apt in 
the light of the final two scenes of Raise the Red Lantern. In the closing scene of the film, 
Song Lian passes through her rooms in a deranged state, never to enjoy the sights of the hung 
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red lanterns on her wing again (with its concomitant of the Master‟s sexual advances.) Eerily, 
as Song Lian circulates through her rooms in the final scene just referred to, it is set against 
the busy announcement, with the urgent preparations which it demands, of Master Chen 
taking a new “wife”, a move no doubt necessitated by dwindling numbers of sexually 
available females in his household. 
The envy and deadly contest which Master Chen stirs up between his “women,” perhaps 
unknowingly (as there is now evidence to suggest malice or intention in the narrative), but 
decidedly with indifference – since as Elizabeth Spelmann (1990) reminds us, bias is 
ensconced in privilege – sets in motion a series of events which results in violent clashes 
between the discourses of class and gender. Yan‟er‟s hatred of Song Lian is the direct result 
of the latter‟s social standing: she has a university education of sorts, pointed out above, 
which precipitates her becoming Master‟s Chen‟s concubine rather than Yan‟er herself (as she 
is a mere servant girl from a poor family, though good enough for groping.) For her part, 
Song Lian despises Yan‟er for ingratiating herself with the Master, as though the Master had 
no choice in the matter, although it is not clear what other options for social mobility are open 
to women of Yan‟er‟s station in life. Master‟s Chen‟s behaviour encourages the perception 
that he considers all women under his roof fair game. 
In respect of my remark that Raise the Red Lantern evinces an overlap of discourses on 
gender and class, I am mindful of Delaney‟s & Yanagisako‟s remark, referred to above, that 
discourse-analysis on the intersection of discursive movements yields greater riches in terms 
of an understanding of social stratification than the examination of a single, exclusive 
discourse. It is after all the confluence of discourses which shape subjectivity and resultant 
agency, as I argue in Chapters Two and Four. 
In the case of women, Phyllis Chesler (2009:172-204) makes out a compelling argument that 
the troubled mother-daughter relationship, reproduced under conditions of patriarchal 
oppression in all patriarchal societies, as I will argue shortly, are both reproduced on another 
level as well – which is in each and every relationship a woman is likely to strike up with any 
and every woman in the course of her life. Women, according to Chesler, relate to other 
women, irrespective of age, as a daughter would to her own mother, and experience their 
interaction with that other woman as they would interaction with their m/other. In a 
subsequent chapter she summarizes her thesis in the following striking way. Mothers and 
daughters, claim Chesler (2009:267-268), 
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rarely acknowledge the possibility that their own mothers may envy them. Such 
knowledge is terrifying and threatens the symbiotic connection… The daughter still 
needs the mother - “precisely because she never had a nurturing mother”. In my view, 
maternal envy teaches many daughters how not to be a threat to other women. In 
addition, maternal envy teaches daughters to be passive, fearful, conformist, obedie nt – 
as well as similarly cruel to other women (emphasis in the original). 
To illustrate, Chesler (2009:173-174) argues that a strong woman is experienced by the 
“daughter” as a cold withdrawing “m/other” and is soon to be rejected by the “daughter”. She 
cites examples from her own life as an academic feminist, psychoanalyst and writer teaching 
at American universities. Women with a need for nurturance and warmth left her employ after 
finding her not “mothering enough”. By the same token, strong women with a mothering 
streak tend to fend for weaker women during group interaction.  
Eichenbaum & Orbach (1988:113-120), feminist psychologists with many years‟ experience 
treating women with depressive disorders, and whom I cited in Chapter One as authority for 
my argument that a woman‟s relationship with her m/other is the hinge on which her 
psychical construction turns, report that the protective boundaries which women set up 
around needy women or the fences erected around a woman perceived as a “care-giver”, in a 
group situation, is something to behold. Contemporary women in all patriarchal societies  
reproduce and relive the pain, disappointments, unfulfilled expectations and occasional joys 
that made up their earliest and most profound experience of all, namely that with their 
m/other, with every other “m/other” she relates to throughout her life span. (Whether or not 
the same is true for a woman, whether or not she is Chinese, who meets up with an 
emotionally needy man with feminine character traits, I do not know, but I suspect, for the 
reasons I enumerate upon below, that it is.) 
No wonder then that I chose as the title of this dissertation “Places to look for M/other,” since 
a woman‟s ongoing engagement with all other women is precisely that. The same is true for 
my motivation to pursue this project as I argue in Chapter One. Before my going on to 
analyze the battle plan between Song Lian and Yan‟er by employing Chesler‟s psychological 
model, explained above, I intend to propose two alternative explanations for the relentless 
competition and strife between women generally, on which I am in complete agreement with 
Chesler. My reason for doing so is that since I wrote the first draft of Chapter One more than 
three years ago, I have become increasingly uncomfortable with a structuralist approach. 
Whether or not Chesler‟s model is applicable to Chinese conditions may or may not be true 
but I am more comfortable to also draw out other possible explanations for the life-and-death 
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struggle in which Chinese women sometimes engage with one another.The first explanation 
is that proposed by Susan Brownmiller, a Western feminist, and the second, significantly 
tendered in the Chinese context, is that by the China scholar Margery Wolf (1972), which is 
based on field research she did in a Taiwanese village (which, in view of Chiang‟s strong 
Confucian outlook on gender, explored in Chapter Four, will qualify it as a “traditional 
Chinese society with a Confucian bent”).  
I pause briefly to express my unease with applying Chesler‟s model, which to my mind is no 
doubt correct for most, even the great majority of patriarchal societies. Since I wrote the first 
draft of Chapter One, I have since become convinced that if the Oedipus model applies to the 
Chinese context, it only relates to the mother-son relationship, strictly speaking, discussed 
below within the ambit of my analysis of the second of Zhang‟s films, Curse of the Golden 
Flower (2006), as the father is entirely excluded from the bonding between this pair. Unlike 
the classic Western model, explored in Chapter One, where the son attempts to displace the 
father in order to assume his position vis-à-vis the mother, the Chinese son, as I will attempt 
to show below, has no need for such maneuvers since the father has never been in the running 
for a strong emotional relationship with m/other and in this sense always remains an 
“outsider.” The only caveat is that the Chinese mother-son relationship is a non- incestuous 
one, generally speaking, unlike the Western model which also includes a sexual element at an 
unconscious level. In this sense I agree with Malinowski rather than Jones over whether the 
Oedipus model applies, assuming it does cross-culturally, in a differentiated manner, which is 
the former‟s view, rather than universally, which represents the latter‟s opinion (Moore 1992).  
In the same way in which I have doubts over the applicability of the Oedipus model to 
Confucian societies, I also have doubts over whether Chesler‟s thesis (that the mother-
daughter relationship is the exclusive motor which drives female conflict under conditions of 
patriarchal oppression), though no doubt correct for most societies structured along 
patriarchal lines, necessarily applies to Chinese societies. I accordingly propose two 
alternative models which might, as I have indicated above, either in conjunction with one 
another or individually, explain the continuous aggression between females, which certainly 
is true cross-culturally in all of patriarchy, as Chesler so convincingly demonstrates.  
Firstly, Margery Wolf (1972) defines and understands “uterine power,” based on 
anthropological fieldwork done in a Chinese society, as power-relations centred on the 
mother‟s reproductive abilities (power emanating from the womb), and her efforts to deliver 
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sons and secure a good relationship with these new men in her life so as to gain allies in a 
hostile new familial environment. Recall that in traditional Chinese society, as I explained in 
Chapter One, a daughter has to leave her natal family and enter a new home, much like Song 
Lian‟s ordeal in Master Chen‟s house, as a wife or concubine. Moreover, she is immediately 
met with suspicion and hostility as to her loyalties and, no doubt, as so brilliantly portrayed in 
Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern (1991), with envy and fear on the part of the existing women, 
of the imbalance wrought by the new-comer‟s sexual and reproductive economy. Consider 
Yan‟er‟s persistent and strong hatred towards Song Lian from the very moment she enters the 
Master‟s house. In the words of Phyllis Chesler (2009:174), women fantasize over “princes 
so as to be rescued from the cruel and arbitrary rule of an all- female world in which women 
replace – and are themselves replaced by – other women.” As I am cautious of a structuralist 
approach, a term explained in Chapter One, and as Wolf‟s theory is extracted from her 
experience in a Far Eastern village, I consider next an explanation for harsh female rivalry 
from the pen of a renowned Western feminist, Susan Brownmiller, the author of a seminal 
feminist text on the politics of rape, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1976). It is 
precisely from this text that I source her views on the origin of female hatred as between 
women (not between women and men).  
Susan Brownmiller (1976:157) makes the case convincingly that “[i]t is consistent with the 
nature of oppression that within an oppressed group, men abuse women.” I may also marshal 
the support of Kenneth M. Stampp (in Brownmiller 1976:157), an expert on slavery, who 
writes about the conditions of slaves in the American deep South as “[h]aving to submit to the 
superior power of their masters, many slaves were extremely aggressive toward each other”  
(a state of affairs that recalls Fanon‟s concept of “horizontal violence” among colonized 
people). Arguing by analogy from slaves to women, both groups dominated by men, it is not 
difficult to make the following step: within the oppressed group of women itself, a certain 
section of women, who feel themselves superior to their fellow womenfolk by virtue o f either 
class or race or both, and oppress their even more unfortunate gender mates. Brownmiller 
quotes one case which illustrates my argument. Solomon Northup (in Brownmiller 1976: 
158-159), a freed slave, recalls in his memoirs the tragic case of one Patsey, an attractive 
slave girl who had the bad fortune “to be the slave of a licentious master and a jealous 
mistress.” If Patsey did not catch the whip from her owner for not submitting to his sexual 
demands, she was in danger of abuse from his wife, who thought nothing of throwing broken 
glass in her face. My point is that Patsey‟s tragic life certainly was not an isolated case and 
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the abuse by either abusive masters or envious mistresses took their toll on slave women who 
simply had no currency to deny the master. 
All three models, explaining the hatred and envy among women, deserve careful 
consideration as it might well be that, in our postmodern world with its increasing tendency 
to fracture society, one model applies in one social context while not in another. Against the 
backdrop of the preceding exposition of Chesler‟s thesis on the profoundly foundational 
nature of a woman‟s relationship with m/other and how it finds essential echoes with other 
women, I will now consider Song Lian‟s clash with Yan‟er in Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern. 
In Chapter One I attempted to demonstrate the idea, first proposed by Jane Gallop (1988), 
that class or race (or both), serves as a convenient rationalization for both men and women 
(whether feminist or not) to seek out other women to service their needs (be it household 
chores or sexual services) just as m/other would have done, barring perhaps the last example. 
A woman of a lesser class, such as Yan‟er in Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern, is thus 
experienced by her mistress Song Lian as m/other, assuming Chesler‟s model holds, in view 
of the notorious “push-pull” dynamic evident among mothers and daughters in the 
contemporary world. Song Lian‟s encounter with Yan‟er is played out on two levels: firstly, 
Yan‟er does not only double as the stand-in m/other but also traumatically so as both 
disapproving and cold. For her part, Yan‟er experiences Song Lian as an equally emotionally 
unavailable mother, without any understanding or consideration for her desperate need to 
chase Master Chen, and both of them have no qualms to reject the other without much ado. 
Each enacts her part from a different vantage point and yet the result is the same: “abjection” 
of the m/other by the mature, adult daughter. Recall, as I explained in Chapter One, that 
Kristeva believes one of the major causes of depression among women in the West is the girl-
child‟s necessity to “abject” M/other in order to become a person in her own right, but, since 
she identifies so strongly with M/other, the act of abjection leads to mental problems 
(depression case in point). Compared with Kristeva‟s model, it could justifiably be argued 
that women “reject” (certainly a stronger word) rather than “abject” the “stand- in” mother or 
daughter. Gender- identification plays a very important role in how women relate to one 
another, as Kristeva points out. 
In terms of gender-discursive movement, I argue, as does Gallop, that race and class are 
interchangeable in the scenario sketched above. Had Song Lian been a white American 
madam and Yan‟er her Philipino maid, with all the other dynamics in place as in the film, the 
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struggle, and perhaps also the tragic results, would have been the same. Chesler argues that 
these aggressive patterns between females are pursued to the very end as the re can only be 
one winner. On the other hand, Jaschok and Miers (1994:23) confirm the findings of non-
Western feminists that oppressions are not uniform, just as the Oedipus model, if it applies to 
non-Western social settings, is not uniform either, and that place and time make for many 
varied configurations. They argue that in the Chinese context research has proven that it is 
women, rather than men, who are more likely to benefit directly from the sale, prostitution, 
servitude and services of other women (Jaschok and Miers 1994:14-15). It would seem then 
that if Chesler is correct in her thesis of the magnitude of the mother-daughter relations vis-à-
vis other women, just as we have seen in the life-or-death engagement between Song Lian 
and Yan‟er in Raise the Red Lantern, then the persistent complexities of that relationship are 
relived in frightening ways by women on many different levels throughout her life. No 
wonder m/other is eerily present, perhaps most prominently so in her absence, across most 
cinematic genres. I have attempted to demonstrate this line of thinking in Chapter Three by 
relying extensively on the work of Lucy Fischer. My point, which I have attempted to rework 
along many different angles throughout this dissertation, is that the patriarchal construct of 
m/other, bearing in mind its social and political dimensions, is convincingly shown up as 
thoroughly drenched in misogyny. If class and race are interchangeable, as I have argued 
throughout this dissertation (that it is), “m/other” is always nothing but a glorified maid 
constantly on stand-by (even in different guises) to service our needs, that of both men and 
women. M/other is the fantasy of the Other which haunts us, and maternal discourse might be 
scarce or insufficiently healthy, but, as I have shown in Chapter Three, its so-called absence 
uncannily shadows our every move. I suggest that credit is due to the cross-cultural analytical 
insight, which I have employed in my reading of Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern in the first 
half of this chapter, of examining the concept of m/otherhood at the critical intersection of 
cross-cutting discourses (such as those of gender, class and race). 
Women, as the preceding analysis has attempted to show, remain either “mothers” or 
“daughters” in their emotional and intimate dealings with any other woman in very 
significant ways and, more chillingly, continue to do battle with m/other for love, recognition 
and independence. The lesson from Raise the Red Lantern provides only for a rehash of the 
well-known “push-pull dynamic” between mother and daughter in Western industrialized 
societies. Is a curative discourse in Chinese societies not available to inform or enrich this 
troubled yet immensely important relationship? In my judgment such a discourse is indeed 
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available and for this purpose I now turn to a consideration of the mother-son relationship in 
Chinese societies within the context of my analysis of Zhang‟s film, Curse of the Golden 
Flower (2006), his final cinematic collaboration with Gong Li, where definite glimpses of 
this very special relationship are to be found. After considering the parameters of the mother-
son relationship in its historical manifestation as a general rule in Chinese culture, I will turn 
to an example of a good mother and daughter relationship, as evinced by Colette and her 
mother Sido, which features as an exception in patriarchal societies. In saying that there are 
exceptions to the generalized rules of patriarchal oppressions, such as a good 
m/other/daughter relationship – that between Sido and Colette being a case in point – is 
another way of saying, as I argue in Chapters Two and Four, that patriarchal power is not all-
encompassing as it leaves room for resistance.  
 
The narrative thrust in Curse of the Golden Flower (2006), set in ancient China perhaps 
during the Tang Dynasty, is briefly that of a discontented and desperately unhappy Empress 
Phoenix (Gong Li) who attempts a violent palace coup against her hated husband, the 
Emperor (Chow Yun-fat). She intends to let the cat out the bag, so to speak, during the 
Festival of Chong Yan, when thousands upon thousands of these golden coloured 
chrysanthemums (the so-called “golden flowers” alluded to in the title) are in full flower. For 
her onslaught against the imperial might of the Emperor, she enlists the help of her first born 
son, her beloved Prince Jai (Jay Chou). But they are betrayed, by among others Crown Prince 
Wan (Liu Ye), the Emperor‟s son from a previous mysterious union, and despite Prince Jai‟s 
spectacular deployment of the state army on the appointed day (with a cast of extras running 
into thousands, Curse of the Golden Flower is reputedly the most expensive Chinese film at 
the time of its release in 2006), the insurrection fails. Prince Jai is captured alive (in fact 
special orders are given to ensure that no harm befalls him) and the Emperor, no doubt fully 
briefed on Jai‟s motives for rebellion, declares himself prepared to forgive him provided that 
Jai undertakes to ensure that the Empress takes her daily medication faithfully.  
 
Central to the plot is the Emperor‟s express aim, known only to himself and the imperial 
physician, of literally driving the Empress nuts by having secreted portions of Persian black 
fungus added to her daily doses of medicine, as the aforesaid physician explains to his 
daughter Chan in a bone-chilling scene in which the latter in sworn to secrecy. The Empress 
is required to take this medication by imperial decree allegedly for her suffering anaemia. The 
plot is disclosed to the Empress by one of her spies, who include the imperial physician‟s 
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wife among their number, and Prince Jai, who expresses constant and persistent concern for 
his mother‟s health throughout the film. In fact, he only agrees to take up the sword against 
his father, the Emperor, after the Empress has brought him up to speed with the true nature of 
the medication she has been ordered to consume. In the final scene, which evinces a very 
tender exchange between mother and son, rarely seen on the screen, Prince Jai ends his life, 
after begging her forgiveness for failing her, rather than agree to the Emperor‟s demand that 
he personally administer his mother‟s “medicine.” The significance of the scene-sequence 
leading up to the final scene, as I have just described it, lies in the deduction, on the part of 
the audience, that the Emperor appears to be aware of the fact that both Prince Jai and the 
Empress have full knowledge of the secret ingredient, the Persian black fungus, since nightly 
assassins are dispatched to rub out the good doctor and his family. The implication is that the 
Emperor knows that the court physician‟s wife has disclosed that secret ingredient to the 
Empress, and she again lost no time to communicate this information to her beloved son, 
which whom she enjoys an excellent relationship. 
 
Against this background, the Emperor‟s offer to Prince Jai to assume personal responsibility 
for his ensuring that his mother take her daily doses of “medicine” in exchange for the 
Emperor‟s forgiveness, takes on an a sinister, even sadistic, turn. The strong emotional bond 
between mother and son, developed in scene after scene, is not lost on the audience as this is 
the prime driver in the unfolding of the narrative. I have viewed the movie a good many times 
and I have no doubt that the Emperor (since he himself is a Chinese son of a Chinese mother, 
after all) is fully up to date with the dynamics of the mother-son relationship between Prince 
Jai and the Empress – including Prince Jai‟s only motivation for revolt, as he himself exp lains 
it to his father in the final spectacular scene, namely loving concern for his m/other. Did the 
Emperor, knowing all this, expect Prince Jai to commit suicide when he placed this “Sophie‟s 
choice” before him? Might this also have been the reason why orders were issued to take him 
alive, in spite of the loss of many lives as Prince Jai fought in majestic mode? The nub is this 
– the Emperor knew full well that Prince Jai could not, would not, accept his so-called offer 
of forgiveness and he certainly also knew that nothing at all would defeat the Empress so 
completely as Prince Jai‟s dying at his own hand because of his love for her. I argue that the 
answer to the above-mentioned two questions to be affirmative, as I read this film in the 
context of the strong mother-son bond in Chinese societies. As I attempt to demonstrate 
below in my reading of Curse of the Golden Flower, I am convinced that the Chinese mother-
son relationship (and I argue that this is so for very specific historical reasons) is a good  
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model to scrutinize for lessons to reinvigorate the dearth in maternal discourse, as identified 
by Kristeva, by resuscitating the mother-daughter relationship, so pivotal in the moral course 
of a woman‟s life in contemporary patriarchal societies (if not in traditional Confucian 
societies, certainly in the West.)  
 
I have touched on the theme of the historical and cultural specificity of the unique mother and 
son relationship in Chinese societies, and I will take this as my point of departure.  In a 
ground-breaking study on the alleged political machinations of early Buddhism to gain a 
foothold in China, since the movement‟s migration from India to China in the 1st century C.E. 
(A.D.), China scholar Alan Cole develops an argument in the published version of his 
doctoral thesis, Mothers and Sons in Chinese Buddhism (1998), that the reception of 
Buddhism into ancient Chinese society, which according to him became fully established in 
the 5th century C.E., initially ran into a serious obstacle. This is the Buddhist injunction to 
converts to leave their parental home and join the sanghai Buddhist temple community, an 
idea frowned upon by the Chinese, devoted to caring for parents. Buddhist teaching 
eventually managed to overcome this problem by latching onto and exploiting a weakness in 
Chinese society in the wake of the Confucian values so dominant in traditional Chinese 
societies. Cole is referring here to the neglect of the m/other in the Chinese household. By his 
employing Margery Wolf‟s concept of “uterine” power, explored above in the context of my 
analysis of Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern (in the first part of this chapter) and possible 
alternative theories for the life-threatening aggression between women, Cole (198:34-40) 
argues that when a new wife joins her husband‟s family, she is isolated and emotionally bereft 
as she is treated with contempt and suspicion by the female members of the clan (as we have 
seen in Raise the Red Lantern.) In the well- formulated phrase of one of Cole‟s commentators, 
Charles Jones (1998:410), “[h]ow did Buddhism make use of certain fault lines in Confucian 
family values in order to gain acceptance and support in China?”  
 
Cole‟s strategy is two-fold. Firstly, he sets out to analyze ancient Chinese Buddhist texts in an 
attempt, largely successful in my view (but see Lassoff 1998 for a considered opinion to the 
contrary), to show how Buddhist theologians used the cultural artifact or cultural 
phenomenon  of the isolated m/other to germinate and encourage, through a combination of 
both myth and teaching, a strong, emotionally satisfying, mother and son relationship in the 
light of the former‟s desperate attempts to forge ties in a hostile  and alien landscape. 
Certainly – in a move which will not be lost on the Emperor (Chow Yun-fat) in Zhang‟s 
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Curse of the Golden Flower – this Buddhist ploy of pandering to the spiritual and emotional 
needs of the Chinese m/other in her uterine-power struggles in her new husband‟s house, 
against competing concubines, perhaps the principal wife and even outside players 
(prostitutes and courtesans), her very own son, the crown on any Chinese m/other‟s 
reproductive efforts, will be a most formidable ally. 
 
The texts scrutinized by Cole are both apocryphal commentaries on the original “sacred” text, 
written up in China after Buddhism‟s arrival there, and moralist myths. I will recount two 
which show the mother as in desperate need of redemption by her son (Cole 1998:57-64). 
Since it is woman‟s animalistic nature (sex and excretion: menstruation and afterbirth, Cole 
1998:77-78, 230-231) which earns them rebirth in Hell, mothers end up reborn there for no 
other reason than their being mothers. A brief examination of two of these texts, in line with a 
cross-cultural feminist analysis, is especially illuminating for the successful way in which 
Buddhist ideology (has) managed to marginalize women into positions of powerlessness. The 
two texts I have in mind are The Blood Bowl sutra (Cole 1998:197) and The Illustrated Tale 
of Mu Lian Saving His Mother From the Netherworld (Cole 1998:81, 178). 
 
In The Blood Bowl, a son descends into a women‟s hell, perhaps especially reserved for 
m/others, to rescue his mother from a fate worse than death itself. Women are prostrated in a 
well of blood covering them up to their mouths, from which they are forced to drink thrice a 
day. In the latter myth, Mu Lian discovers his mother in the Avīcī Hell, a place specifically 
reserved for sexual profanities (she had to conceive him after all), where the good lady is 
secured to a fire bed featuring 49 nails. I am in complete agreement with both Samantha 
Lassoff‟s (1998:11, 14) and the Buddhist nun Y. C. Lhamo‟s (Lassoff 1998:5) feminist 
exposure of the insidious ways in which women‟s biological nature or “devious intents” to 
subvert family values are drummed up as part of the “array of reasons” to justify the 
subjugation of women. This naturalization of chauvinist discrimination to keep women down 
works so successfully precisely because it is so absurd  (to paraphrase Žižek‟s argument in the 
cinematic documentary The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology [2012], on how the Nazis succeeded 
to demonize the figure of the Jew, in another context). Consider the issue of defilement 
through female excretion. Mu Lian finds his mother in hell crawling on all fours trailing 
strings of dirt. Why would male excretion be any nobler than that of women especially 
considering that women have “no control” over their female embodiment (Lassoff 1998:11)? 
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Cole‟s second strategy is to read the striking mother-son dyad as an Oedipal variation, 
perhaps less successfully, along the lines suggested by Malinowski, indicated at the end of 
Chapter Four, which exclude the father rather effectively. Lassoff (1998:9) lashes Cole for 
applying the model to a pre-modern, and one may add non-Western, culture. I have indicated 
my discomfort with structuralist applications on more than one occasion in this dissertation, 
but if the Oedipus complex is understood as a variant structure it might well have an 
application of sorts. I myself hit on the idea that the mother/son bond in Chinese societies 
may lend itself to an Oedipal explanatory reading. I am supported in my defence of Cole by 
Kristeva‟s own casting of Colette‟s incestuous relationship with her much younger stepson, 
recounted later in this chapter, as a form of Oedipal manifestation. 
 
If Cole is correct in his historical and political assessment of the origin of this uniquely non-
incestuous mother-son relationship, this would be yet another example of how women are 
used as pawns, though sometimes to their own direct benefit as well, for the most part, as the 
plot in Curse of the Golden Flower shows, in political games between men. 
 
Be that as it may, the pressing question for my purposes is what the nature and the parameters 
of this beautiful Chinese mother and son relationship are and how it can be utilized to 
resuscitate ailing maternal discourse, specifically as evinced in discourses on the rickety and 
emotionally derailed relationship between mother and daughter in most contemporary 
patriarchal societies. 
 
Susan Mann (1997:11-13), a scholar of China‟s last imperial house, the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911), when the Manchus ruled China, outlines the features of the mother-son relationship in 
the cultural context. Since daughters are brought up with the knowledge that they are to leave 
their natal family, perhaps like a son in Western industrialized societies, and join her 
husband‟s family, which would include his other sexual playmates, only a son, perhaps like a 
daughter in the West, could capitalize on a strong emotional bond with mother, likely to last 
all her (or his) life (at p.11). Husband and wife spend little quality time together and a 
m/other may well visit harsh treatment on a daughter- in-law whom she views as a threat to 
her precious relationship with her son. Meaningful encounters between the sexes, save for 
that between mother and her son, were rare indeed in pre-modern China. Men “poured their 
most powerful emotions into a lifelong bond with their mother” (Mann 1997:15). Louise 
Edwards (Mann 1997:16) goes as far as to call the world created in Dream of the Red 
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Chamber, a fictionalized account of a sex manual, as an erotic encounter with m/other in 
social space stripped of conventional ethics. Her point is that desire and spiritual 
enlightenment merge and that path leads through the idealized mother. Finally, Mann 
(1997:33) refers to the “filial devotion [which] they [mothers] inspired in their sons.” For 
both mothers and sons in Chinese societies, their relationship with one another is likely to be 
the most significant inter-personal experience ever. 
 
Because these glimpses of the mother and son relationship in Chinese societies in the work of 
China scholars are admittedly sketchy, I perceive a need to flesh it out a little. This 
relationship can be seen as a leftover from feudal or traditional society but, as I have 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, is still very much part and parcel of modern Chinese society, 
in it having become part of the Chinese social fabric through secularization. Published 
accounts of the emotional depth of the Chinese mother/son dyad are rare. Zhang‟s Curse of 
the Golden Flower (2006) provides us with a precious account. One of the Buddhist moralist 
accounts which Cole reads contains ten mother/son stories. Here I consider the mother-son 
relations in Chinese societies in the context of Zhang‟s aforesaid film, and in particular the 
relationship between the Empress (Gong Li) and her beloved son, Prince Jai (Jay Chou), as it 
unfolds in the narrative. 
 
I propose that the following values are present in this very special relationship: immense 
mutual loyalty, consideration and respect; unbounded love and a deep emotional bond; utter 
and complete trust; the ability to communicate and talk freely about anything and, finally, 
unbridled freedom of action (though not without expressing an opinion on the wisdom of the 
proposed behaviour.) I myself have been fortunate to observe this relationship closely for 
nearly five years, as I have lived with a Chinese mother and son during this period of time. 
Both of them, mother and son, are ethnic Han Chinese with Buddhist leanings. I may add that 
I have also been fortunate to observe mother and son relationships of this quality in Western 
culture but as an exception, as is the case with Colette‟s relationship with Sido, and not as a 
general rule. 
 
The special quality of the Empress‟ relationship with her son is immediately apparent in the 
early scenes where Prince Jai communicates his concern over the Empress‟ health (and her 
strained relations with the Emperor) as well as her unwillingness to consume the medicinal 
concoctions prepared by Imperial decree. It is only to Prince Jai that the Empress discloses 
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her knowledge of the (recently) added secret ingredient of her medicine, the Persian black 
fungus. The Empress makes it clear to him that the recent addition is a ruse designed by the 
Emperor to drive her insane in a space of a couple of months, as I explained above. The ease 
of communication, albeit on very sensitive matters, and the utter and complete trust between 
the two is a pleasure to observe. Prince Jai‟s love for and loyalty to his mother (he addresses 
her respectfully and tenderly as “Mother”) precipitates the Empress‟ successful attempts to 
convince him that her welfare depends on his joining her armed insurrection on the day of the 
Festival of Chong Yan. Prince Jai, as he admits to the Emperor in the final scene, was only 
moved to rebel because of his concern for and devotion to his mother, and certainly not 
because of any designs he may have had on the throne, as I have outlined above. 
 
Prince Jai‟s beautiful, strong and healthy relationship with his mother, the Empress, raises the 
question whether this maternal discourse is heterodox or orthodox. Cole (1998), cited above, 
has explored the historical reasons as to why and how this discourse originated as a reaction 
and necessary response to the phenomenon of the emotionally bereft wife/mother within the 
context of a Confucian social order, which employed a discourse on gender heavily skewed in 
favour of men (an institutionalized orthodox discourse on gender). I argue, as does Cole, that 
in an environment hostile to women, the new wife, lonely and pro foundly alienated, must 
yield a uterine scepter in her shaping of a one-generational family (as opposed to the multi-
generational continuous unit endorsed by patriarchy), and the strong mother-son bond in 
Chinese societies is indeed a heterodox discourse aimed at recruiting a most powerful ally for 
the m/other. My argument is in line with the reading I glean from Zhang‟s Curse of the 
Golden Flower (2006). Prince Jai, the Empress‟ beloved son, has no scruples sacrificing his 
life for his mother even though, as he concedes to the Emperor in the final scene, he kne w 
this was a battle he could not win. 
 
Another interesting feature of the film is the Empress‟ poor, even indifferent relationship with 
her youngest son, Prince Yu, which brings us full-circle to a fresh consideration of the 
troubled mother-daughter relationship in patriarchal societies (although I have expressed my 
discomfort with an unqualified structuralist approach). Blumberg (2009:8-13, 32-37) has 
demonstrated convincingly, in the context of developmental evolution in the life sciences, 
that so-called “freaks” or “monsters” have a significant role to play in the overall 
understanding of a theory (evolution being the case in point.) Oddities or aberrations point to 
a singular feature in Darwin‟s sacred notion of the necessity of infinite variety. Blumberg 
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(2009:32-34), citing the work of the late nineteenth century naturalist William Bateson,  
reasons that the odd-ones-out are nothing but internal “caps” on the idea of infinite 
differentiation.  
 
Blumberg (2009:5-7) illustrates his argument with reference to the phenomenon of conjoined 
twins (a “person” or “persons” with one body and two heads). Although it might be traumatic 
and even unbelievable for us to observe conjoined twins functioning as a unit, they do so in 
fact perfectly well. They are able to swim, dance and bicycle in what may appear to us 
“normal” human beings as unimaginable, magnificent feats. Blumberg‟s point: oddities such 
as conjoined twins are in no way deficient but able to function without any difficulty as a 
complete unit. Put in another way, the appearance of freaks or monsters in the system, points 
to areas of exhaustion. A good example illustrating the point in the context of Catholicism, is 
the notorious case of Pope Joan, where a woman, ordained as Pope Johannis Anglicus, 
allegedly managed to ascend the papal throne surreptitiously in the ninth century. A film by 
the same name was released in 2009 with the German actress Johanna Wokalek rendering a 
very credible performance as Pope Joan. How does Blumberg‟s assessment of the value of 
internal caps on further differentiation within the system help us, if it does, in our attempts to 
reinvigorate maternal discourse, specifically the fractured mother and daughter bond? 
 
I argue in Chapter One, based on the conclusions which feminist psychologists have drawn 
from their clinical work with women suffering from depression, that the strife-torn mother-
daughter relation is true for all patriarchal societies. However, there are exceptions to the rule, 
just as Prince Yu‟s strained relationship with the Empress, in a society where a strong mother-
son bond is almost a given, could be called a black swan in the Chinese context. As far as 
mothers and daughters are concerned, the French novelist Colette‟s well-known relationship 
with her mother Sido, is just such a “black swan”. 
 
I examine Colette‟s emotionally and intellectually satisfying relationship with her mother 
Sido in the context of Blumberg‟s idea that aberrations from the norm, as Colette‟s strong and 
healthy bond with her mother surely is, point up internal limits to the system of the 
perpetuation of patriarchal oppressions, which produced the troubled mother-daughter bond 
in the first place. If the analogy between biology and psychology holds, as I believe it does, 
phenomena such as the relationship between the Empress and Prince Jai (as it is so 
beautifully portrayed in Curse of the Golden Flower) and that of Colette-Sido might show us 
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a way out of the impasse. Before drawing out the conclusions, I proceed to examine the 
features inherent in Colette‟s strong relationship with her mother Sido, which, fortuna tely, are 
documented well by, among others, Julia Kristeva (2004) herself. 
 
In my exploration of Colette‟s relationship with her mother Sido, I am continually reminded 
of Phyllis Chesler‟s (2009:198-199, 205) account of Electra as a metaphor for contemporary 
daughters in their on-going struggle with m/other to attain self- realization. Chesler 
(2009:198-204) shows convincingly how daughters, like the character Electra, as in 
Sophocles‟ play by the same name, desperately attempt to overcome m/others‟ stifling 
presence by “killing” her so as to replace her as Father‟s consort. None of this creepy 
backstabbing aggression is evident in Colette‟s bond with her mother. In fact, it is striking 
how Colette‟s interaction with Sido  fits perfectly with an alternative model for the 
psychological development of girls (the negative Oedipus complex, a concept I introduced in 
Chapter One), as the (positive) Oedipus complex is perhaps better suited as a model for boys. 
 
I argue that, in the context of a female perspective, the negative Oedipus complex is a viable 
feminist paradigm for “daughters”. The negative Oedipus holds that a girl‟s development 
turns on her identification with her mother to the extent that she does not wish to replace her, 
implied in the Electra myth and given contemporary clinical credence in Chesler‟s work,  but 
aims to become her mother. As I attempt to demonstrate, within my traversing of the Colette-
Sido nexus, for a young woman the negative Oedipus complex requires a very special 
relationship with her mother: certainly comparable to the quality of and parameters inherent 
in the Chinese mother-son relational context.  
 
Blissful childhood and self-realization are recurring themes in Colette‟s massive literary 
output (Marks 1961:201-203, Kristeva 2004:15). Constant flashbacks are evident throughout 
her work. For Colette her mother Sido is a haven of “warm[th], of security and of love”  
(Marks 1961:202). The question of how Colette came to lead a passionately unconventional 
life within the context of her also enjoying a thoroughly satisfying emotional bond with her 
mother, is the very centrepiece lacking in the contemporary relationship between mother and 
daughter in patriarchy. I examine the Colette-Sido relationship along two axes: personal 
freedom and self-realization, with are, for a woman, only possible in the context of her 
pursuing an unconventional morality in a patriarchal society. 
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 Elaine Marks (1961:9) suggests that Sido‟s favorite  word “Regarde,” which might translate 
as “look, wonder, accept, live,” was the gospel by which Colette lived her life. Sido found 
“constant joy” in all aspects of life (Marks 1961:205-206) as did Colette (Kristeva 2004:7) 
and although Sido‟s world is no more, “the values implicit in it, the values which Sido created, 
exist in memory and in the pages of Colette‟s book[s].” 
 
All Colette‟s fictional characters (Fanny, Jane, Alice, Julie) are endowed with an unorthodox 
ethics reinforced with an uncompromising conviction in the justice of their cause – such as 
that possessed by Colette herself (Marks 1961:109-110, 177). Favorite themes explored by 
Colette are the married woman falling in love with another woman (Claudette Married  
[1902]), a stepmother having an affair with her stepson (such as the incestuous relationship 
Colette herself pursued with her stepson Bertrand de Jouvenel [Kristeva 2004:13]) or a young 
man‟s love for an older woman. The last theme is narrated in The End of Cheri (1926) and it 
is mirrored in Colette‟s own life with reference to the relationship she had with Auguste 
Heriot, a man more than a decade her junior, whom she met in 1910 (Kristeva 2004:49). 
 
Generally speaking, Colette‟s women are less likely than her male characters to execute or 
attempt self-harm. Elaine Marks (1961:111) argues that the experience of love pushes 
Colette‟s women to surpass themselves since, in her striking phrase, “[w]omen thrive in love, 
men wither.” Not only love, but also compassion was an important value for both Colette and 
her mother Sido. Colette was “sensitive to female masochism and the miseries of young 
wives” (Kristeva 2004: 68). Compassion and caring for the underdog was also not lacking in 
her mother who undoubtedly fostered this value in her daughter, a theme to which I will 
return later in this chapter in the context of the mother returning the male gaze. Colette 
(quoted in Kristeva 2004:13) wrote lovingly about Sido as a woman who, in “a shamefaced, 
miserly, narrow-minded little region, opened her village home to stray cats, tramps, and 
pregnant girls.” 
 
Apart from love, the concept of purity is an important one in understanding Colette‟s 
unconventional morality. A person or cause is pure for Colette, contrary to the conventional 
view, when a passionate, unbridled commitment acts as their, or its, driver (Marks 1961:115, 
211). Hence she derives enormous joy from observing the (yes, male) gay scene not despite 
but because of its brutal exclusion of women. The same applies to the pure ambience of the 
opium den. This ability of Colette‟s to find emotional sustenance in unusual cultural practices 
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explains perhaps why she embraces both the good and the bad turns which life has in store 
for her (Marks 1961:115, 211, Kristeva 2004:71).  
 
If Colette‟s moral world is so different from that of her peers, we should not be surprised that 
the ways in which her women interact are also in stark contrast to the life-threatening 
competition and hatred among women which Phyllis Chesler (2009) so ably demonstrates as 
being the norm in contemporary patriarchal societies. Colette‟s females engage with one 
another in “tenderness and [with] compliments” (Marks 1961:116). This might explain why 
the “other woman”, more likely than not, is accommodated and accepted rather than vilified 
and rejected (Marks 1961:213, Kristeva 2004:30-31, 51). Colette creates a soft world for her 
women. She was bisexual, a committed lesbian who, curiously, had no time for feminists 
(Kristeva 2004:10, 41, 56). Kristeva (2004:11) argues that Colette‟s unorthodox sexual 
orientation is in fact essential for woman‟s liberation: “There is no emancipation of woman 
without a liberation of woman‟s sexuality, which is fundamentally a bisexuality and a 
polyphonic sensuality.” 
 
If Colette‟s choices are indicative of the freedom she demanded for herself, how does this 
core value resonate with her mother‟s influence? Colette‟s youth was “dominated by the 
presence of her mother” (Marks 1961:15, 19), a theme to which she returns again and again 
in her writings. Kristeva (2004:53) argues that Colette‟s fiction, starting with My Mother’s 
House (1922), written ten years after Sido‟s death, “recognized the permanence, at the center 
of pleasure, of a mother always started afresh.” Proud and joyous, Colette was her mother‟s 
favourite. “In my family,” wrote Colette (cited in Marks 1961:20-21), there was “no money, 
but books. No gifts, but tenderness. No comfort, but liberty.” 
 
Colette pursued her sense of “personal freedom” (Marks 1961:10) with a vigour seldom 
encountered by women in the West during the first half of the twentieth century (Marks 
1961:14-15, Kristeva 2004:28). A comparative example from another culture, as I note in the 
previous chapter, Chapter Four, is the enthusiasm with which young Chinese women, around 
the same time, chose freedom over the traditional feminine role by either resisting marriage 
or, Nora-like, walking out on husband and children.  
 
Sido‟s legacy entailed complete freedom to explore, observe and to enjoy life which she 
doled out with boundless love (Marks 1961:22). Is it this unbridled sense of freedom which 
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enabled Colette to nurse and heal her own emotional pain by recalling Sido‟s balms (Marks 
1961:215)? Certainly, a mother not envious of her daughter‟s liberties and opportunities 
would be a tremendous asset in building a young daughter‟s confidence in her own abilities, 
dreams and desires. In one of Colette‟s (1989:58) short stories, “If I had a daughter …”, she 
writes touchingly about “the safety of confident mothers”. Kristeva (2004:21) makes the 
following case for the legacy which Sido left Colette: 
 
Happiness at any price, with no moral sense other than that of following her desires and 
writing them down: this is an art of living that goes against the teaching of the Church 
and its secular successors. 
 
Colette offers no apology for her indulgence in female jouissance (“orgasmic bliss” [Stoltzfus 
2006:8]) and her right to happiness (Kristeva 2004:6, 10-11).  
 
Colette‟s writing is testimony to a happy childhood build on a deep, healthy love between 
herself and her adored mother (Marks 1961:7). Kristeva (2004:69) makes reference to 
Simone de Beauvoir‟s acknowledgement of the “exceptional harmony between Colette and 
Sido, „a well-balanced and generous mother.‟” Unlike contemporary daughters nursing the 
knife in Electra- like fashion, Colette became her mother with glee in later life (Marks 
1961:23). “I imitate her manner. I still imitate it”, declares Colette (in Marks 1961:207). 
Kristeva (2004:13) observes that both Colette and her writing evolved, in time, from 
“perversion, père-version, identifying with father, to mére-version, identifying with mother.” 
If present-day women desperately resist becoming their mothers, as Chesler argues (a model 
representing the [positive?] Oedipus complex) then Colette perfectly fits the model of the 
negative Oedipus complex, in which the daughter strives to become the mother. I elucidate 
this alternative psychological developmental model for daughters in Chapter O ne. I suggest 
that what makes the negative Oedipus model a desirable outcome for Colette, though on the 
face of it not for the majority of her peers, is the counterbalance of unlimited freedom which 
Sido so generously and lovingly, as recounted above, allowed Colette and which in turn 
permitted her to become her own person.  
 
In conclusion, Colette became a mother herself after Sido‟s passing. Her own daughter, Bel-
Gazou, is a strong adhesive in the generational bond between these women (Marks 1961:219-
210). This idea ties in well with the therapeutic device observed in practice by Eichenbaum & 
Orbach (1988:116), feminist psychotherapists, which is that the healing of emotional wounds 
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in women requires an endless linking of generations, mothers and daughters, since the mother 
herself is a neglected, needy daughter. I will return to this interesting idea of the mother as 
herself a daughter in need of love and understanding in my analysis of Yu Duo (1990), the 
third and last cinematic performance of Gong Li‟s I read in this chapter. A strong and healthy 
mother-daughter bond finds apt expression in that profound maternal value which Colette and 
Sido held in common, that “rare blend of love and respect” (Marks 1961:209-210). In the 
final analysis, as all women know, love alone, is not enough. And this formula is the same 
magic which feeds and sustains the mother-son relationship between the Empress and her 
beloved son Prince Jai in Zhang‟s cinematic masterpiece, Curse of the Golden Flower (2006).  
 
My argument is that the value of the Chinese perspective on the sca rcity of maternal 
discourse in patriarchy is that whereas Colette‟s beautiful bond with her mother Sido is a 
rarity or, to use Blumberg‟s evolutionary biological language, a “monster” or a “freak”, the 
equally telling mother-son relationship in Chinese societies is the rule and not a “freak” or 
rarity. The upshot of my reasoning is that healthy, loving, respectful mother-daughter 
relationships in the contemporary world are possible as a rule rather than an exception, in the 
same way in which good mother-son relationships are indeed the norm, and not freaks, in 
Chinese societies. If Chesler is right about her thesis that the mother-daughter bond is the 
cornerstone of women‟s relationships, then the reinvigoration of that former adhesive will 
also add value to the later social construction.One of the great advantages of a cross-cultural 
analysis over rival methodologies is its ability to shed light on a cultural oversight or blind 
spot in the home culture. I have attempted to utilize this advantageously in the scrutiny of the 
troubled mother-daughter relationship found in patriarchal spaces, despite the fact that I was 
wrong about my initial hunch in Chapter One, which is that a curative discourse might be 
found in the Chinese mother-daughter nexus. It had the advantage, however, of leading me to 
the mother and son relationship in Chinese culture, which I am convinced can be milked for 
valuable discursive nourishing to resurrect the mother-daughter dyad. This I have attempted 
to do in the first section of this chapter in the context of my reading of both Raise the Red 
Lantern and Curse of the Golden Flower. 
 
As I have indicated at the outset of this chapter, my strategy attempting to reinvigorate 
maternal discourse in patriarchal societies, is a two-pronged pincer movement. Firstly, I seek 
a curative discourse for the troubled mother-daughter dyad in the thriving mother-son 
bonding in Chinese societies, as I believe I have done in my analysis of Zhang‟s Curse of the 
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Golden Flower, followed by attempting to locate an empowering discourse from an initiative 
emanating from the mother herself. The mother, as a metaphor for the “neglected” daughter, 
which she certainly represents herself, needs to move beyond denying men sex in order to 
negotiate peace for all, to an affirmative policy designed to retake her happiness and that of 
her equally entitled daughter. I examine such a discursive line in Zhang‟s film Yu Dou (1990) 
with Gong Li in the title role. 
 
I analyze Yu Dou within the context of Laura Mulvey‟s (1989a) influential paper in which she 
not only demonstrated that modern cinema is a device which allows men to pamper their 
infantile fears of m/other by exploiting the female image (the phallic “lack” igniting fear of 
castration) by way of the fetish, encapsulated in the concept of “the gaze”, and consequently 
denying the agency of women as “safe” stereotypes. Her proposed solution is that cinema 
should be destroyed. Compelling though Mulvey‟s argument is, it is fortunately not the only 
solution to the danger of cinema as this is formulated by her [Mulvey].  Constance Penley 
(1989) proposes that we need to contend with the possibility that the m/other might “return 
the look”. It is this profound idea which I draw out to explore the poss ibilities for the m/other 
to regain the initiative rather than the now jejune suggestion that she must accept her station 
as a mere object of the “male gaze”. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that the 
phenomenon of “mother-blaming” among women, both feminists and not, is a serious 
problem in the contemporary world. Showing m/other one possible way to assert her belief in 
her own entitlement (as Colette‟s uncompromising and unapologetic lifestyle evinced a very 
strong and powerful sense of entitlement, discussed earlier in this chapter) in this very 
sensitive region of mother/daughter relations, could go some distance in healing this rift.  
 
Ways of rethinking m/other as a courageous survivor and not as a victim are perhaps overdue.  
I consider Penley‟s proposition to engage constructively with patriarchy, which I aim to tease 
out in my analysis of Zhang‟s cinematic masterwork, Yu Dou, decidedly more fruitful that the 
suggestion of Mulvey‟s to seek ways of dismantling the screen culture. It is perhaps apt that 
an alternative solution to Mulvey‟s destructive, and yet understandable, answer is available in 
a cinematic version of media technologies.  
 
Before sketching out the narrative thrust in Yu Dou, I look at Penley‟s thesis in greater detail. 
Penley (1989:27-28) asks whether or not it is possible to cancel out the “imaginary relation 
between spectator and screen?” If I read her correctly, I understand this to be a reference to 
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the inbuilt feature of fetish in the screen culture and its understandably undesirable, 
oppressive nature, as I outline in Chapter Three. She quotes Stephen Heath‟s view that the 
important current task of feminism is not on procedure but on the machinations of the story-
line, that is, “the construction and relations of meaning and subject in a specific signifying 
practice” (p. 27). To illustrate, Penley goes on to point out that the efforts of many female 
filmmakers at present address feminist issues on cinema and not the modernist drive for the 
most creative answer to operational concerns. Her list of names include those of Chantal 
Akerman and Marguerite Duras, two French directors, and to which one could also add the 
work of the Chinese filmmakers such as that of Hong Li, who has documented, in narrative 
cinema, the role of women‟s labour in the New China as clearly linked to their gender.  
 
To return to Penley‟s argument on the urgent task at hand, to secure the interests of feminism 
in film, she argues persuasively against a “narrative which reunifies and rephallizes a 
spectator posed by the film as coherent and all-powerful” (at p. 28.) According to Penley this 
restructuring of the elements of narrative cinema is necessary to by-pass solutions to 
women‟s dilemmas which play into the hands of patriarchal expectations and traps laid in 
advance by the “master,” as I argue myself in Chapter Four. Penley (1989:28) puts her case 
very eloquently and it is worth the trouble quoting her own formulation: 
 
If filmic practice, like the fetishistic ritual, is an inscription of the look on the body of 
the mother, we must now begin to consider the possibilities and consequences of the 
mother returning that look. 
 
Penley makes some attempt to explain what she meant with this sentence in a long footnote 
on the same page and although her exposition is not without interest, I do not consider myself 
bound to it, as I take a different course in my interpretation of the sentence in question. My 
interest in Penley‟s formulation, quoted above, lies in what the mother‟s look conveys to the 
audience and in particular the sort of response I have in mind, namely compassion rather than 
eroticism. If this does not differ from Penley‟s own understanding of her well-composed idea, 
then I am in agreement with her interpretation. Zhang‟s Yu Dou (1990), historically the first 
production of the three I analyze in this chapter, conveys exactly what I hope to demonstrate 
in terms of the mother‟s engagement both as a m/other of a neglected daughter and as a 
neglected daughter herself, in particular Gong Li‟s acting in the title role. I aim to explicate 
the m/other‟s proposed role within the context of Gong Li‟s performance of her role as Yu 
Dou. 
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Both Raise the Red Lantern (1991) and Yu Dou (1990), the first and the last film I analyze in 
this Chapter, are set in rural villages in 1920s China during the so-called republican period 
(1911-1937) (Marchetti 2006:11), if we assume that the Japanese invasion in 1937 represents 
the “epistemological break” between the republic  and the onset of the communist regime in 
1949. In the narrative drive of Yu Dou, a young woman (Gong Li) is bought by an old, 
impotent man to be his new wife (her predecessor succumbed from beatings at his hand) and 
brought home for subjugation through sexual torture. The female lead bathes her tired abused 
body, as her husband‟s cousin Tianqing (Li Baotian, a familiar face in Zhang‟s filmic pieces) 
plays peeping tom.  He surveys her through the eyehole/keyhole which significantly, as I 
point out in the opening to this chapter, serves as a metaphor for men‟s voyeuristic daily 
observation of women generally. While Tianqing is in search of voyeuristic excitement, 
reminiscent of a male audience‟s groping for fetish props to belie the persistent threat of 
castration inherent in the sight of phallus- less m/other, a theme I explore in some detail in 
Chapter Three, Yu Dou turns to face him full-on and returns his look. This scene and its 
implications are essential to my exploration of Constance Penley‟s profound idea of the 
m/other meeting the male gaze by returning it, discussed above. Many commentators have 
analyzed this scene, but for my purposes I will merely quote a short extract from that of 
Jenny Lau‟s (Winter 1991-1992: 3). 
One finds that the explicit erotic content of the film – beginning when Judou 
deliberately turns around to expose her naked body to the peeping Tianqing – is not 
derived from the simple act of narcissism. Indeed, her tired, dirty, and bruised body, 
together with the melancholy accompanying music, offers no visual for Tianqing or the 
film audience. Judou‟s turning around represents a decisive move against gerontocratic 
and patriarchal rule that operates against her. 
The moment Yu Dou turns to answer Tianqing‟s look, a Copernican revolution occurs in the 
ways in which the m/other‟s body is transformed from an object of desire to a hurting subject 
non-verbally crying out for compassion and caring. I have deliberately refrained from placing 
the words object and subject in italics in the previous line since I wish to point out how 
dramatic the shift from the former to the latter is. Note how the keyhole (which serves as the 
spy hole registering Tianqing‟s observations of the battered body of Yu Dou/Gong Li) 
doubles as a camera or screen which shows up how cinematic experiences carry over into 
everyday unthinking practices. We relive the sight of glamorous female goddesses on the 
screen every time we catch sight of the female form. Feminists have pointed out how the 
consumption of pornography is driven by this all-consuming need by the male audience to 
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hold onto fetish objects. My point about the transformation of the m/other‟s body from 
sexualized object to wounded person demanding a different viewer paradigm, finds 
vindication in the remainder of the film sequences, which bring round Tianqing‟s “voyeuristic 
pleasure to embarrassed compassion” (Marchetti 2006:3). Do we have any clues or helpful 
suggestions to offer the mother in her quest/demand for compassion and care in an indifferent 
world, where the voyeur may not be consciously aware of his tendency to reduce a subject to 
an object for no reason other than his own insecurities, dating back to infantile fears without 
rational foundation? 
My response is affirmative. Tang et al (2010:548) argue that the evidence which they have 
gathered on contemporary relations between the genders in Chinese societies suggests that 
Chinese women are increasingly questioning and renegotiating the power imbalance between 
the sexes. In the same vein, Tani Barlow (2002:156) proposes that film and its commentary 
provide one arena where “the still unpredicated female subject” expresses an intense desire to 
search for room to be a woman beyond the “damaging codes of masculine gender 
performativity.” Two contemporary films she references which explore this theme are Xie 
Fei‟s Women of the Lake of Scented Souls and Huang Shuqin‟s Woman, Demon, Human. Gina 
Marchetti (2006:17-19) comes to the same conclusion as the Tang research team quoted 
above. Her point is that films such as Yu Dou and Raise the Red Lantern, analyzed above in 
this chapter (in the context of attempting to find a possible curative discursive regime to 
assuage the cruel rift between mothers and daughters in the contemporary world), 
successfully challenge and deepen the masculinity crisis in the Chinese world of authority. 
The Warrior Woman, as epitomized in novels such as that of Maxine Hong Kingston‟s The 
Warrior Woman: Memoir of a Childhood among Ghosts (2010), has achieved a most 
remarkable transformation in a globalized world made accessible not only by affordable 
travel but also by the enormous possibilities opened up by transnational and cross-cultural 
“screen culture”. To illustrate, the traditional “warrior woman,” as in Kingston‟s novel by the 
same name, was never able to assume a mandate for her own happiness but, in traditional 
Chinese society, could only take up the sword to defend or avenge Confucian filial (male) 
honour. On the cusp of the twenty-first century, however, helped along greatly by the 
pressures of globalization and enriched by ideas on sexuality and gender from other corners 
of the world, she is finally “able to transcend the dueling demands of Confucian obligations 
and postfeminist career expectations” (Marchetti 2006:19). Marchetti peppers her argument 
with references to several recent Chinese films such as Ann Hui‟s Summer Snow (1994), The 
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Bride with White Hair and Green Snake (both released in 1993) or Clara Law‟s Farewell, 
China (1990) and Autumn Moon (1992). In the latter two productions, as in many other recent 
Chinese films, a softening of the rigidity of gender role casting are palpably observable 
(Marchetti 2006:189), with the implication that gender privileges are also in the balance. To 
illustrate her argument, I briefly discuss two transnational Chinese cinematic productions. 
These are Wong Kar-wai‟s Chungking Express (1994) and Evans Chan‟s Crossings (1994).  
In my reading of Chungking Express, especially for a non-Chinese audience, is done in the 
context of what Rey Chow (Marchetti 2006: 53) has called the West‟s Orientalist imagining 
of China as a “feminized space.” Where, in this film, Chinese women circulated freely 
outside the confines of patriarchal rule, even the display of masses of consumer goods, no 
doubt standing in as a range of fetishes (canned fish and pineapples, sunglasses and the like), 
begin to take on a life of their own, with the consumer goods speaking and expressing 
feelings. Whereas Chungking Express (which is an allusion to Hong Kong‟s Midnight 
Express) can be read as a “double cinematic move” to fetishize, since it involves not only the 
actress wearing sunglasses and a raincoat, but a Chinese woman at that, I also read the film as 
a blurring of gender roles, in that women call the shots (the unnamed female star, Brigitte Lin, 
a Marilyn Monroe- lookalike, trumps her own expiry date, a reference to the count-down to 
Hong Kong‟s hand-over to the PRC on 1 July 1997). The relatively free circulation of women 
as opposed to Chinese men (who need to stay put, such as Cop 223 [Ho Chi-wu], left behind 
with a broken heart, to clean up the mess) casts Chinese men in the role of nurturers, which, 
as I point out below in my brief reference to Jane Campion‟s The Piano, is a significant move 
beyond the rigidity of gender expectations. Finally, the fact that the consumer goods engage 
in conversation blurs in important ways the distinction between fetish and women. Are 
consumer goods, fetish stand- ins par excellence, now returning the look as an act of 
compassionate alliance with the m/other?  
Fittingly, Chan‟s Crossings deals with issues of immigration, Western fascination with 
Chinese/ Far Asian women as an “orientalist” fetish, a concept already identified in Wong‟s 
Chungking Express, discussed above, and Chinese women‟s new identities as cosmopolitan 
citizens in Chinese diaspora communities across the world. Mo-Yung (Anita Yuen) enters 
New York illegally to follow her boyfriend Benny (Simon Yam), who turns out not to be a 
photographer but a drug runner (an allusion to the British Opium Wars?). In New York, Mo-
Yung meets Rubie (Lindzay Chan) and the women‟s intimate and confidential talks in a 
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coffee shop in Times Square sets the scene for a possible “new world” where women can 
indulge in being female beyond the crushing gender frames imposed by patriarchal 
oppressions. The compassion and caring (or mothering and nurturing, in feminist 
psychological terms) which they invest in each other, unlike the violated female characters in 
Zhang‟s Raise the Red Lantern, is a sheer pleasure to behold. Mo-Yung and Rubie listen to 
each other and their interaction emphasizes the idea of compassion through the very act of 
caring inherent in listening as a means of sharing. The symbol of the ear, which also doubles 
as a reference to Hong Kong, as a historic go-between in relations between mainland China 
and the West, and between Hong Kong and the PRC, is never far from the action (Marchetti 
2006:169, 171, 177-181). 
Listening is different for women. But so is travelling. Moving, as Marchetti (2006:181) points 
out, is a different matter for women than for men. Chinese women, such as Rubie and Mo-
Yung in Crossings, in moving or crossing beyond the acceptable or legitimate boundaries set 
for them, are not just a case of negotiating new environments, money, weather, and foreign 
cultures and immigration enforcements.  
For Chinese women in the context of the globalized Chinese diaspora, it is finally also an 
opportunity to escape the narrow confines of traditional Chinese morality and patriarchy. 
Caring, sharing and listening while the camera lingers in close-up shots on the vase of 
flowers, cups of coffee and overflowing ash-tray (brewing ambience rather than the violence 
of narrative penetration, as I argue in Chapter Three), shows us a new world beyond that so 
skillfully portrayed by Gong Li in Raise the Red Lantern, discussed earlier in this chapter. In 
that world caring and nurturing are only a dream in a cut-throat hell of scamming, a cruel and 
indifferent world of concubines, first wives and unrelenting competition for men and the 
resources they represent.  Finally, Joey (Ted Brunneti), who stalks Rubie, mistaking her as 
Japanese while she speaks perfect Cantonese and fluent British English, meets his “dream 
woman” (a Thai girl) whom he believes to possess the personality traits he values so highly in 
women (Marchetti 2006:175): submissiveness, loyalty, understanding, a m/other in shorthand. 
Joey‟s fetish for Asian women knows no specifics or differentiation and his mirage of his 
“ideal woman” (which might just be nothing other than m/other in a familiar guise) dissolves 
into a generalized stereotype which, as I argued in Chapter Three, feeds into the dangerous 
image of a powerful and withholding M/other. 
Chinese women such as the Empress (in Curse of the Golden Flower [2006]), Yu Dou (in the 
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film by the same title [1990]) and Song Lian (in Raise the Red Lantern [1991]) are turning 
around, though their bodies may be battered and bruised – “but pregnant with possibilities” 
(Marchetti 2006:18) – to return the look. The profound way in which the shape of a woman 
has come to represent (“allegorize” is Marchetti‟s word) freedom is indeed a moment worth 
commenting on. The dissenting or rebel discourse on gender, represented by Gong Li‟s 
characters, with underpinnings resonating on the dearth of discourse on the m/other, takes its 
place in the community of Chinese women‟s transnational / globalized/ Chinese diasporic 
new role as “warrior women” with a different mission, different mind-set and different 
priorities. Marchetti (2006:18) herself is worth quoting here. In her own words: “In genres as 
diverse as comedy, melodrama, fantasy, soft-core porn, and the martial arts action film, 
female protagonists take on the Chinese patriarchy and renegotiate their place within global 
Chinese society.” This is a trend which I consider to be very encouraging indeed, since if 
women – as the female lead in the three films of Zhang‟s and Gong Li‟s analyzed in this 
chapter attempts to do – begin a dialogue as a rule, and not as an exception, with men 
representing the unsustainability and unjustifiability of sexist assumptions between men and 
women, a sure change in the ideology which has kept us in this glass prison is inevitable.  I 
am further encouraged in my conclusions by the fact that I believe, as I will attempt to 
demonstrate briefly below, the mother‟s tendency to “return the look” (an insight which I 
gained partially by employing primarily a cross-cultural analysis in my reading of three 
cinematic Chinese artifacts), is not one exclusive to the Chinese experience.  
In non-Chinese cultures examples are to be found of the m/other‟s profound move, as so 
movingly and brilliantly portrayed by Gong Li in Zhang‟s masterpiece Yu Dou (1990), of 
transforming the voyeur into a compassionate fellow human being. I enumerate upon a few 
and I also invite the reader to think of examples drawn from her own world. In Jane 
Campion‟s internationally acclaimed film The Piano (1993), the mute English woman Ada 
(Holly Hunter), recently arrived fresh as a “postal bride” for her new husband Steward (Sam 
Neill) in colonial New Zealand, decides to “buy” back her piano, which was bartered away, 
together with an undertaking that Ada would instruct the new owner [him] in its use. The new 
owner of her beloved piano is their half-Maori neighbor, George Baines (Harvey Keitel). The 
deal is struck: George is allowed to touch her while Ada plays the piano, one lesson for every 
black key, for its eventual return. After a number of lessons, Baines decides to give her the 
piano anyway without the need for further compensation. What is Baines‟ rationalization?  
Simply this: “The arrangement makes a whore of you, and me wretched. I want you to care 
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for me, but you can‟t.” Campion‟s film has the great merit that the male viewer, the supposed 
voyeur, takes the initiative to enable the m/other to garner the confidence to show her bruised 
body and spirit. The film can also be read in another way which may even be more 
enlightening than my proposed first reading. I have argued in Chapter One that men can 
nurture (read: m/other) as well as women can, and it is my argument that Baines can also be 
understood as standing- in for the m/other in the scene referred to. In interviews with Susan 
Mitchell (1997a: 32, 34; 1997b:182 ), two well-known feminists, Erica Jong and Naomi Wolf, 
report that they have close bonds with nurturing biological fathers and husbands and, in 
Wolf‟s case, also a “mothering” brother. My point: both men and women can and do mother, 
and both are in a position to “return the look” and metamorphosise Kafka‟s cockroach back 
into a compassionate fellow human being.  
A second example from a non-Chinese culture on the m/other (whether it be male or female) 
regaining her entitlement to her own happiness and self-determination, and that of her 
children, is Toni Morrison‟s famous novel Beloved (1987). A film, based on the book, with 
Oprah Winfrey in the role of Sethe, was produced a decade later but as I have not seen the 
film, I will restrict my remarks to the book version. Morrison‟s narrative is based on the 
reported true incident of a runaway female slave, Margaret Garner, set in the American Deep 
South. In terms of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 fugitive slaves could now be pursued and 
recaptured across state lines. Sethe discovers this as she attempts to hide out in Ohio, after 
making her escape from Kentucky. As Sheriffs approach Margaret‟s/ Sethe‟s hide-out, she 
kills her youngest child and also attempts to kill her other three children. Her utter 
desperation at sparing her children the horrid fate of slavery is palpable and yet her 
courageous behaviour is simply incomprehensible to the white slave-owning community. I 
read Sethe‟s killing of her own “beloved” child – hence the title of both the book and the film 
– decidedly as a return of the look by the mother, who insists on denying patriarchy the right 
to determine her choices.  
Finally, consider the compassion involved in Jean Rhys‟s (herself a woman from Creole stock 
in the West Indies) reading of the tragic fate of Martha Mason, a Creole woman incarcerated 
in Rochester‟s attic in grim England, in Charlotte Brontë‟s rightfully famous nineteenth 
century novel Jane Eyre (1960). Rhys was so touched by the fate of Martha Mason, who like 
herself a Creole woman from the West Indies was battling racism in an uncanny, non-
nurturing  environment (England), that she wrote her own, equally famous novel, Wild 
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Sargasso Sea, in which she gives Martha Mason a life of her own. It might be worth recalling 
that Rhys battled with the slim text of Wild Sargasso Sea (1966) for many years while eking 
out an existence in London in reduced circumstances. Did Jean Rhys feel compelled to 
mother and protect the ghost of Martha Mason, as Sethe, also as a/n m/other, felt compelled 
to take control of a situation spinning out of control? I believe this to be true in both cases. 
If the m/other is still lurking under the surface across cinematic genres in the Western world, 
as I argue in Chapter Three, then we have something to learn from Chinese cinema, such as 
the three productions of Zhang dealt with in this chapter, but also from a great many other 
contemporary Chinese artifacts on offer, where the Mother does not threaten to erupt but has 
done so already. This must be seen in the context of Constance Penley‟s argument that it is 
m/other herself who retakes the initiative to “return the look”, and in the same process 
transmuting the audience‟s need for fetish drivers to that of compassion and caring.  
 
I argue at some length in Chapter One that feminist psychology on the psychic development 
and construction of women under conditions of patriarchal oppression, differentiated as it 
may be in time and space, has uncovered an important component in the cause of depression 
among women. Girls, unlike men, are unable to break with m/other and remain psychically 
united to her. At the same time, attempts to break the bond and move towards greater psychic 
individuation, are met with anger and envy by a mother who may not have had the same 
opportunities as her daughter, who now aspires to enjoy herself. It may almost certainly, as 
Kristeva demonstrates in applying her neo-Freudian model of abjection, lead to feelings of 
pity, self- loathing and resentment in the daughter, since she naturally identifies with mother 
as a gender partner. As will be recalled, I attempt to reconcile the approach of feminist 
psychology with that of Kristeva and I believe that I have done so successfully. This “push-
pull” dynamic in the mother/daughter relationship may never be resolved and, as Phyllis 
Chesler so ably showed, is the very hinge on which every woman‟s relationship-nexus with 
any other woman turns. In other words, a woman identifies with another woman, irrespective 
of age and entirely dependent on the other woman‟s psychic needs or strengths, with her as 
either a mother or a daughter. I argue that the well-documented, healthy relationship between 
Colette and her mother traversed in this chapter proves that dominant discourse on gender 
leaves chinks which may be explored for purposes of devising and building spaces of 
resistance. Hence the vital importance, as I argue in this chapter, of not neglecting the 
examination and resurrection of failed causes of the past. Examples are the despairing 
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situations (life and death struggle between concubines in the Master‟s house, being medicated 
by an overbearing husband with the intention of driving the wife crazy over time, and sexual 
abuse and cruelty in a marriage from which there in no escape) in which Gong Li‟s characters 
find themselves in the three films analyzed in this chapter. Why does the mother/daughter 
dyad have feminist political considerations and consequences? 
 
Apart from the two obvious features, which is that the mother/daughter relationship is both 
the cornerstone of a woman‟s psychic construction (Eichenbaum & Orbach 1988) and the 
hinge on which her relationship with every other woman turns (Chesler 2009), the quality of 
this primary bond in the contemporary world also has a less obvious political implication. 
Most women are unable, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, to move beyond reverence for 
the male icon (Coward 1993, Würtzel 2006). Chesler (2009:205), quoting the work of 
psychoanalyst Nini Herman, who agrees. She believes the fundamental problem explaining 
women‟s inability to embrace freedom and the “legacy of entitlement” which is its 
concomitant (values essential to a good mother/daughter relationship as I identified in 
Colette‟s relationship with Sido), is hidden in the seams of precisely that relationship.  
 
   Nini Herman believes that the unresolved issues “which are active at the core of       
the mother-daughter dyad” are, to some extent, what psychologically holds women 
back and accounts for women‟s unconscious collusion with patriarchal edicts. I 
agree. Nini Herman believes that the unexamined mother-daughter relationship is 
precisely where women are “obstinately marking time” rather than moving toward 
freedom. 
 
Perhaps women are not so much refusing to proceed beyond their current impasse as that they 
are unable to do so. In my examination of Colette‟s good relationship with Sido, recounted 
earlier in this chapter, I isolated the willingness to embrace personal freedom and an 
unconventional lifestyle, which it implies, as fundamentally important values which needs to 
be passed on from mother to daughter. Unless efforts are made to encourage mothers to be 
confident in their own abilities, so as to be spiritually generous enough to bequeath these 
priceless commodities to their daughters, it might be unlikely that women could bridge this 
horizon of incomprehension alone, without m/other. At the same time the daughter‟s “fear” of 
freedom, as 95% of agoraphobics are women (Joy Melville in Eichenbaum & Orbach 
1988:174n1), should not be underestimated. No doubt these writers are speaking from the 
perspective of women in the West. Smith (1991:1061) uses the same 
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metaphor, ”agoraphobia,” in her analysis of Kingston‟s novel/autobiography of Chinese 
women‟s crippling fear and psychic inability to move beyond the sexual and physical 
limitations placed on women‟s freedom.  In my view agoraphobia and many other similar 
affections in women, curbing their freedom of movement and choice of location in which to 
work and live, are rebel discourses, manifesting psychosomatically, protesting the inferior 
position of women in contemporary societies.   According to Luise Eichenbaum and Susie 
Orbach (1988:192) the process to undo women‟s deep-seated conviction of the justice of their 
own dis-entitlement and self- loathing will necessarily take many generations to implement as 
it requires a “psychic recasting” of both genders exorcised of woman-hatred and 
“unconscious sexism”. One such powerful interventionist strategy, as I suggested in my brief 
reading of Jane Campion‟s The Piano, is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that womanhood 
is synonymous with mothering (aptly also the battle cry of the second wave though perhaps 
worth repeating). Men, as I have argued in both this chapter and Chapter One, can potentially 
mother and nurture as well as women do although conceivably they will need both the space 
and the encouragement to develop the skills and the mindset necessary (Eichenbaum & 
Orbach 1988:193) for such a “cultural paradigm shift.” Taking the relentless pressure off 
women to nurture and care exclusively will allow them the vital space to breath and find 
themselves. Luce Irigaray, as reported by Elizabeth Grösz (1989:120), has expressed this idea 
very sharply in her writing, which is that “if the mother is uniquely mother, the child has no 
image of woman, and thus of sexual difference” (emphasis in the original). If and when both 
men and women care and nurture, the conditions would be in place which could allow 
maternal discourse to be liberated from its “assigned” role as a repressed other.  
 
Nobody expects a smooth path and the probability of repeated failure should not deter us. 
Every preliminary victory is likely to unleash a conservative “backlash” made up from the 
ranks of both men and women (Faludi 1992, English 1983). To paraphrase Rosa Luxemburg, 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, it is up to us to create, step by step, the correct 
conditions for successful revolt.  And for this important exercise, the Chinese perspective is 
telling indeed. Judith Arcana (1979:13, quoted in Fischer 1996:206) uses foot-binding as a 
powerful metaphor to explain this hurting yet cruc ial bond: “A mother‟s victimization does 
not merely humiliate her, it mutilates her daughter who watches her for clues as to what it 
means to be a woman. Like the traditional bound-foot Chinese woman, she passes on her 
affliction. The mother‟s self-hatred and low expectations are the binding rages for her 
daughter‟s psyche.” I could not have said it better myself, which is why I quote Arcana. 
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Should we be surprised that far more women suffer depression, a legacy certainly capable of 
being passed on from mother to susceptible daughter, in patriarchal societies than do men? 
 
I am convinced that the only true solution, assuming that to be a solution, to the problem of 
depression among women in the West – bearing in mind that it is the result of a patriarchal 
arrangement to keep women dependent and hooked on infantile love, a process in which one 
thing feeds off another while perpetuating the oppressive structures intact – is a radical 
restructuring of society. By this phrase, “a radical restructuring of society”, I do not mean the 
attempts throughout the twentieth century of a “complete overhaul of society” by utopian 
sympathizers with causes such as Communism, Maoism and other socialist causes. My idea 
is much more modest, which is the examination and possible resurrection of lost ghosts (as 
argued at the beginning of this chapter), discourse on m/other being a case in point. How is 
this to be achieved? 
 
The three productions of Zhang Yimou, starring Gong Li, show us one possibility. “I refuse to 
submit without a fight,” Empress Phoenix tells her beloved son Prince Jai in confidence. The 
great merit of the rebel or heterodox discourse, employed in these productions (where a 
woman‟s experience in coping and dealing with oppression [with and] on every level of her 
existence, is made available for mass consumption by other women, over and above orthodox 
discourse), lies in its ability to dissipate and dissolve the female stereotype. (Essentially this 
means the pure, sacrificing mother as opposed to the scheming evil b itch which is the 
prostitute.) Another boon of rebel discourse in cinema is captured in Tani Barlow‟s (2002:156) 
argument that it, together with other cultural productions (through brutalized efforts bound up 
with suffocating present gender structures) “feed[s] desires for things beyond” our present 
grasp. In the introduction to her essays on women and feminism, Katha Pollitt (1995:xiv) 
enthusiastically endorses Mary Wollstonecraft‟s plea for women to be seen as neither 
goddesses nor evil witches, but simply as “reasonable creatures” with the same failings and 
strengths as men. 
 
True to Kracauer, quoted at the outset together with Žižek, on the same theme, we should 
cultivate an interest in history so as to see what we can learn from defeats in the past for 
rekindling the flames of future revolutions. Hence my choice of cinema, as a marker of rebel 
discourse on gender, which leaves traces of the past in an age where the signified, life-and-
blood women, has been severed from the signifier (the representation of women in cultural 
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artifacts), so as to leave a sign divorced from all meaning save that which services male 
fantasies of the female (Kaplan1983a:310). The one message which Gong Li‟s three thespian 
offerings permit is one of defeat against overwhelming odds. Many women in (patriarchal) 
repressive society, such as contemporary Chinese culture, as noted above, may not be 
prepared to accept the challenge on these terms. The idea explored in this contribution is that 
women, suited to take up many incommensurable positions, are the ideal audience to 
communicate heterodox discourse, precisely because, in the words of Laura Mulvey (Kaplan 
1983a:321), women, left out of the (positive) Oedipus model (and certainly of parallel 
constructions in the East), have not been completely “colonized”, as I argued in Chapter 
Three. 
 
My point is that a stark, dystopic vision, such as the one we gather from the three films, is 
nonetheless nourishing. The strategy of stacking the stakes high in order to bring about 
drastic disruption in gender relations, is one which finds favour with Irving Goffman (1971: 
166, 199) and Pierre Bourdieu. Both argue that sharp social upheaval leads to a 
rearrangement of gender relationships. I have attempted to demonstrate this idea in Chapter 
Four with reference to both the Cultural Revolution and the period just before and after the 
founding of the first republic in 1911. But there is more to this idea than merely upping the 
stakes. I opened this chapter with reference to Žižek and Kracauer‟s plea for a celebration of 
lost causes. The lost causes I have in mind here are those espoused by the female protagonist 
(Gong Li) in the three films analyzed in this chapter, as I argue at its opening of this chapter. 
Tani Barlow, referred to above, puts it in a different, though eloquent way, which concerns 
the need for woman to be female outside the confusing, hurting ways in which our 
contemporary understanding of gender is straitjacketed or molded.  In Sophie Fiennes‟ 
documentary film, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012), Žižek, who manages the narration, 
argues, as I have in this chapter, that we need novel fantasies to escape the great danger of 
relapsing into patriarchal pre-determined “solutions.” At the same time, says Žižek, we need 
to search for ways to accommodate and celebrate the ghosts of lost causes (such as repressed 
maternal discourse) because only then can we be in a position to make a credible attempt to 
escape from the limitations of the horizon imposed on us by ideology. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter One I defined the problem, taking my cue from Kristeva’s writings on 
motherhood, as the neglect, on the one hand, and the suppression, on the other hand, of 
maternal discourse in the West. It will be recalled that, in particular, the mother-daughter 
dyad has suffered serious facture leading to depression and other mental maladies among 
women. The suggestion was made that discourse in another culture, contemporary mainland 
Chinese society as a case in point, might be able to offer considerations which might 
reinvigorate discourse in the West. 
In Chapter Two I outlined and discussed the various elements constituting a cross-cultural 
(feminist) approach. I have to concede that my choice of methodology is a perhaps novel way 
of reading cinema, although admittedly foreign cinema, and at the same time it is also a 
method which broke down almost immediately (as I documented my dilemma in Chapter 
Three). It is however an approach which allows us the wisdom to proceed “against the grain”, 
in the context of a culture very different from our own, in our reading of discursive 
formations  (as I attempt to do with Raise the Red Lantern [1991]), without falling into the 
pitfall of an understanding devoid of specific cultural parameters. As an example I referred to 
one range of different traditional forms of marriage, those among the Cantonese, in Chinese 
culture which is a far cry from the Western institution.   
 
In my reading of three Chinese cinematic texts in Chapter Five, I have aimed to suss out a 
possible curative discursive balm to assuage the troubled mother-daughter bond in the West 
(and possibly in most contemporary patriarchal societies, including Chinese societies.) 
Accordingly, in Raise the Red Lantern (1991), I examine the strife between women in Master 
Chen’s house against the backdrop of the theory of Phyllis Chesler (2009), so skilfully 
demonstrated in her book Woman’s Inhumanity Towards Woman, that a woman’s 
relationship with any other woman reflects the quality, the need and the hurting of the 
relationship which she had with her own m/other. In doing so, I make allowances for the fact 
that the relationship between women in Chinese societies may be based on a different 
dynamic than that of Chesler’s view (such as Margery Wolf’s idea of “uterine” power) which 
builds on the feminist understanding of woman’s psychology that the structure of a woman’s 
psyche under conditions of patriarchal oppression(s) hinges on her relationship with her 
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mother (which, as a general rule, is poor and fractured). As I do not find the mother-daughter 
relationship in Chinese societies of much help, I turn my attention next to the mother-son 
dyad.  
 
In The Curse of the Golden Flower (2006), I find a good model in the mother-son 
relationship as a possible answer to the fraught mother-daughter bond. In comparing the 
features of the former relationship, which is a general rule in Chinese societies - dating, 
according to Cole (1998), from the introduction of Buddhism into Chinese culture some two 
thousand years ago - to a good mother-daughter bond, an exception to the rule, in the West 
(that between Colette and Sido), I draw two conclusions. A good mother-child bond (be that 
son or daughter) has two important prerequisites from an inter-cultural perspective. Firstly, 
m/other must have enough confidence in herself to allow her child freedom to be and become 
her/himself. Secondly, an unconventional notion of morality, especially for a daughter, is 
imperative as conventional morality (femininity, marriage, children) might just lead her back 
into the labyrinth of the dominant discourse on gender. It might be worth noting that, as 
Kristeva has remarked (quoted in Chapter One), it is essential to be an “outsider” (as I am in 
relation to Chinese culture) in order to discover something novel in that society, which could 
benefit the home culture.  
 
Finally, in my reading of Yu Dou (1990), I shift the focus from the daughter to the mother 
herself by employing Patrice Petro’s profound idea of the mother taking the initiative to 
return the voyeuristic look, inherent in cinema generally, and exposing her tired, broken 
female form to the male gaze at the eye-hole. In “returning the gaze”, the m/other “retakes the 
night” by bringing about a Copernican revolution in gender relations. The male gaze is 
transformed from that of a voyeur to one of compassion and caring. I conclude my 
deliberations on the three cinematic texts of Zhang’s by developing and demonstrating my 
proposal that both men and women can care and nurture, and that an initiative to help men 
explore their capacity and willingness to “m/other,” will go a long way toward taking the 
pressure off women to care and nurture – allowing them much needed space and time to be 
and develop themselves. 
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It is curious that I have unearthed a rebel cinematic discourse on gender in Chinese screen 
culture as a possible answer to Kristeva’s concern about the scarcity of dominant discourse 
on maternity, in the light of the demise of Christianity (traditionally understood) in Europe 
and European diaspora communities. But even if my proposed solution does not address 
Kristeva’s problem as she originally formulated it (her essay “Stabat Mater” was first 
published in the Northern winter of 1977), which is to help women who might wish to 
experience the jouissance of motherhood, I argue that the fruits of a rebel discourse to 
assuage the hurting, devastating m/other-daughter dyad, is also likely to revitalize dominant 
discourse on maternity in surprising new ways. Consider the lesson in Yu Dou (1990), 
elaborated on above. Gong Li transforms the embarrassed peeping tom Tianqing’s 
pornographic intentions into one of compassion and caring by skilful “strategic intervention”. 
In the final analysis, my claim is that the extension of nurturing and reciprocal respect to the 
m/other (recall that she is after all also a needy daughter hungry for caring) cannot but have a 
beneficial influence on dominant discourse on maternity (even Kristeva’s suppressed model).  
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